Baseball Innovation
Posted: Wed Oct 26, 2011 4:21 pm
As a person who follows the most unsuccessful team in the history of Major League Baseball, I often consider strategic changes they might make that would help them to become competitive. It is obvious that with their payroll limitations they will never be successful if they employ the same basic strategies as the teams they are competing against. They have to be smarter.
As you may know, baseball is a neurotically-traditional sport, where simple and obvious changes in strategy sometimes take decades to come into favor, because Managers and General Managers are reluctant to make decisions that go against the norms, for fear that the decisions will be unsuccessful and they will get fired. For example, it would be a rare manager indeed who would use a left-handed pinch hitter against a left-handed pitcher, unless there was a specific history of that batter being spectacularly successful against that particular pitcher in the past (or there were no right handed batters available). It is simply not done.
The focus of this essay is the simple fact that the traditional strategy with respect to starting pitchers for the past hundred years or so is to bring in a “starter” to begin the game, then use him until he is no longer effective and replace him with a “reliever.” 70 years ago, when most starters were able to finish the game, that strategy may have made sense. Subsequently, however, it was realized that it is more rational to bring in a fresh reliever than to stay with a fatigued starting pitcher. It is also relevant that the batters may have seen the starting pitcher 2 or 3 times already that day, and are likely to have more success next time through the batting order.
But today’s common strategy is still based on the outmoded assumption that the starting pitcher will finish the game. Thus, the starting pitcher will usually stay in the game until the manager is convinced that he is no longer effective. (“Forward thinking” managers will pull a pitcher if the number of pitches exceeds a pre-set limit, but this is also stupid). This strategy accepts as a given that there will come a time in the game when the starting pitcher will be ineffective, and give up a number of walks, hits, and/or runs.
What sense does it make to employ a strategy that almost invariably results in the key defensive player (the pitcher) experiencing a significant failure? It’s almost like the gambler who is determined to keep playing until he runs out of money. It is impossible to win with that strategy.
I submit that the more rational utilization of pitchers is to create situations where the best pitchers on the staff (i.e., the “starters”) are most likely to achieve success. More importantly, since they are your best pitchers, you want them in the game and reasonably fresh at the time when it is most likely that the decisive scoring will take place – the last three innings.
The strategy is simply this: The pitcher who starts the game (the “Shortie”) should have the task of completing three full innings - ideally, going once through the batting order. That’s it. Then the Shortie is done for the day. All he has to focus on is getting through the other team’s lineup one time without allowing them to score.
Next, at the start of the fourth inning, bring in the pitcher who would now be thought of as a “Starter”; I will refer to him as the “Long Man.” His role is to finish the game. Ideally, the Shortie will have a completely different pitching style than the Long Man. The Shortie is left-handed and the Long Man is right handed. The Shortie is a junk-ball pitcher and the Long Man throws smoke. Give the opposing batters two different looks.
The benefits of this strategy are many:
• The other team’s “platoon” strategy is largely neutralized.
• The need for “relief pitchers” is minimized.
• The entire pitching staff gets a more predictable workload, and can plan their conditioning activities accordingly.
• Pitcher fatigue should not be a factor at the end of the game.
• Opposing batters will see two different pitchers their first two times up, thus reducing their comfort level.
There are some downsides, to be sure:
• The Long Man will not know exactly when (time wise) he will have to start pitching; he will have to be a little bit flexible in his pre-game preparation.
• This would create statistical anomalies: Shorties could never get credit for a Win, but they could be charged with a Loss. They would all end the season with records like 0-12. Long Men would get a corresponding boost to their W/L records; if they come in with their team behind, they (normally) cannot be charged with a Loss, but if they come in with their team ahead, they are much more likely to get a Win.
• Managers would often have to use a pinch hitter early in the game (batting for the Shortie), making that player unavailable later.
But I think this strategy would definitely improve a team’s overall ERA, because the Starting Pitcher’s inevitable bad inning as he tires out will be largely eliminated, and Shorties will be able to focus on their well-defined task.
I believe that the Long Men could be utilized pretty much as they are now, pitching every fifth game. The role of Shortie does not exist now, but I would assume for planning purposes that a Shortie should be able to pitch every third – or at worst every fourth – day. Remember, they will rarely be called on to pitch on other than their scheduled days, so the wear and tear of warming up every day (for a possible relief appearance) will be replaced with a three or four day regular conditioning routine. When they do start a game, I would expect the average outing to be about 40-50 pitches, but a 30-pitch outing would not be unheard of.
