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Scooter
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The phenomenon which I have just described also accounts for the feeble
manner in which German interests are promoted and defended by a section
of the clergy.

Such conduct is not the manifestation of a malicious intent, nor is it
the outcome of orders given from 'above', as we say; but such a lack of
national grit and determination is due to defects in our educational
system. For, instead of inculcating in the youth a lively sense of their
German nationality, the aim of the educational system is to make the
youth prostrate themselves in homage to the idea, as if the idea were an
idol.

The education which makes them the devotees of such abstract notions as
'Democracy', 'International Socialism', 'Pacifism', etc., is so
hard-and-fast and exclusive and, operating as it does from within
outwards, is so purely subjective that in forming their general picture
of outside life as a whole they are fundamentally influenced by these
A PRIORI notions. But, on the other hand, the attitude towards their own
German nationality has been very objective from youth upwards. The
Pacifist--in so far as he is a German--who surrenders himself
subjectively, body and soul, to the dictates of his dogmatic principles,
will always first consider the objective right or wrong of a situation
when danger threatens his own people, even though that danger be grave
and unjustly wrought from outside. But he will never take his stand in
the ranks of his own people and fight for and with them from the sheer
instinct of self-preservation.

Another example may further illustrate how far this applies to the
different religious denominations. In so far as its origin and tradition
are based on German ideals, Protestantism of itself defends those ideals
better. But it fails the moment it is called upon to defend national
interests which do not belong to the sphere of its ideals and
traditional development, or which, for some reason or other, may be
rejected by that sphere.

Therefore Protestantism will always take its part in promoting German
ideals as far as concerns moral integrity or national education, when
the German spiritual being or language or spiritual freedom are to be
defended: because these represent the principles on which Protestantism
itself is grounded. But this same Protestantism violently opposes every
attempt to rescue the nation from the clutches of its mortal enemy;
because the Protestant attitude towards the Jews is more or less rigidly
and dogmatically fixed. And yet this is the first problem which has to
be solved, unless all attempts to bring about a German resurgence or to
raise the level of the nation's standing are doomed to turn out
nonsensical and impossible.

During my sojourn in Vienna I had ample leisure and opportunity to study
this problem without allowing any prejudices to intervene; and in my
daily intercourse with people I was able to establish the correctness of
the opinion I formed by the test of thousands of instances.

In this focus where the greatest varieties of nationality had converged
it was quite clear and open to everybody to see that the German pacifist
was always and exclusively the one who tried to consider the interests
of his own nation objectively; but you could never find a Jew who took a
similar attitude towards his own race. Furthermore, I found that only
the German Socialist is 'international' in the sense that he feels
himself obliged not to demand justice for his own people in any other
manner than by whining and wailing to his international comrades. Nobody
could ever reproach Czechs or Poles or other nations with such conduct.
In short, even at that time, already I recognized that this evil is only
partly a result of the doctrines taught by Socialism, Pacifism, etc.,
but mainly the result of our totally inadequate system of education, the
defects of which are responsible for the lack of devotion to our own
national ideals.

Therefore the first theoretical argument advanced by the Pan-German
leaders as the basis of their offensive against Catholicism was quite
entenable.

The only way to remedy the evil I have been speaking of is to train the
Germans from youth upwards to an absolute recognition of the rights of
their own people, instead of poisoning their minds, while they are still
only children, with the virus of this curbed 'objectivity', even in
matters concerning the very maintenance of our own existence. The result
of this would be that the Catholic in Germany, just as in Ireland,
Poland or France, will be a German first and foremost. But all this
presupposes a radical change in the national government.

The strongest proof in support of my contention is furnished by what
took place at that historical juncture when our people were called for
the last time before the tribunal of History to defend their own
existence, in a life-or-death struggle.

As long as there was no lack of leadership in the higher circles, the
people fulfilled their duty and obligations to an overwhelming extent.
Whether Protestant pastor or Catholic priest, each did his very utmost
in helping our powers of resistance to hold out, not only in the
trenches but also, and even more so, at home. During those years, and
especially during the first outburst of enthusiasm, in both religious
camps there was one undivided and sacred German Empire for whose
preservation and future existence they all prayed to Heaven.

The Pan-German Movement in Austria ought to have asked itself this one
question: Is the maintenance of the German element in Austria possible
or not, as long as that element remains within the fold of the Catholic
Faith? If that question should have been answered in the affirmative,
then the political Party should not have meddled in religious and
denominational questions. But if the question had to be answered in the
negative, then a religious reformation should have been started and not
a political party movement.

Anyone who believes that a religious reformation can be achieved through
the agency of a political organization shows that he has no idea of the
development of religious conceptions and doctrines of faith and how
these are given practical effect by the Church.

No man can serve two masters. And I hold that the foundation or
overthrow of a religion has far greater consequences than the foundation
or overthrow of a State, to say nothing of a Party.

It is no argument to the contrary to say that the attacks were only
defensive measures against attacks from the other side.

Undoubtedly there have always been unscrupulous rogues who did not
hesitate to degrade religion to the base uses of politics. Nearly always
such a people had nothing else in their minds except to make a business
of religions and politics. But on the other hand it would be wrong to
hold religion itself, or a religious denomination, responsible for a
number of rascals who exploit the Church for their own base interests
just as they would exploit anything else in which they had a part.

Nothing could be more to the taste of one of these parliamentary
loungers and tricksters than to be able to find a scapegoat for his
political sharp-practice--after the event, of course. The moment
religion or a religious denomination is attacked and made responsible
for his personal misdeeds this shrewd fellow will raise a row at once
and call the world to witness how justified he was in acting as he did,
proclaiming that he and his eloquence alone have saved religion and the
Church. The public, which is mostly stupid and has a very short memory,
is not capable of recognizing the real instigator of the quarrel in the
midst of the turmoil that has been raised. Frequently it does not
remember the beginning of the fight and so the rogue gets by with his
stunt.

A cunning fellow of that sort is quite well aware that his misdeeds have
nothing to do with religion. And so he will laugh up his sleeve all the
more heartily when his honest but artless adversary loses the game and,
one day losing all faith in humanity, retires from the activities of
public life.

But from another viewpoint also it would be wrong to make religion, or
the Church as such, responsible for the misdeeds of individuals. If one
compares the magnitude of the organization, as it stands visible to
every eye, with the average weakness of human nature we shall have to
admit that the proportion of good to bad is more favourable here than
anywhere else. Among the priests there may, of course, be some who use
their sacred calling to further their political ambitions. There are
clergy who unfortunately forget that in the political mêlée they ought
to be the paladins of the more sublime truths and not the abettors of
falsehood and slander. But for each one of these unworthy specimens we
can find a thousand or more who fulfil their mission nobly as the
trustworthy guardians of souls and who tower above the level of our
corrupt epoch, as little islands above the seaswamp.

I cannot condemn the Church as such, and I should feel quite as little
justified in doing so if some depraved person in the robe of a priest
commits some offence against the moral law. Nor should I for a moment
think of blaming the Church if one of its innumerable members betrays
and besmirches his compatriots, especially not in epochs when such
conduct is quite common. We must not forget, particularly in our day,
that for one such Ephialtes (Note 7) there are a thousand whose hearts
bleed in sympathy with their people during these years of misfortune and
who, together with the best of our nation, yearn for the hour when fortune
will smile on us again.

[Note 7. Herodotus (Book VII, 213-218) tells the story of how a Greek
traitor, Ephialtes, helped the Persian invaders at the Battle of
Thermopylae (480 B.C.) When the Persian King, Xerxes, had begun to
despair of being able tobreak through the Greek defence, Ephialtes came
to him and, on being promiseda definite payment, told the King of a
pathway over the shoulder of the mountainto the Greek end of the Pass.
The bargain being clinched, Ephialtes led adetachment of the Persian
troops under General Hydarnes over the mountainpathway. Thus taken in
the rear, the Greek defenders, under Leonidas, King of Sparta, had to
fight in two opposite directions within the narrow pass. Terrible
slaughter ensued and Leonidas fell in the thick of the fighting.

The bravery of Leonidas and the treason of Ephialtes impressed Hitler,
asit does almost every schoolboy. The incident is referred to again in
MEIN KAMPF (Chap. VIII, Vol. I), where Hitler compares the German troops
thatfell in France and Flanders to the Greeks at Thermopylae, the
treachery of Ephialtes being suggested as the prototype of the defeatist
policy of the German politicians towards the end of the Great War.]

If it be objected that here we are concerned not with the petty problems
of everyday life but principally with fundamental truths and questions
of dogma, the only way of answering that objection is to ask a question:

Do you feel that Providence has called you to proclaim the Truth to the
world? If so, then go and do it. But you ought to have the courage to do
it directly and not use some political party as your mouthpiece; for in
this way you shirk your vocation. In the place of something that now
exists and is bad put something else that is better and will last into
the future.

If you lack the requisite courage or if you yourself do not know clearly
what your better substitute ought to be, leave the whole thing alone.
But, whatever happens, do not try to reach the goal by the roundabout
way of a political party if you are not brave enough to fight with your
visor lifted.

Political parties have no right to meddle in religious questions except
when these relate to something that is alien to the national well-being
and thus calculated to undermine racial customs and morals.

If some ecclesiastical dignitaries should misuse religious ceremonies or
religious teaching to injure their own nation their opponents ought
never to take the same road and fight them with the same weapons.

To a political leader the religious teachings and practices of his
people should be sacred and inviolable. Otherwise he should not be a
statesman but a reformer, if he has the necessary qualities for such a
mission.

Any other line of conduct will lead to disaster, especially in Germany.

In studying the Pan-German Movement and its conflict with Rome I was
then firmly persuaded, and especially in the course of later years, that
by their failure to understand the importance of the social problem the
Pan-Germanists lost the support of the broad masses, who are the
indispensable combatants in such a movement. By entering Parliament the
Pan-German leaders deprived themselves of the great driving force which
resides in the masses and at the same time they laid on their own
shoulders all the defects of the parliamentary institution. Their
struggle against the Church made their position impossible in numerous
circles of the lower and middle class, while at the same time it robbed
them of innumerable high-class elements--some of the best indeed that
the nation possessed. The practical outcome of the Austrian Kulturkampf
was negative.