The general manager will have to go after pitchers who would be comfortable pitching three innings at a stretch, and mirror-image the Shorties with the Long Men (righties vs. lefties).
Will the Pirates adopt my strategy? Will anyone?
As you may know, baseball is a neurotically-traditional sport, where simple and obvious changes in strategy sometimes take decades to come into favor, because Managers and General Managers are reluctant to make decisions that go against the norms, for fear that the decisions will be unsuccessful and they will get fired. For example, it would be a rare manager indeed who would use a left-handed pinch hitter against a left-handed pitcher, unless there was a specific history of that batter being spectacularly successful against that particular pitcher in the past (or there were no right handed batters available). It is simply not done.
The focus of this essay is the simple fact that the traditional strategy with respect to starting pitchers for the past hundred years or so is to bring in a “starter” to begin the game, then use him until he is no longer effective and replace him with a “reliever.” 70 years ago, when most starters were able to finish the game, that strategy may have made sense. Subsequently, however, it was realized that it is more rational to bring in a fresh reliever than to stay with a fatigued starting pitcher. It is also relevant that the batters may have seen the starting pitcher 2 or 3 times already that day, and are likely to have more success next time through the batting order.
But today’s common strategy is still based on the outmoded assumption that the starting pitcher will finish the game. Thus, the starting pitcher will usually stay in the game until the manager is convinced that he is no longer effective. (“Forward thinking” managers will pull a pitcher if the number of pitches exceeds a pre-set limit, but this is also stupid). This strategy accepts as a given that there will come a time in the game when the starting pitcher will be ineffective, and give up a number of walks, hits, and/or runs.
What sense does it make to employ a strategy that almost invariably results in the key defensive player (the pitcher) experiencing a significant failure? It’s almost like the gambler who is determined to keep playing until he runs out of money. It is impossible to win with that strategy.
I submit that the more rational utilization of pitchers is to create situations where the best pitchers on the staff (i.e., the “starters”) are most likely to achieve success. More importantly, since they are your best pitchers, you want them in the game and reasonably fresh at the time when it is most likely that the decisive scoring will take place – the last three innings.
The strategy is simply this: The pitcher who starts the game (the “Shortie”) should have the task of completing three full innings - ideally, going once through the batting order. That’s it. Then the Shortie is done for the day. All he has to focus on is getting through the other team’s lineup one time without allowing them to score.
Next, at the start of the fourth inning, bring in the pitcher who would now be thought of as a “Starter”; I will refer to him as the “Long Man.” His role is to finish the game. Ideally, the Shortie will have a completely different pitching style than the Long Man. The Shortie is left-handed and the Long Man is right handed. The Shortie is a junk-ball pitcher and the Long Man throws smoke. Give the opposing batters two different looks.
The benefits of this strategy are many:
• The other team’s “platoon” strategy is largely neutralized.
• The need for “relief pitchers” is minimized.
• The entire pitching staff gets a more predictable workload, and can plan their conditioning activities accordingly.
• Pitcher fatigue should not be a factor at the end of the game.
• Opposing batters will see two different pitchers their first two times up, thus reducing their comfort level.
There are some downsides, to be sure:
• The Long Man will not know exactly when (time wise) he will have to start pitching; he will have to be a little bit flexible in his pre-game preparation.
• This would create statistical anomalies: Shorties could never get credit for a Win, but they could be charged with a Loss. They would all end the season with records like 0-12. Long Men would get a corresponding boost to their W/L records; if they come in with their team behind, they (normally) cannot be charged with a Loss, but if they come in with their team ahead, they are much more likely to get a Win.
• Managers would often have to use a pinch hitter early in the game (batting for the Shortie), making that player unavailable later.
But I think this strategy would definitely improve a team’s overall ERA, because the Starting Pitcher’s inevitable bad inning as he tires out will be largely eliminated, and Shorties will be able to focus on their well-defined task.
I believe that the Long Men could be utilized pretty much as they are now, pitching every fifth game. The role of Shortie does not exist now, but I would assume for planning purposes that a Shortie should be able to pitch every third – or at worst every fourth – day. Remember, they will rarely be called on to pitch on other than their scheduled days, so the wear and tear of warming up every day (for a possible relief appearance) will be replaced with a three or four day regular conditioning routine. When they do start a game, I would expect the average outing to be about 40-50 pitches, but a 30-pitch outing would not be unheard of.
The general manager will have to go after pitchers who would be comfortable pitching three innings at a stretch, and mirror-image the Shorties with the Long Men (righties vs. lefties).
Will the Pirates adopt my strategy? Will anyone?