Although they succeeded in winning 100,000 members away from the Church,
that did not do much harm to the latter. The Church did not really need
to shed any tears over these lost sheep, for it lost only those who had
for a long time ceased to belong to it in their inner hearts. The
difference between this new reformation and the great Reformation was
that in the historic epoch of the great Reformation some of the best
members left the Church because of religious convictions, whereas in
this new reformation only those left who had been indifferent before and
who were now influenced by political considerations. From the political
point of view alone the result was as ridiculous as it was deplorable.

Once again a political movement which had promised so much for the
German nation collapsed, because it was not conducted in a spirit of
unflinching adherence to naked reality, but lost itself in fields where
it was bound to get broken up.

The Pan-German Movement would never have made this mistake if it had
properly understood the PSYCHE of the broad masses. If the leaders had
known that, for psychological reasons alone, it is not expedient to
place two or more sets of adversaries before the masses--since that
leads to a complete splitting up of their fighting strength--they would
have concentrated the full and undivided force of their attack against a
single adversary. Nothing in the policy of a political party is so
fraught with danger as to allow its decisions to be directed by people
who want to have their fingers in every pie though they do not know how
to cook the simplest dish.

But even though there is much that can really be said against the
various religious denominations, political leaders must not forget that
the experience of history teaches us that no purely political party in
similar circumstances ever succeeded in bringing about a religious
reformation. One does not study history for the purpose of forgetting or
mistrusting its lessons afterwards, when the time comes to apply these
lessons in practice. It would be a mistake to believe that in this
particular case things were different, so that the eternal truths of
history were no longer applicable. One learns history in order to be
able to apply its lessons to the present time and whoever fails to do
this cannot pretend to be a political leader. In reality he is quite a
superficial person or, as is mostly the case, a conceited simpleton
whose good intentions cannot make up for his incompetence in practical
affairs.

The art of leadership, as displayed by really great popular leaders in
all ages, consists in consolidating the attention of the people against
a single adversary and taking care that nothing will split up that
attention into sections. The more the militant energies of the people
are directed towards one objective the more will new recruits join the
movement, attracted by the magnetism of its unified action, and thus the
striking power will be all the more enhanced. The leader of genius must
have the ability to make different opponents appear as if they belonged
to the one category; for weak and wavering natures among a leader's
following may easily begin to be dubious about the justice of their own
cause if they have to face different enemies.

As soon as the vacillating masses find themselves facing an opposition
that is made up of different groups of enemies their sense of
objectivity will be aroused and they will ask how is it that all the
others can be in the wrong and they themselves, and their movement,
alone in the right.

Such a feeling would be the first step towards a paralysis of their
fighting vigour. Where there are various enemies who are split up into
divergent groups it will be necessary to block them all together as
forming one solid front, so that the mass of followers in a popular
movement may see only one common enemy against whom they have to fight.
Such uniformity intensifies their belief in the justice of their own
cause and strengthens their feeling of hostility towards the opponent.

The Pan-German Movement was unsuccessful because the leaders did not
grasp the significance of that truth. They saw the goal clearly and
their intentions were right; but they took the wrong road. Their action
may be compared to that of an Alpine climber who never loses sight of
the peak he wants to reach, who has set out with the greatest
determination and energy, but pays no attention to the road beneath his
feet. With his eye always fixed firmly on the goal he does not think
over or notice the nature of the ascent and finally he fails.

The manner in which the great rival of the Pan-German Party set out to
attain its goal was quite different. The way it took was well and
shrewdly chosen; but it did not have a clear vision of the goal. In
almost all the questions where the Pan-German Movement failed, the
policy of the Christian-Socialist Party was correct and systematic.

They assessed the importance of the masses correctly, and thus they
gained the support of large numbers of the popular masses by emphasizing
the social character of the Movement from the very start. By directing
their appeal especially to the lower middle class and the artisans, they
gained adherents who were faithful, persevering and self-sacrificing.
The Christian-Socialist leaders took care to avoid all controversy with
the institutions of religion and thus they secured the support of that
mighty organization, the Catholic Church. Those leaders recognized the
value of propaganda on a large scale and they were veritable virtuosos
in working up the spiritual instincts of the broad masses of their
adherents.

The failure of this Party to carry into effect the dream of saving
Austria from dissolution must be attributed to two main defects in the
means they employed and also the lack of a clear perception of the ends
they wished to reach.

The anti-Semitism of the Christian-Socialists was based on religious
instead of racial principles. The reason for this mistake gave rise to
the second error also.

The founders of the Christian-Socialist Party were of the opinion that
they could not base their position on the racial principle if they
wished to save Austria, because they felt that a general disintegration
of the State might quickly result from the adoption of such a policy. In
the opinion of the Party chiefs the situation in Vienna demanded that
all factors which tended to estrange the nationalities from one another
should be carefully avoided and that all factors making for unity should
be encouraged.

At that time Vienna was so honeycombed with foreign elements, especially
the Czechs, that the greatest amount of tolerance was necessary if these
elements were to be enlisted in the ranks of any party that was not
anti-German on principle. If Austria was to be saved those elements were
indispensable. And so attempts were made to win the support of the small
traders, a great number of whom were Czechs, by combating the liberalism
of the Manchester School; and they believed that by adopting this
attitude they had found a slogan against Jewry which, because of its
religious implications, would unite all the different nationalities
which made up the population of the old Austria.

It was obvious, however, that this kind of anti-Semitism did not upset
the Jews very much, simply because it had a purely religious foundation.
If the worst came to the worst a few drops of baptismal water would
settle the matter, hereupon the Jew could still carry on his business
safely and at the same time retain his Jewish nationality.

On such superficial grounds it was impossible to deal with the whole
problem in an earnest and rational way. The consequence was that many
people could not understand this kind of anti-Semitism and therefore
refused to take part in it.

The attractive force of the idea was thus restricted exclusively to
narrow-minded circles, because the leaders failed to go beyond the mere
emotional appeal and did not ground their position on a truly rational
basis. The intellectuals were opposed to such a policy on principle. It
looked more and more as if the whole movement was a new attempt to
proselytize the Jews, or, on the other hand, as if it were merely
organized from the wish to compete with other contemporary movements.
Thus the struggle lost all traces of having been organized for a
spiritual and sublime mission. Indeed, it seemed to some people--and
these were by no means worthless elements--to be immoral and
reprehensible. The movement failed to awaken a belief that here there
was a problem of vital importance for the whole of humanity and on the
solution of which the destiny of the whole Gentile world depended.

Through this shilly-shally way of dealing with the problem the
anti-Semitism of the Christian-Socialists turned out to be quite
ineffective.

It was anti-Semitic only in outward appearance. And this was worse than
if it had made no pretences at all to anti-Semitism; for the pretence
gave rise to a false sense of security among people who believed that
the enemy had been taken by the ears; but, as a matter of fact, the
people themselves were being led by the nose.

The Jew readily adjusted himself to this form of anti-Semitism and found
its continuance more profitable to him than its abolition would be.

This whole movement led to great sacrifices being made for the sake of
that State which was composed of many heterogeneous nationalities; but
much greater sacrifices had to be made by the trustees of the German
element.

One did not dare to be 'nationalist', even in Vienna, lest the ground
should fall away from under one's feet. It was hoped that the Habsburg
State might be saved by a silent evasion of the nationalist question;
but this policy led that State to ruin. The same policy also led to the
collapse of Christian Socialism, for thus the Movement was deprived of
the only source of energy from which a political party can draw the
necessary driving force.

During those years I carefully followed the two movements and observed
how they developed, one because my heart was with it and the other
because of my admiration for that remarkable man who then appeared to me
as a bitter symbol of the whole German population in Austria.

When the imposing funeral CORTÈGE of the dead Burgomaster wound its way
from the City Hall towards the Ring Strasse I stood among the hundreds
of thousands who watched the solemn procession pass by. As I stood there
I felt deeply moved, and my instinct clearly told me that the work of
this man was all in vain, because a sinister Fate was inexorably leading
this State to its downfall. If Dr. Karl Lueger had lived in Germany he
would have been ranked among the great leaders of our people. It was a
misfortune for his work and for himseif that he had to live in this
impossible State.

When he died the fire had already been enkindled in the Balkans and was
spreading month by month. Fate had been merciful in sparing him the
sight of what, even to the last, he had hoped to prevent.

I endeavoured to analyse the cause which rendered one of those movements
futile and wrecked the progress of the other. The result of this
investigation was the profound conviction that, apart from the inherent
impossibility of consolidating the position of the State in the old
Austria, the two parties made the following fatal mistake:

The Pan-German Party was perfectly right in its fundamental ideas
regarding the aim of the Movement, which was to bring about a German
restoration, but it was unfortunate in its choice of means. It was
nationalist, but unfortunately it paid too little heed to the social
problem, and thus it failed to gain the support of the masses. Its
anti-Jewish policy, however, was grounded on a correct perception of the
significance of the racial problem and not on religious principles. But
it was mistaken in its assessment of facts and adopted the wrong tactics
when it made war against one of the religious denominations.

The Christian-Socialist Movement had only a vague concept of a German
revival as part of its object, but it was intelligent and fortunate in
the choice of means to carry out its policy as a Party. The
Christian-Socialists grasped the significance of the social question;
but they adopted the wrong principles in their struggle against Jewry,
and they utterly failed to appreciate the value of the national idea as
a source of political energy.

If the Christian-Socialist Party, together with its shrewd judgment in
regard to the worth of the popular masses, had only judged rightly also
on the importance of the racial problem--which was properly grasped by
the Pan-German Movement--and if this party had been really nationalist;
or if the Pan-German leaders, on the other hand, in addition to their
correct judgment of the Jewish problem and of the national idea, had
adopted the practical wisdom of the Christian-Socialist Party, and
particularly their attitude towards Socialism--then a movement would
have developed which, in my opinion, might at that time have
successfully altered the course of German destiny.

If things did not turn out thus, the fault lay for the most part in the
inherent nature of the Austrian State.

I did not find my own convictions upheld by any party then in existence,
and so I could not bring myself to enlist as a member in any of the
existing organizations or even lend a hand in their struggle. Even at
that time all those organizations seemed to me to be already jaded in
their energies and were therefore incapable of bringing about a national
revival of the German people in a really profound way, not merely
outwardly.

My inner aversion to the Habsburg State was increasing daily.

The more I paid special attention to questions of foreign policy, the
more the conviction grew upon me that this phantom State would surely
bring misfortune on the Germans. I realized more and more that the
destiny of the German nation could not be decisively influenced from
here but only in the German Empire itself. And this was true not only in
regard to general political questions but also--and in no less a
degree--in regard to the whole sphere of cultural life.

Here, also, in all matters affecting the national culture and art, the
Austrian State showed all the signs of senile decrepitude, or at least
it was ceasing to be of any consequence to the German nation, as far as
these matters were concerned. This was especially true of its
architecture. Modern architecture could not produce any great results in
Austria because, since the building of the Ring Strasse--at least in
Vienna--architectural activities had become insignificant when compared
with the progressive plans which were being thought out in Germany.

And so I came more and more to lead what may be called a twofold
existence. Reason and reality forced me to continue my harsh
apprenticeship in Austria, though I must now say that this
apprenticeship turned out fortunate in the end. But my heart was
elsewhere.

A feeling of discontent grew upon me and made me depressed the more I
came to realize the inside hollowness of this State and the
impossibility of saving it from collapse. At the same time I felt
perfectly certain that it would bring all kinds of misfortune to the
German people.

I was convinced that the Habsburg State would balk and hinder every
German who might show signs of real greatness, while at the same time it
would aid and abet every non-German activity.

This conglomerate spectacle of heterogeneous races which the capital of
the Dual Monarchy presented, this motley of Czechs, Poles, Hungarians,
Ruthenians, Serbs and Croats, etc., and always that bacillus which is
the solvent of human society, the Jew, here and there and
everywhere--the whole spectacle was repugnant to me. The gigantic city
seemed to be the incarnation of mongrel depravity.

The German language, which I had spoken from the time of my boyhood, was
the vernacular idiom of Lower Bavaria. I never forgot that particular
style of speech, and I could never learn the Viennese dialect. The
longer I lived in that city the stronger became my hatred for the
promiscuous swarm of foreign peoples which had begun to batten on that
old nursery ground of German culture. The idea that this State could
maintain its further existence for any considerable time was quite
absurd.

Austria was then like a piece of ancient mosaic in which the cohesive
cement had dried up and become old and friable. As long as such a work
of art remains untouched it may hold together and continue to exist; but
the moment some blow is struck on it then it breaks up into thousands of
fragments. Therefore it was now only a question of when the blow would
come.

Because my heart was always with the German Empire and not with the
Austrian Monarchy, the hour of Austria's dissolution as a State appeared
to me only as the first step towards the emancipation of the German
nation.

All these considerations intensified my yearning to depart for that
country for which my heart had been secretly longing since the days of
my youth.

I hoped that one day I might be able to make my mark as an architect and
that I could devote my talents to the service of my country on a large
or small scale, according to the will of Fate.

A final reason was that I longed to be among those who lived and worked
in that land from which the movement should be launched, the object of
which would be the fulfilment of what my heart had always longed for,
namely, the union of the country in which I was born with our common
fatherland, the German Empire.

There are many who may not understand how such a yearning can be so
strong; but I appeal especially to two groups of people. The first
includes all those who are still denied the happiness I have spoken of,
and the second embraces those who once enjoyed that happiness but had it
torn from them by a harsh fate. I turn to all those who have been torn
from their motherland and who have to struggle for the preservation of
their most sacred patrimony, their native language, persecuted and
harried because of their loyalty and love for the homeland, yearning
sadly for the hour when they will be allowed to return to the bosom of
their father's household. To these I address my words, and I know that
they will understand.

Only he who has experienced in his own inner life what it means to be
German and yet to be denied the right of belonging to his fatherland can
appreciate the profound nostalgia which that enforced exile causes. It
is a perpetual heartache, and there is no place for joy and contentment
until the doors of paternal home are thrown open and all those through
whose veins kindred blood is flowing will find peace and rest in their
common REICH.

Vienna was a hard school for me; but it taught me the most profound
lessons of my life. I was scarcely more than a boy when I came to live
there, and when I left it I had grown to be a man of a grave and pensive
nature. In Vienna I acquired the foundations of a WELTANSCHAUUNG in
general and developed a faculty for analysing political questions in
particular. That WELTANSCHAUUNG and the political ideas then formed
have never been abandoned, though they were expanded later on in some
directions. It is only now that I can fully appreciate how valuable
those years of apprenticeship were for me.

That is why I have given a detailed account of this period. There, in
Vienna, stark reality taught me the truths that now form the fundamental
principles of the Party which within the course of five years has grown
from modest beginnings to a great mass movement. I do not know what my
attitude towards Jewry, Social-Democracy, or rather Marxism in general,
to the social problem, etc., would be to-day if I had not acquired a
stock of personal beliefs at such an early age, by dint of hard study
and under the duress of Fate.

For, although the misfortunes of the Fatherland may have stimulated
thousands and thousands to ponder over the inner causes of the collapse,
that could not lead to such a thorough knowledge and deep insight as a
man may develop who has fought a hard struggle for many years so that he
might be master of his own fate.
"If you don't have a seat at the table, you're on the menu."

-- Author unknown

User avatar
Scooter
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Location: Toronto, ON

Re: "Upload Failure"

Post by Scooter »

CHAPTER IV



MUNICH


At last I came to Munich, in the spring of 1912.

The city itself was as familiar to me as if I had lived for years within
its walls.

This was because my studies in architecture had been constantly turning
my attention to the metropolis of German art. One must know Munich if
one would know Germany, and it is impossible to acquire a knowledge of
German art without seeing Munich.

All things considered, this pre-war sojourn was by far the happiest and
most contented time of my life. My earnings were very slender; but after
all I did not live for the sake of painting. I painted in order to get
the bare necessities of existence while I continued my studies. I was
firmly convinced that I should finally succeed in reaching the goal I
had marked out for myself. And this conviction alone was strong enough
to enable me to bear the petty hardships of everyday life without
worrying very much about them.

Moreover, almost from the very first moment of my sojourn there I came
to love that city more than any other place known to me. A German city!
I said to myself. How different to Vienna. It was with a feeling of
disgust that my imagination reverted to that Babylon of races. Another
pleasant feature here was the way the people spoke German, which was
much nearer my own way of speaking than the Viennese idiom. The Munich
idiom recalled the days of my youth, especially when I spoke with those
who had come to Munich from Lower Bavaria. There were a thousand or more
things which I inwardly loved or which I came to love during the course
of my stay. But what attracted me most was the marvellous wedlock of
native folk-energy with the fine artistic spirit of the city, that
unique harmony from the Hofbräuhaus to the Odeon, from the October
Festival to the PINAKOTHEK, etc. The reason why my heart's strings are
entwined around this city as around no other spot in this world is
probably because Munich is and will remain inseparably connected with
the development of my own career; and the fact that from the beginning
of my visit I felt inwardly happy and contented is to be attributed to
the charm of the marvellous Wittelsbach Capital, which has attracted
probably everybody who is blessed with a feeling for beauty instead of
commercial instincts.

Apart from my professional work, I was most interested in the study of
current political events, particularly those which were connected with
foreign relations. I approached these by way of the German policy of
alliances which, ever since my Austrian days, I had considered to be an
utterly mistaken one. But in Vienna I had not yet seen quite clearly how
far the German Empire had gone in the process of' self-delusion. In
Vienna I was inclined to assume, or probably I persuaded myself to do so
in order to excuse the German mistake, that possibly the authorities in
Berlin knew how weak and unreliable their ally would prove to be when
brought face to face with realities, but that, for more or less
mysterious reasons, they refrained from allowing their opinions on this
point to be known in public. Their idea was that they should support the
policy of alliances which Bismarck had initiated and the sudden
discontinuance of which might be undesirable, if for no other reason
than that it might arouse those foreign countries which were lying in
wait for their chance or might alarm the Philistines at home.

But my contact with the people soon taught me, to my horror, that my
assumptions were wrong. I was amazed to find everywhere, even in circles
otherwise well informed, that nobody had the slightest intimation of the
real character of the Habsburg Monarchy. Among the common people in
particular there was a prevalent illusion that the Austrian ally was a
Power which would have to be seriously reckoned with and would rally its
man-power in the hour of need. The mass of the people continued to look
upon the Dual Monarchy as a 'German State' and believed that it could be
relied upon. They assumed that its strength could be measured by the
millions of its subjects, as was the case in Germany. First of all, they
did not realize that Austria had ceased to be a German State and,
secondly, that the conditions prevailing within the Austrian Empire were
steadily pushing it headlong to the brink of disaster.

At that time I knew the condition of affairs in the Austrian State
better than the professional diplomats. Blindfolded, as nearly always,
these diplomats stumbled along on their way to disaster. The opinions
prevailing among the bulk of the people reflected only what had been
drummed into them from official quarters above. And these higher
authorities grovelled before the 'Ally', as the people of old bowed down
before the Golden Calf. They probably thought that by being polite and
amiable they might balance the lack of honesty on the other side. Thus
they took every declaration at its full face value.

Even while in Vienna I used to be annoyed again and again by the
discrepancy between the speeches of the official statesmen and the
contents of the Viennese Press. And yet Vienna was still a German city,
at least as far as appearances went. But one encountered an utterly
different state of things on leaving Vienna, or rather German-Austria,
and coming into the Slav provinces. It needed only a glance at the
Prague newspapers in order to see how the whole exalted hocus-pocus of
the Triple Alliance was judged from there. In Prague there was nothing
but gibes and sneers for that masterpiece of statesmanship. Even in the
piping times of peace, when the two emperors kissed each other on the
brow in token of friendship, those papers did not cloak their belief
that the alliance would be liquidated the moment a first attempt was
made to bring it down from the shimmering glory of a Nibelungen ideal to
the plane of practical affairs.

Great indignation was aroused a few years later, when the alliances were
put to the first practical test. Italy not only withdrew from the Triple
Alliance, leaving the other two members to march by themselves. but she
even joined their enemies. That anybody should believe even for a moment
in the possibility of such a miracle as that of Italy fighting on the
same side as Austria would be simply incredible to anyone who did not
suffer from the blindness of official diplomacy. And that was just how
people felt in Austria also.

In Austria only the Habsburgs and the German-Austrians supported the
alliance. The Habsburgs did so from shrewd calculation of their own
interests and from necessity. The Germans did it out of good faith and
political ignorance. They acted in good faith inasmuch as they believed
that by establishing the Triple Alliance they were doing a great service
to the German Empire and were thus helping to strengthen it and
consolidate its defence. They showed their political ignorance, however,
in holding such ideas, because, instead of helping the German Empire
they really chained it to a moribund State which might bring its
associate into the grave with itself; and, above all, by championing
this alliance they fell more and more a prey to the Habsburg policy of
de-Germanization. For the alliance gave the Habsburgs good grounds for
believing that the German Empire would not interfere in their domestic
affairs and thus they were in a position to carry into effect, with more
ease and less risk, their domestic policy of gradually eliminating the
German element. Not only could the 'objectiveness' of the German
Government be counted upon, and thus there need be no fear of protest
from that quarter, but one could always remind the German-Austrians of
the alliance and thus silence them in case they should ever object to
the reprehensible means that were being employed to establish a Slav
hegemony in the Dual Monarchy.

What could the German-Austrians do, when the people of the German Empire
itself had openly proclaimed their trust and confidence in the Habsburg
régime?

Should they resist, and thus be branded openly before their kinsfolk in
the REICH as traitors to their own national interests? They, who for so
many decades had sacrificed so much for the sake of their German
tradition!

Once the influence of the Germans in Austria had been wiped out, what
then would be the value of the alliance? If the Triple Alliance were to
be advantageous to Germany, was it not a necessary condition that the
predominance of the German element in Austria should be maintained? Or
did anyone really believe that Germany could continue to be the ally of
a Habsburg Empire under the hegemony of the Slavs?

The official attitude of German diplomacy, as well as that of the
general public towards internal problems affecting the Austrian
nationalities was not merely stupid, it was insane. On the alliance, as
on a solid foundation, they grounded the security and future existence
of a nation of seventy millions, while at the same time they allowed
their partner to continue his policy of undermining the sole foundation
of that alliance methodically and resolutely, from year to year. A day
must come when nothing but a formal contract with Viennese diplomats
would be left. The alliance itself, as an effective support, would be
lost to Germany.

As far as concerned Italy, such had been the case from the outset.

If people in Germany had studied history and the psychology of nations a
little more carefully not one of them could have believed for a single
hour that the Quirinal and the Viennese Hofburg could ever stand
shoulder to shoulder on a common battle front. Italy would have exploded
like a volcano if any Italian government had dared to send a single
Italian soldier to fight for the Habsburg State. So fanatically hated
was this State that the Italians could stand in no other relation to it
on a battle front except as enemies. More than once in Vienna I have
witnessed explosions of the contempt and profound hatred which 'allied'
the Italian to the Austrian State. The crimes which the House of
Habsburg committed against Italian freedom and independence during
several centuries were too grave to be forgiven, even with the best of
goodwill. But this goodwill did not exist, either among the rank and
file of the population or in the government. Therefore for Italy there
were only two ways of co-existing with Austria--alliance or war. By
choosing the first it was possible to prepare leisurely for the second.

Especially since relations between Russia and Austria tended more and
more towards the arbitrament of war, the German policy of alliances was
as senseless as it was dangerous. Here was a classical instance which
demonstrated the lack of any broad or logical lines of thought.

But what was the reason for forming the alliance at all? It could not
have been other than the wish to secure the future of the REICH better
than if it were to depend exclusively on its own resources. But the
future of the REICH could not have meant anything else than the problem
of securing the means of existence for the German people.

The only questions therefore were the following: What form shall the
life of the nation assume in the near future--that is to say within such
a period as we can forecast? And by what means can the necessary
foundation and security be guaranteed for this development within the
framework of the general distribution of power among the European
nations? A clear analysis of the principles on which the foreign policy
of German statecraft were to be based should have led to the following
conclusions:

The annual increase of population in Germany amounts to almost 900,000
souls. The difficulties of providing for this army of new citizens must
grow from year to year and must finally lead to a catastrophe, unless
ways and means are found which will forestall the danger of misery and
hunger. There were four ways of providing against this terrible
calamity:

(1) It was possible to adopt the French example and artificially
restrict the number of births, thus avoiding an excess of population.

Under certain circumstances, in periods of distress or under bad
climatic condition, or if the soil yields too poor a return, Nature
herself tends to check the increase of population in some countries and
among some races, but by a method which is quite as ruthless as it is
wise. It does not impede the procreative faculty as such; but it does
impede the further existence of the offspring by submitting it to such
tests and privations that everything which is less strong or less
healthy is forced to retreat into the bosom of tile unknown. Whatever
survives these hardships of existence has been tested and tried a
thousandfold, hardened and renders fit to continue the process of
procreation; so that the same thorough selection will begin all over
again. By thus dealing brutally with the individual and recalling him
the very moment he shows that he is not fitted for the trials of life,
Nature preserves the strength of the race and the species and raises it
to the highest degree of efficiency.

The decrease in numbers therefore implies an increase of strength, as
far as the individual is concerned, and this finally means the
invigoration of the species.

But the case is different when man himself starts the process of
numerical restriction. Man is not carved from Nature's wood. He is made
of 'human' material. He knows more than the ruthless Queen of Wisdom. He
does not impede the preservation of the individual but prevents
procreation itself. To the individual, who always sees only himself and
not the race, this line of action seems more humane and just than the
opposite way. But, unfortunately, the consequences are also the
opposite.

By leaving the process of procreation unchecked and by submitting the
individual to the hardest preparatory tests in life, Nature selects the
best from an abundance of single elements and stamps them as fit to live
and carry on the conservation of the species. But man restricts the
procreative faculty and strives obstinately to keep alive at any cost
whatever has once been born. This correction of the Divine Will seems to
him to be wise and humane, and he rejoices at having trumped Nature's
card in one game at least and thus proved that she is not entirely
reliable. The dear little ape of an all-mighty father is delighted to
see and hear that he has succeeded in effecting a numerical restriction;
but he would be very displeased if told that this, his system, brings
about a degeneration in personal quality.

For as soon as the procreative faculty is thwarted and the number of
births diminished, the natural struggle for existence which allows only
healthy and strong individuals to survive is replaced by a sheer craze
to 'save' feeble and even diseased creatures at any cost. And thus the
seeds are sown for a human progeny which will become more and more
miserable from one generation to another, as long as Nature's will is
scorned.

But if that policy be carried out the final results must be that such a
nation will eventually terminate its own existence on this earth; for
though man may defy the eternal laws of procreation during a certain
period, vengeance will follow sooner or later. A stronger race will oust
that which has grown weak; for the vital urge, in its ultimate form,
will burst asunder all the absurd chains of this so-called humane
consideration for the individual and will replace it with the humanity
of Nature, which wipes out what is weak in order to give place to the
strong.

Any policy which aims at securing the existence of a nation by
restricting the birth-rate robs that nation of its future.

(2) A second solution is that of internal colonization. This is a
proposal which is frequently made in our own time and one hears it
lauded a good deal. It is a suggestion that is well-meant but it is
misunderstood by most people, so that it is the source of more mischief
than can be imagined.

It is certainly true that the productivity of the soil can be increased
within certain limits; but only within defined limits and not
indefinitely. By increasing the productive powers of the soil it will be
possible to balance the effect of a surplus birth-rate in Germany for a
certain period of time, without running any danger of hunger. But we
have to face the fact that the general standard of living is rising more
quickly than even the birth rate. The requirements of food and clothing
are becoming greater from year to year and are out of proportion to
those of our ancestors of, let us say, a hundred years ago. It would,
therefore, be a mistaken view that every increase in the productive
powers of the soil will supply the requisite conditions for an increase
in the population. No. That is true up to a certain point only, for at
least a portion of the increased produce of the soil will be consumed by
the margin of increased demands caused by the steady rise in the
standard of living. But even if these demands were to be curtailed to
the narrowest limits possible and if at the same time we were to use all
our available energies in the intenser cultivation, we should here reach
a definite limit which is conditioned by the inherent nature of the soil
itself. No matter how industriously we may labour we cannot increase
agricultural production beyond this limit. Therefore, though we may
postpone the evil hour of distress for a certain time, it will arrive at
last. The first phenomenon will be the recurrence of famine periods from
time to time, after bad harvests, etc. The intervals between these
famines will become shorter and shorter the more the population
increases; and, finally, the famine times will disappear only in those
rare years of plenty when the granaries are full. And a time will
ultimately come when even in those years of plenty there will not be
enough to go round; so that hunger will dog the footsteps of the nation.
Nature must now step in once more and select those who are to survive,
or else man will help himself by artificially preventing his own
increase, with all the fatal consequences for the race and the species
which have been already mentioned.

It may be objected here that, in one form or another, this future is in
store for all mankind and that the individual nation or race cannot
escape the general fate.

At first glance, that objection seems logical enough; but we have to
take the following into account:

The day will certainly come when the whole of mankind will be forced to
check the augmentation of the human species, because there will be no
further possibility of adjusting the productivity of the soil to the
perpetual increase in the population. Nature must then be allowed to use
her own methods or man may possibly take the task of regulation into his
own hands and establish the necessary equilibrium by the application of
better means than we have at our disposal to-day. But then it will be a
problem for mankind as a whole, whereas now only those races have to
suffer from want which no longer have the strength and daring to acquire
sufficient soil to fulfil their needs. For, as things stand to-day, vast
spaces still lie uncultivated all over the surface of the globe. Those
spaces are only waiting for the ploughshare. And it is quite certain
that Nature did not set those territories apart as the exclusive
pastures of any one nation or race to be held unutilized in reserve for
the future. Such land awaits the people who have the strength to acquire
it and the diligence to cultivate it.

Nature knows no political frontiers. She begins by establishing life on
this globe and then watches the free play of forces. Those who show the
greatest courage and industry are the children nearest to her heart and
they will be granted the sovereign right of existence.

If a nation confines itself to 'internal colonization' while other races
are perpetually increasing their territorial annexations all over the
globe, that nation will be forced to restrict the numerical growth of
its population at a time when the other nations are increasing theirs.
This situation must eventually arrive. It will arrive soon if the
territory which the nation has at its disposal be small. Now it is
unfortunately true that only too often the best nations--or, to speak
more exactly, the only really cultured nations, who at the same time are
the chief bearers of human progress--have decided, in their blind
pacifism, to refrain from the acquisition of new territory and to be
content with 'internal colonization.' But at the same time nations of
inferior quality succeed in getting hold of large spaces for
colonization all over the globe. The state of affairs which must result
from this contrast is the following:

Races which are culturally superior but less ruthless would be forced to
restrict their increase, because of insufficient territory to support
the population, while less civilized races could increase indefinitely,
owing to the vast territories at their disposal. In other words: should
that state of affairs continue, then the world will one day be possessed
by that portion of mankind which is culturally inferior but more active
and energetic.

A time will come, even though in the distant future, when there can be
only two alternatives: Either the world will be ruled according to our
modern concept of democracy, and then every decision will be in favour
of the numerically stronger races; or the world will be governed by the
law of natural distribution of power, and then those nations will be
victorious who are of more brutal will and are not the nations who have
practised self-denial.

Nobody can doubt that this world will one day be the scene of dreadful
struggles for existence on the part of mankind. In the end the instinct
of self-preservation alone will triumph. Before its consuming fire this
so-called humanitarianism, which connotes only a mixture of fatuous
timidity and self-conceit, will melt away as under the March sunshine.
Man has become great through perpetual struggle. In perpetual peace his
greatness must decline.

For us Germans, the slogan of 'internal colonization' is fatal, because
it encourages the belief that we have discovered a means which is in
accordance with our innate pacifism and which will enable us to work for
our livelihood in a half slumbering existence. Such a teaching, once it
were taken seriously by our people, would mean the end of all effort to
acquire for ourselves that place in the world which we deserve. If. the
average German were once convinced that by this measure he has the
chance of ensuring his livelihood and guaranteeing his future, any
attempt to take an active and profitable part in sustaining the vital
demands of his country would be out of the question. Should the nation
agree to such an attitude then any really useful foreign policy might be
looked upon as dead and buried, together with all hope for the future of
the German people.

Once we know what the consequences of this 'internal colonization'
theory would be we can no longer consider as a mere accident the fact
that among those who inculcate this quite pernicious mentality among our
people the Jew is always in the first line. He knows his softies only
too well not to know that they are ready to be the grateful victims of
every swindle which promises them a gold-block in the shape of a
discovery that will enable them to outwit Nature and thus render
superfluous the hard and inexorable struggle for existence; so that
finally they may become lords of the planet partly by sheer DOLCE FAR
NIENTE and partly by working when a pleasing opportunity arises.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that any German 'internal
colonization' must first of all be considered as suited only for the
relief of social grievances. To carry out a system of internal
colonization, the most important preliminary measure would be to free
the soil from the grip of the speculator and assure that freedom. But
such a system could never suffice to assure the future of the nation
without the acquisition of new territory.

If we adopt a different plan we shall soon reach a point beyond which
the resources of our soil can no longer be exploited, and at the same
time we shall reach a point beyond which our man-power cannot develop.

In conclusion, the following must be said:

The fact that only up to a limited extent can internal colonization be
practised in a national territory which is of definitely small area and
the restriction of the procreative faculty which follows as a result of
such conditions--these two factors have a very unfavourable effect on
the military and political standing of a nation.

The extent of the national territory is a determining factor in the
external security of the nation. The larger the territory which a people
has at its disposal the stronger are the national defences of that
people. Military decisions are more quickly, more easily, more
completely and more effectively gained against a people occupying a
national territory which is restricted in area, than against States
which have extensive territories. Moreover, the magnitude of a national
territory is in itself a certain assurance that an outside Power will
not hastily risk the adventure of an invasion; for in that case the
struggle would have to be long and exhausting before victory could be
hoped for. The risk being so great. there would have to be extraordinary
reasons for such an aggressive adventure. Hence it is that the
territorial magnitude of a State furnishes a basis whereon national
liberty and independence can be maintained with relative ease; while, on
the contrary, a State whose territory is small offers a natural
temptation to the invader.

As a matter of fact, so-called national circles in the German REICH
rejected those first two possibilities of establishing a balance between
the constant numerical increase in the population and a national
territory which could not expand proportionately. But the reasons given
for that rejection were different from those which I have just
expounded. It was mainly on the basis of certain moral sentiments that
restriction of the birth-rate was objected to. Proposals for internal
colonization were rejected indignantly because it was suspected that
such a policy might mean an attack on the big landowners, and that this
attack might be the forerunner of a general assault against the
principle of private property as a whole. The form in which the latter
solution--internal colonization--was recommended justified the
misgivings of the big landowners.

But the form in which the colonization proposal was rejected was not
very clever, as regards the impression which such rejection might be
calculated to make on the mass of the people, and anyhow it did not go
to the root of the problem at all.

Only two further ways were left open in which work and bread could be
secured for the increasing population.

(3) It was possible to think of acquiring new territory on which a
certain portion of' the increasing population could be settled each
year; or else

(4) Our industry and commerce had to be organized in such a manner as to
secure an increase in the exports and thus be able to support our people
by the increased purchasing power accruing from the profits made on
foreign markets.

Therefore the problem was: A policy of territorial expansion or a
colonial and commercial policy. Both policies were taken into
consideration, examined, recommended and rejected, from various
standpoints, with the result that the second alternative was finally
adopted. The sounder alternative, however, was undoubtedly the first.

The principle of acquiring new territory, on which the surplus
population could be settled, has many advantages to recommend it,
especially if we take the future as well as the present into account.

In the first place, too much importance cannot be placed on the
necessity for adopting a policy which will make it possible to maintain
a healthy peasant class as the basis of the national community. Many of
our present evils have their origin exclusively in the disproportion
between the urban and rural portions of the population. A solid stock of
small and medium farmers has at all times been the best protection which
a nation could have against the social diseases that are prevalent
to-day. Moreover, that is the only solution which guarantees the daily
bread of a nation within the framework of its domestic national economy.
With this condition once guaranteed, industry and commerce would retire
from the unhealthy position of foremost importance which they hold
to-day and would take their due place within the general scheme of
national economy, adjusting the balance between demand and supply. Thus
industry and commerce would no longer constitute the basis of the
national subsistence, but would be auxiliary institutions. By fulfilling
their proper function, which is to adjust the balance between national
production and national consumption, they render the national
subsistence more or less independent of foreign countries and thus
assure the freedom and independence of the nation, especially at
critical junctures in its history.

Such a territorial policy, however, cannot find its fulfilment in the
Cameroons but almost exclusively here in Europe. One must calmly and
squarely face the truth that it certainly cannot be part of the
dispensation of Divine Providence to give a fifty times larger share of
the soil of this world to one nation than to another. In considering
this state of affairs to-day, one must not allow existing political
frontiers to distract attention from what ought to exist on principles
of strict justice. If this earth has sufficient room for all, then we
ought to have that share of the soil which is absolutely necessary for
our existence.

Of course people will not voluntarily make that accommodation. At this
point the right of self-preservation comes into effect. And when
attempts to settle the difficulty in an amicable way are rejected the
clenched hand must take by force that which was refused to the open hand
of friendship. If in the past our ancestors had based their political
decisions on similar pacifist nonsense as our present generation does,
we should not possess more than one-third of the national territory that
we possess to-day and probably there would be no German nation to worry
about its future in Europe. No. We owe the two Eastern Marks (Note 8) of
the Empire to the natural determination of our forefathers in their
struggle for existence, and thus it is to the same determined policy that
we owe the inner strength which is based on the extent of our political
and racial territories and which alone has made it possible for us to
exist up to now.

[Note 8. German Austria was the East Mark on the South and East Prussia
was the East Mark on the North.]

And there is still another reason why that solution would have been the
correct one:

Many contemporary European States are like pyramids standing on their
apexes. The European territory which these States possess is
ridiculously small when compared with the enormous overhead weight of
their colonies, foreign trade, etc. It may be said that they have the
apex in Europe and the base of the pyramid all over the world; quite
different from the United States of America, which has its base on the
American Continent and is in contact with the rest of the world only
through its apex. Out of that situation arises the incomparable inner
strength of the U.S.A. and the contrary situation is responsible for the
weakness of most of the colonial European Powers.

England cannot be suggested as an argument against this assertion,
though in glancing casually over the map of the British Empire one is
inclined easily to overlook the existence of a whole Anglo-Saxon world.
England's position cannot be compared with that of any other State in
Europe, since it forms a vast community of language and culture together
with the U.S.A.

Therefore the only possibility which Germany had of carrying a sound
territorial policy into effect was that of acquiring new territory in
Europe itself. Colonies cannot serve this purpose as long as they are
not suited for settlement by Europeans on a large scale. In the
nineteenth century it was no longer possible to acquire such colonies by
peaceful means. Therefore any attempt at such a colonial expansion would
have meant an enormous military struggle. Consequently it would have
been more practical to undertake that military struggle for new
territory in Europe rather than to wage war for the acquisition of
possessions abroad.

Such a decision naturally demanded that the nation's undivided energies
should be devoted to it. A policy of that kind which requires for its
fulfilment every ounce of available energy on the part of everybody
concerned, cannot be carried into effect by half-measures or in a
hesitating manner. The political leadership of the German Empire should
then have been directed exclusively to this goal. No political step
should have been taken in response to other considerations than this
task and the means of accomplishing it. Germany should have been alive
to the fact that such a goal could have been reached only by war, and
the prospect of war should have been faced with calm and collected
determination.

The whole system of alliances should have been envisaged and valued from
that standpoint. If new territory were to be acquired in Europe it must
have been mainly at Russia's cost, and once again the new German Empire
should have set out on its march along the same road as was formerly
trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time to acquire soil for the
German plough by means of the German sword and thus provide the nation
with its daily bread.

For such a policy, however, there was only one possible ally in Europe.
That was England.

Only by alliance with England was it possible to safeguard the rear of
the new German crusade. The justification for undertaking such an
expedition was stronger than the justification which our forefathers had
for setting out on theirs. Not one of our pacifists refuses to eat the
bread made from the grain grown in the East; and yet the first plough
here was that called the 'Sword'.

No sacrifice should have been considered too great if it was a necessary
means of gaining England's friendship. Colonial and naval ambitions
should have been abandoned and attempts should not have been made to
compete against British industries.

Only a clear and definite policy could lead to such an achievement. Such
a policy would have demanded a renunciation of the endeavour to conquer
the world's markets, also a renunciation of colonial intentions and
naval power. All the means of power at the disposal of the State should
have been concentrated in the military forces on land. This policy would
have involved a period of temporary self-denial, for the sake of a great
and powerful future.

There was a time when England might have entered into negotiations with
us, on the grounds of that proposal. For England would have well
understood that the problems arising from the steady increase in
population were forcing Germany to look for a solution either in Europe
with the help of England or, without England, in some other part of the
world.

This outlook was probably the chief reason why London tried to draw
nearer to Germany about the turn of the century. For the first time in
Germany an attitude was then manifested which afterwards displayed
itself in a most tragic way. People then gave expression to an
unpleasant feeling that we might thus find ourselves obliged to pull
England's chestnuts out of the fire. As if an alliance could be based on
anything else than mutual give-and-take! And England would have become a
party to such a mutual bargain. British diplomats were still wise enough
to know that an equivalent must be forthcoming as a consideration for
any services rendered.

Let us suppose that in 1904 our German foreign policy was managed
astutely enough to enable us to take the part which Japan played. It is
not easy to measure the greatness of the results that might have accrued
to Germany from such a policy.

There would have been no world war. The blood which would have been shed
in 1904 would not have been a tenth of that shed from 1914 to 1918. And
what a position Germany would hold in the world to-day?

In any case the alliance with Austria was then an absurdity.

For this mummy of a State did not attach itself to Germany for the
purpose of carrying through a war, but rather to maintain a perpetual
state of peace which was meant to be exploited for the purpose of slowly
but persistently exterminating the German element in the Dual Monarchy.

Another reason for the impossible character of this alliance was that
nobody could expect such a State to take an active part in defending
German national interests, seeing that it did not have sufficient
strength and determination to put an end to the policy of
de-Germanization within its own frontiers. If Germany herself was not
moved by a sufficiently powerful national sentiment and was not
sufficiently ruthless to take away from that absurd Habsburg State the
right to decide the destinies of ten million inhabitants who were of the
same nationality as the Germans themselves, surely it was out of the
question to expect the Habsburg State to be a collaborating party in any
great and courageous German undertaking. The attitude of the old REICH
towards the Austrian question might have been taken as a test of its
stamina for the struggle where the destinies of the whole nation were at
stake.

In any case, the policy of oppression against the German population in
Austria should not have been allowed to be carried on and to grow
stronger from year to year; for the value of Austria as an ally could be
assured only by upholding the German element there. But that course was
not followed.

Nothing was dreaded so much as the possibility of an armed conflict; but
finally, and at a most unfavourable moment, the conflict had to be faced
and accepted. They thought to cut loose from the cords of destiny, but
destiny held them fast.

They dreamt of maintaining a world peace and woke up to find themselves
in a world war.

And that dream of peace was a most significant reason why the
above-mentioned third alternative for the future development of Germany
was not even taken into consideration. The fact was recognized that new
territory could be gained only in the East; but this meant that there
would be fighting ahead, whereas they wanted peace at any cost. The
slogan of German foreign policy at one time used to be: The use of all
possible means for the maintenance of the German nation. Now it was
changed to: Maintenance of world peace by all possible means. We know
what the result was. I shall resume the discussion of this point in
detail later on.

There remained still another alternative, which we may call the fourth.
This was: Industry and world trade, naval power and colonies.

Such a development might certainly have been attained more easily and
more rapidly. To colonize a territory is a slow process, often extending
over centuries. Yet this fact is the source of its inner strength, for
it is not through a sudden burst of enthusiasm that it can be put into
effect, but rather through a gradual and enduring process of growth
quite different from industrial progress, which can be urged on by
advertisement within a few years. The result thus achieved, however, is
not of lasting quality but something frail, like a soap-bubble. It is
much easier to build quickly than to carry through the tough task of
settling a territory with farmers and establishing farmsteads. But the
former is more quickly destroyed than the latter.

In adopting such a course Germany must have known that to follow it out
would necessarily mean war sooner or later. Only children could believe
that sweet and unctuous expressions of goodness and persistent avowals
of peaceful intentions could get them their bananas through this
'friendly competition between the nations', with the prospect of never
having to fight for them.

No. Once we had taken this road, England was bound to be our enemy at
some time or other to come. Of course it fitted in nicely with our
innocent assumptions, but still it was absurd to grow indignant at the
fact that a day came when the English took the liberty of opposing our
peaceful penetration with the brutality of violent egoists.

Naturally, we on our side would never have done such a thing.

If a European territorial policy against Russia could have been put into
practice only in case we had England as our ally, on the other hand a
colonial and world-trade policy could have been carried into effect only
against English interests and with the support of Russia. But then this
policy should have been adopted in full consciousness of all the
consequences it involved and, above all things, Austria should have been
discarded as quickly as possible.

At the turn of the century the alliance with Austria had become a
veritable absurdity from all points of view.

But nobody thought of forming an alliance with Russia against England,
just as nobody thought of making England an ally against Russia; for in
either case the final result would inevitably have meant war. And to
avoid war was the very reason why a commercial and industrial policy was
decided upon. It was believed that the peaceful conquest of the world by
commercial means provided a method which would permanently supplant the
policy of force. Occasionally, however, there were doubts about the
efficiency of this principle, especially when some quite
incomprehensible warnings came from England now and again. That was the
reason why the fleet was built. It was not for the purpose of attacking
or annihilating England but merely to defend the concept of world-peace,
mentioned above, and also to protect the principle of conquering the
world by 'peaceful' means. Therefore this fleet was kept within modest
limits, not only as regards the number and tonnage of the vessels but
also in regard to their armament, the idea being to furnish new proofs
of peaceful intentions.

The chatter about the peaceful conquest of the world by commercial means
was probably the most completely nonsensical stuff ever raised to the
dignity of a guiding principle in the policy of a State, This nonsense
became even more foolish when England was pointed out as a typical
example to prove how the thing could be put into practice. Our doctrinal
way of regarding history and our professorial ideas in that domain have
done irreparable harm and offer a striking 'proof' of how people 'learn'
history without understanding anything of it. As a matter of fact,
England ought to have been looked upon as a convincing argument against
the theory of the pacific conquest of the world by commercial means. No
nation prepared the way for its commercial conquests more brutally than
England did by means of the sword, and no other nation has defended such
conquests more ruthlessly. Is it not a characteristic quality of British
statecraft that it knows how to use political power in order to gain
economic advantages and, inversely, to turn economic conquests into
political power? What an astounding error it was to believe that England
would not have the courage to give its own blood for the purposes of its
own economic expansion! The fact that England did not possess a national
army proved nothing; for it is not the actual military structure of the
moment that matters but rather the will and determination to use
whatever military strength is available. England has always had the
armament which she needed. She always fought with those weapons which
were necessary for success. She sent mercenary troops, to fight as long
as mercenaries sufficed; but she never hesitated to draw heavily and
deeply from the best blood of the whole nation when victory could be
obtained only by such a sacrifice. And in every case the fighting
spirit, dogged determination, and use of brutal means in conducting
military operations have always remained the same.

But in Germany, through the medium of the schools, the Press and the
comic papers, an idea of the Englishman was gradually formed which was
bound eventually to lead to the worst kind of self-deception. This
absurdity slowly but persistently spread into every quarter of German
life. The result was an undervaluation for which we have had to pay a
heavy penalty. The delusion was so profound that the Englishman was
looked upon as a shrewd business man, but personally a coward even to an
incredible degree. Unfortunately our lofty teachers of professorial
history did not bring home to the minds of their pupils the truth that
it is not possible to build up such a mighty organization as the British
Empire by mere swindle and fraud. The few who called attention to that
truth were either ignored or silenced. I can vividly recall to mind the
astonished looks of my comrades when they found themselves personally
face to face for the first time with the Tommies in Flanders. After a
few days of fighting the consciousness slowly dawned on our soldiers
that those Scotsmen were not like the ones we had seen described and
caricatured in the comic papers and mentioned in the communiqués.

It was then that I formed my first ideas of the efficiency of various
forms of propaganda.

Such a falsification, however, served the purpose of those who had
fabricated it. This caricature of the Englishman, though false, could be
used to prove the possibility of conquering the world peacefully by
commercial means. Where the Englishman succeeded we should also succeed.
Our far greater honesty and our freedom from that specifically English
'perfidy' would be assets on our side. Thereby it was hoped that the
sympathy of the smaller nations and the confidence of the greater
nations could be gained more easily.

We did not realize that our honesty was an object of profound aversion
for other people because we ourselves believed in it. The rest of the
world looked on our behaviour as the manifestation of a shrewd
deceitfulness; but when the revolution came, then they were amazed at
the deeper insight it gave them into our mentality, sincere even beyond
the limits of stupidity.

Once we understand the part played by that absurd notion of conquering
the world by peaceful commercial means we can clearly understand how
that other absurdity, the Triple Alliance, came to exist. With what
State then could an alliance have been made? In alliance with Austria we
could not acquire new territory by military means, even in Europe. And
this very fact was the real reason for the inner weakness of the Triple
Alliance. A Bismarck could permit himself such a makeshift for the
necessities of the moment, but certainly not any of his bungling
successors, and least of all when the foundations no longer existed on
which Bismarck had formed the Triple Alliance. In Bismarck's time
Austria could still be looked upon as a German State; but the gradual
introduction of universal suffrage turned the country into a
parliamentary Babel, in which the German voice was scarcely audible.

From the viewpoint of racial policy, this alliance with Austria was
simply disastrous. A new Slavic Great Power was allowed to grow up close
to the frontiers of the German Empire. Later on this Power was bound to
adopt towards Germany an attitude different from that of Russia, for
example. The Alliance was thus bound to become more empty and more
feeble, because the only supporters of it were losing their influence
and were being systematically pushed out of the more important public
offices.

About the year 1900 the Alliance with Austria had already entered the
same phase as the Alliance between Austria and Italy.

Here also only one alternative was possible: Either to take the side of
the Habsburg Monarchy or to raise a protest against the oppression of
the German element in Austria. But, generally speaking, when one takes
such a course it is bound eventually to lead to open conflict.

From the psychological point of view also, the Triple decreases
according as such an alliance limits its object to the defence of the
STATUS QUO. But, on the other hand, an alliance will increase its
cohesive strength the more the parties concerned in it may hope to use
it as a means of reaching some practical goal of expansion. Here, as
everywhere else, strength does not lie in defence but in attack.

This truth was recognized in various quarters but, unfortunately, not by
the so-called elected representatives of the people. As early as 1912
Ludendorff, who was then Colonel and an Officer of the General Staff,
pointed out these weak features of the Alliance in a memorandum which he
then drew up. But of course the 'statesmen' did not attach any
importance or value to that document. In general it would seem as if
reason were a faculty that is active only in the case of ordinary
mortals but that it is entirely absent when we come to deal with that
branch of the species known as 'diplomats'.
"If you don't have a seat at the table, you're on the menu."

-- Author unknown

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Scooter
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It was lucky for Germany that the war of 1914 broke out with Austria as
its direct cause, for thus the Habsburgs were compelled to participate.
Had the origin of the War been otherwise, Germany would have been left
to her own resources. The Habsburg State would never have been ready or
willing to take part in a war for the origin of which Germany was
responsible. What was the object of so much obloquy later in the case of
Italy's decision would have taken place, only earlier, in the case of
Austria. In other words, if Germany had been forced to go to war for
some reason of its own, Austria would have remained 'neutral' in order
to safeguard the State against a revolution which might begin
immediately after the war had started. The Slav element would have
preferred to smash up the Dual Monarchy in 1914 rather than permit it to
come to the assistance of Germany. But at that time there were only a
few who understood all the dangers and aggravations which resulted from
the alliance with the Danubian Monarchy.

In the first place, Austria had too many enemies who were eagerly
looking forward to obtain the heritage of that decrepit State, so that
these people gradually developed a certain animosity against Germany,
because Germany was an obstacle to their desires inasmuch as it kept the
Dual Monarchy from falling to pieces, a consummation that was hoped for
and yearned for on all sides. The conviction developed that Vienna could
be reached only by passing through Berlin.

In the second place, by adopting this policy Germany lost its best and
most promising chances of other alliances. In place of these
possibilities one now observed a growing tension in the relations with
Russia and even with Italy. And this in spite of the fact that the
general attitude in Rome was just as favourable to Germany as it was
hostile to Austria, a hostility which lay dormant in the individual
Italian and broke out violently on occasion.

Since a commercial and industrial policy had been adopted, no motive was
left for waging war against Russia. Only the enemies of the two
countries, Germany and Russia, could have an active interest in such a
war under these circumstances. As a matter of fact, it was only the Jews
and the Marxists who tried to stir up bad blood between the two States.

In the third place, the Alliance constituted a permanent danger to
German security; for any great Power that was hostile to Bismarck's
Empire could mobilize a whole lot of other States in a war against
Germany by promising them tempting spoils at the expense of the Austrian
ally.

It was possible to arouse the whole of Eastern Europe against Austria,
especially Russia, and Italy also. The world coalition which had
developed under the leadership of King Edward could never have become a
reality if Germany's ally, Austria, had not offered such an alluring
prospect of booty. It was this fact alone which made it possible to
combine so many heterogeneous States with divergent interests into one
common phalanx of attack. Every member could hope to enrich himself at
the expense of Austria if he joined in the general attack against
Germany. The fact that Turkey was also a tacit party to the unfortunate
alliance with Austria augmented Germany's peril to an extraordinary
degree.

Jewish international finance needed this bait of the Austrian heritage
in order to carry out its plans of ruining Germany; for Germany had not
yet surrendered to the general control which the international captains
of finance and trade exercised over the other States. Thus it was
possible to consolidate that coalition and make it strong enough and
brave enough, through the sheer weight of numbers, to join in bodily
conflict with the 'horned' Siegfried. (Note 9)

[Note 9. Carlyle explains the epithet thus: "First then, let no one from
the title GEHOERNTE (Horned, Behorned), fancy that our brave Siegfried,
who was the loveliest as well as the bravest of men, was actually
cornuted, and had hornson his brow, though like Michael Angelo's Moses; or
even that his skin, to which the epithet BEHORNED refers, was hard like a
crocodile's, and not softer than the softest shamey, for the truth is,
his Hornedness means only an Invulnerability, like that of Achilles..."]

The alliance with the Habsburg Monarchy, which I loathed while still in
Austria, was the subject of grave concern on my part and caused me to
meditate on it so persistently that finally I came to the conclusions
which I have mentioned above.

In the small circles which I frequented at that time I did not conceal
my conviction that this sinister agreement with a State doomed to
collapse would also bring catastrophe to Germany if she did not free
herself from it in time. I never for a moment wavered in that firm
conviction, even when the tempest of the World War seemed to have made
shipwreck of the reasoning faculty itself and had put blind enthusiasm
in its place, even among those circles where the coolest and hardest
objective thinking ought to have held sway. In the trenches I voiced and
upheld my own opinion whenever these problems came under discussion. I
held that to abandon the Habsburg Monarchy would involve no sacrifice if
Germany could thereby reduce the number of her own enemies; for the
millions of Germans who had donned the steel helmet had done so not to
fight for the maintenance of a corrupt dynasty but rather for the
salvation of the German people.

Before the War there were occasions on which it seemed that at least one
section of the German public had some slight misgivings about the
political wisdom of the alliance with Austria. From time to time German
conservative circles issued warnings against being over-confident about
the worth of that alliance; but, like every other reasonable suggestion
made at that time, it was thrown to the winds. The general conviction
was that the right measures had been adopted to 'conquer' the world,
that the success of these measures would be enormous and the sacrifices
negligible.

Once again the 'uninitiated' layman could do nothing but observe how the
'elect' were marching straight ahead towards disaster and enticing their
beloved people to follow them, as the rats followed the Pied Piper of
Hamelin.

If we would look for the deeper grounds which made it possible to foist
on the people this absurd notion of peacefully conquering the world
through commercial penetration, and how it was possible to put forward
the maintenance of world-peace as a national aim, we shall find that
these grounds lay in a general morbid condition that had pervaded the
whole body of German political thought.

The triumphant progress of technical science in Germany and the
marvellous development of German industries and commerce led us to
forget that a powerful State had been the necessary pre-requisite of
that success. On the contrary, certain circles went even so far as to
give vent to the theory that the State owed its very existence to these
phenomena; that it was, above all, an economic institution and should be
constituted in accordance with economic interests. Therefore, it was
held, the State was dependent on the economic structure. This condition
of things was looked upon and glorified as the soundest and most normal
arrangement.

Now, the truth is that the State in itself has nothing whatsoever to do
with any definite economic concept or a definite economic development.
It does not arise from a compact made between contracting parties,
within a certain delimited territory, for the purpose of serving
economic ends. The State is a community of living beings who have
kindred physical and spiritual natures, organized for the purpose of
assuring the conservation of their own kind and to help towards
fulfilling those ends which Providence has assigned to that particular
race or racial branch. Therein, and therein alone, lie the purpose and
meaning of a State. Economic activity is one of the many auxiliary means
which are necessary for the attainment of those aims. But economic
activity is never the origin or purpose of a State, except where a State
has been originally founded on a false and unnatural basis. And this
alone explains why a State as such does not necessarily need a certain
delimited territory as a condition of its establishment. This condition
becomes a necessary pre-requisite only among those people who would
provide and assure subsistence for their kinsfolk through their own
industry, which means that they are ready to carry on the struggle for
existence by means of their own work. People who can sneak their way,
like parasites, into the human body politic and make others work for
them under various pretences can form a State without possessing any
definite delimited territory. This is chiefly applicable to that
parasitic nation which, particularly at the present time preys upon the
honest portion of mankind; I mean the Jews.

The Jewish State has never been delimited in space. It has been spread
all over the world, without any frontiers whatsoever, and has always
been constituted from the membership of one race exclusively. That is
why the Jews have always formed a State within the State. One of the
most ingenious tricks ever devised has been that of sailing the Jewish
ship-of-state under the flag of Religion and thus securing that
tolerance which Aryans are always ready to grant to different religious
faiths. But the Mosaic Law is really nothing else than the doctrine of
the preservation of the Jewish race. Therefore this Law takes in all
spheres of sociological, political and economic science which have a
bearing on the main end in view.

The instinct for the preservation of one's own species is the primary
cause that leads to the formation of human communities. Hence the State
is a racial organism, and not an economic organization. The difference
between the two is so great as to be incomprehensible to our
contemporary so-called 'statesmen'. That is why they like to believe
that the State may be constituted as an economic structure, whereas the
truth is that it has always resulted from the exercise of those
qualities which are part of the will to preserve the species and the
race. But these qualities always exist and operate through the heroic
virtues and have nothing to do with commercial egoism; for the
conservation of the species always presupposes that the individual is
ready to sacrifice himself. Such is the meaning of the poet's lines:

UND SETZET IHR NICHT DAS LEBEN EIN,
NIE WIRD EUCH DAS LEBEN GEWONNEN SEIN.

(AND IF YOU DO NOT STAKE YOUR LIFE,
YOU WILL NEVER WIN LIFE FOR YOURSELF.)

[Note 10. Lines quoted from the Song of the Curassiers in Schiller's
WALLENSTEIN.]

The sacrifice of the individual existence is necessary in order to
assure the conservation of the race. Hence it is that the most essential
condition for the establishment and maintenance of a State is a certain
feeling of solidarity, wounded in an identity of character and race and
in a resolute readiness to defend these at all costs. With people who
live on their own territory this will result in a development of the
heroic virtues; with a parasitic people it will develop the arts of
subterfuge and gross perfidy unless we admit that these characteristics
are innate and that the varying political forms through which the
parasitic race expresses itself are only the outward manifestations of
innate characteristics. At least in the beginning, the formation of a
State can result only from a manifestation of the heroic qualities I
have spoken of. And the people who fail in the struggle for existence,
that is to say those, who become vassals and are thereby condemned to
disappear entirely sooner or later, are those who do not display the
heroic virtues in the struggle, or those who fall victims to the perfidy
of the parasites. And even in this latter case the failure is not so
much due to lack of intellectual powers, but rather to a lack of courage
and determination. An attempt is made to conceal the real nature of this
failing by saying that it is the humane feeling.

The qualities which are employed for the foundation and preservation of
a State have accordingly little or nothing to do with the economic
situation. And this is conspicuously demonstrated by the fact that the
inner strength of a State only very rarely coincides with what is called
its economic expansion. On the contrary, there are numerous examples to
show that a period of economic prosperity indicates the approaching
decline of a State. If it were correct to attribute the foundation of
human communities to economic forces, then the power of the State as
such would be at its highest pitch during periods of economic
prosperity, and not vice versa.

It is specially difficult to understand how the belief that the State is
brought into being and preserved by economic forces could gain currency
in a country which has given proof of the opposite in every phase of its
history. The history of Prussia shows in a manner particularly clear and
distinct, that it is out of the moral virtues of the people and not from
their economic circumstances that a State is formed. It is only under
the protection of those virtues that economic activities can be
developed and the latter will continue to flourish until a time comes
when the creative political capacity declines. Therewith the economic
structure will also break down, a phenomenon which is now happening in
an alarming manner before our eyes. The material interest of mankind can
prosper only in the shade of the heroic virtues. The moment they become
the primary considerations of life they wreck the basis of their own
existence.

Whenever the political power of Germany was specially strong the
economic situation also improved. But whenever economic interests alone
occupied the foremost place in the life of the people, and thrust
transcendent ideals into the back.-ground, the State collapsed and
economic ruin followed readily.

If we consider the question of what those forces actually are which are
necessary to the creation and preservation of a State, we shall find
that they are: The capacity and readiness to sacrifice the individual to
the common welfare. That these qualities have nothing at all to do with
economics can be proved by referring to the simple fact that man does
not sacrifice himself for material interests. In other words, he will
die for an ideal but not for a business. The marvellous gift for public
psychology which the English have was never shown better than the way in
which they presented their case in the World War. We were fighting for
our bread; but the English declared that they were fighting for
'freedom', and not at all for their own freedom. Oh, no, but for the
freedom of the small nations. German people laughed at that effrontery
and were angered by it; but in doing so they showed how political
thought had declined among our so-called diplomats in Germany even
before the War. These diplomatists did not have the slightest notion of
what that force was which brought men to face death of their own free
will and determination.

As long as the German people, in the War of 1914, continued to believe
that they were fighting for ideals they stood firm. As soon as they were
told that they were fighting only for their daily bread they began to
give up the struggle.

Our clever 'statesmen' were greatly amazed at this change of feeling.
They never understood that as soon as man is called upon to struggle for
purely material causes he will avoid death as best he can; for death and
the enjoyment of the material fruits of a victory are quite incompatible
concepts. The frailest woman will become a heroine when the life of her
own child is at stake. And only the will to save the race and native
land or the State, which offers protection to the race, has in all ages
been the urge which has forced men to face the weapons of their enemies.

The following may be proclaimed as a truth that always holds good:

A State has never arisen from commercial causes for the purpose of
peacefully serving commercial ends; but States have always arisen from
the instinct to maintain the racial group, whether this instinct
manifest itself in the heroic sphere or in the sphere of cunning and
chicanery. In the first case we have the Aryan States, based on the
principles of work and cultural development. In the second case we have
the Jewish parasitic colonies. But as soon as economic interests begin
to predominate over the racial and cultural instincts in a people or a
State, these economic interests unloose the causes that lead to
subjugation and oppression.

The belief, which prevailed in Germany before the War, that the world
could be opened up and even conquered for Germany through a system of
peaceful commercial penetration and a colonial policy was a typical
symptom which indicated the decline of those real qualities whereby
States are created and preserved, and indicated also the decline of that
insight, will-power and practical determination which belong to those
qualities. The World War with its consequences, was the natural
liquidation of that decline.

To anyone who had not thought over the matter deeply, this attitude of
the German people--which was quite general--must have seemed an
insoluble enigma. After all, Germany herself was a magnificent example
of an empire that had been built up purely by a policy of power.
Prussia, which was the generative cell of the German Empire, had been
created by brilliant heroic deeds and not by a financial or commercial
compact. And the Empire itself was but the magnificent recompense for a
leadership that had been conducted on a policy of power and military
valour.

How then did it happen that the political instincts of this very same
German people became so degenerate? For it was not merely one isolated
phenomenon which pointed to this decadence, but morbid symptoms which
appeared in alarming numbers, now all over the body politic, or eating
into the body of the nation like a gangrenous ulcer. It seemed as if
some all-pervading poisonous fluid had been injected by some mysterious
hand into the bloodstream of this once heroic body, bringing about a
creeping paralysis that affected the reason and the elementary instinct
of self-preservation.

During the years 1912-1914 I used to ponder perpetually on those
problems which related to the policy of the Triple Alliance and the
economic policy then being pursued by the German Empire. Once again I
came to the conclusion that the only explanation of this enigma lay in
the operation of that force which I had already become acquainted with
in Vienna, though from a different angle of vision. The force to which I
refer was the Marxist teaching and WELTANSCHAUUNG and its organized
action throughout the nation.

For the second time in my life I plunged deep into the study of that
destructive teaching. This time, however, I was not urged by the study
of the question by the impressions and influences of my daily
environment, but directed rather by the observation of general phenomena
in the political life of Germany. In delving again into the theoretical
literature of this new world and endeavouring to get a clear view of the
possible consequences of its teaching, I compared the theoretical
principles of Marxism with the phenomena and happenings brought about by
its activities in the political, cultural, and economic spheres.

For the first time in my life I now turned my attention to the efforts
that were being made to subdue this universal pest.

I studied Bismarck's exceptional legislation in its original concept,
its operation and its results. Gradually I formed a basis for my own
opinions, which has proved as solid as a rock, so that never since have
I had to change my attitude towards the general problem. I also made a
further and more thorough analysis of the relations between Marxism and
Jewry.

During my sojourn in Vienna I used to look upon Germany as an
imperturbable colossus; but even then serious doubts and misgivings
would often disturb me. In my own mind and in my conversation with my
small circle of acquaintances I used to criticize Germany's foreign
policy and the incredibly superficial way, according to my thinking, in
which Marxism was dealt with, though it was then the most important
problem in Germany. I could not understand how they could stumble
blindfolded into the midst of this peril, the effects of which would be
momentous if the openly declared aims of Marxism could be put into
practice. Even as early as that time I warned people around me, just as
I am warning a wider audience now, against that soothing slogan of all
indolent and feckless nature: NOTHING CAN HAPPEN TO US. A similar mental
contagion had already destroyed a mighty empire. Can Germany escape the
operation of those laws to which all other human communities are
subject?

In the years 1913 and 1914 I expressed my opinion for the first time in
various circles, some of which are now members of the National Socialist
Movement, that the problem of how the future of the German nation can be
secured is the problem of how Marxism can be exterminated.

I considered the disastrous policy of the Triple Alliance as one of the
consequences resulting from the disintegrating effects of the Marxist
teaching; for the alarming feature was that this teaching was invisibly
corrupting the foundations of a healthy political and economic outlook.
Those who had been themselves contaminated frequently did not realise
that their aims and actions sprang from this WELTANSCHAUUNG, which they
otherwise openly repudiated.

Long before then the spiritual and moral decline of the German people
had set in, though those who were affected by the morbid decadence were
frequently unaware--as often happens--of the forces which were breaking
up their very existence. Sometimes they tried to cure the disease by
doctoring the symptoms, which were taken as the cause. But since nobody
recognized, or wanted to recognize, the real cause of the disease this
way of combating Marxism was no more effective than the application of
some quack's ointment.
"If you don't have a seat at the table, you're on the menu."

-- Author unknown

ex-khobar Andy
Posts: 5419
Joined: Sat Dec 19, 2015 4:16 am
Location: Louisville KY as of July 2018

Re: MSWord Message

Post by ex-khobar Andy »

Methuselah wrote:
Sun Nov 22, 2020 3:20 pm
How embarasing! The message came from a MSWord file, which was sharing the screen with Plan B. False Alarm.

Update: Just got a second message that really did come from the system. Let the speculations begin, but please do so in a PM.

"POST REVIEW
At least one new post has been made to this topic. You may wish to review your post in light of this."

Maybe it is time for breakfast. I'm now embarrased because the software is telling me I misspelled a word, but I'm too tired to research for a fix.
It is indeed embarrassing when you misspell that word (r x 2 and s x 2) twice. You would think that an engineer with years of experience writing SOPs and the like would know to check his work before submitting it.

(Normally I wouldn't post a comment on someone's spelling or grammar unless it was particularly egregious - but Meth, there's something about you which prompts me to make an exception.)

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