SHAME AND ABE L

[MajGenl.Meade]

SHAME AND ABE L

To Mrs. George G. Meade

CAMP PIERPONT, VA., Sunday, December 8, 1861.

My last letter was written on Thursday evening. The next day I went, in command of my brigade, on a foraging expedition, to the farm of a man named Gunnell. We stripped his place of everything we could use ourselves and have imprisoned some civilians without recourse to law. It made me sad to do such injury, and I really was ashamed of our cause, which thus required war to be made on individuals.

Ord argues that Mr. Lincoln has himself dispatched such scruples in a thoroughly legal manner, and we should be reassured by the President’s long experience as a lawyer in Illinois. As recently as July, Mr. Lincoln addressed the legislators and said that his suspension of habeas corpus is entirely consistent with the Constitution. Contrarily, Reynolds maintains that Mr. Lincoln is dissembling, for Justice Taney declares firmly that the Constitution speaks of it only in Article 1, Section 9 dealing with congressional, and not executive, powers.

McCall was determined to quash such dissension amongst his brigadiers by quoting from Mr. Lincoln’s speech to a young men’s Lyceum in Springfield as long ago as 1838, in which the future president declared “to the support of the Constitution and Laws, let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor; let every man remember that to violate the law, is to trample on the blood of his father, and to tear the character of his own, and his children's liberty.”

Therefore, says McCall, since the President believes what he said in 1838, and he says he didn’t violate the Constitution in 1861, then he indeed did not and that is all there is to it, regardless of Taney’s notions. It is gratifying to have such fine logic enlighten these complicated matters.

It is coincidence that on Saturday my pickets brought me an intoxicated person, found wandering down the Georgetown pike. He identified himself somewhat incoherently as Ward Lamon, federal marshal, former legal partner and particular confidant of Mr. Lincoln. He was seeking Chief Justice Taney on a matter of some urgency, to do with a warrant that Lamon cared not to show me, save the signature by A. Lincoln which appeared quite genuine. All I could get out of the fellow was that it was something to do with needing Justice Taney to closely inspect the interior of a jail cell at Fort McHenry on behalf of a man named Merryman.

I had the men keep him under watch until he recovered command of his faculties, whereupon he apologized for his behavior, and tore up the mysterious paper, claiming that it was merely an old relic of no current relevance. He then made off at speed for the Chain Bridge to go into Washington city and I trust it is the last we shall hear of him. I had some men pick up his discarded papers and toss the pieces on a camp fire.

We continue to forage and drill, conduct reviews and make no advance whatever. It appears unlikely that anything of interest to posterity will ever happen in this place. I am very much pleased with my new horse, all except the price, which is pretty digging.

[Lord Jim]

I would make one correction:

We continue to forage pillage and drill,

[Rick]

Here is supposed to be a bunch of his letters all at once so ya don't have to trickle em out

[Lord Jim]

Uh Rick...

You are aware of the fact the General Meade letters here are actually written by our own General Meade....

[Econoline]

...so if you go to that website for Meade's letters, you won't find the most interesting and revealing of his letters there.

[oldr_n_wsr]

You do know that it's because of this website and MGM that I knew the answer to a crossword puzzle a few days ago about Gettysburg. I knew this forum was not all fluff.

[Rick]

You will find out he wanted to retreat at Gettyburg.

Yes LJ I kinda knew that and I really didn't want facts to get in the way, just my offering.

Theys all from Northern aggressors anyway...

[MajGenl.Meade]

If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it is a canard.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 24, 1864. . . . I hear Butterfield is in Washington, and is going to swear that I told him to prepare an order to retreat, and from what Gibbon writes me, it is evident he did prepare such an order; but I trust by the concurrent testimony of every other officer on the field, the documentary evidence in the shape of orders at different periods of the day, and my own sworn statement, to prove that the preparation of this order was not authorized by me, and that it was due to Butterfield's own fears. I understand the Secretary is very indignant at his coming to Washington, and has ordered him back to his post.

A genuine excerpt from THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF GEORGE GORDON MEADE, MAJOR-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, Volume II.


Meade

[Rick]

Meade at Gettysburg: his proposed retreat on the night of the 2nd of July; Gen. Doubleday's defense of his statement that Meade was overruled by the action of a council of War

To the editor of the New York Times:
A short time since a quotation was given in the Times from the Appendix to Swinton's ‘History of the Army of the Potomac’ to the effect that there is not ‘a scintilla of evidence’ to sustain my statement that Gen. Meade contemplated a retreat at Gettysburg. As this is calculated to discredit the account of the battle given in my work on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, I hope you will allow me a few words by way of reply. I would have answered it in the second edition of my book, but unfortunately, that was already in print before I saw the article which reflects so severely on my fairness and generosity.

Mr. Swinton takes the ground that it is an attack on Gen. Meade's reputation to assert that he ever thought of falling back. I am aware that it may seem ungracious to speak thus of Gen. Meade's intentions. As he did remain and fight it out, he is entitled to the credit of doing so. I, therefore, would not have mentioned the subject at all if it had not been for a circumstance that has escaped Mr. Swinton's notice. The desire to retreat was supplemented by acts which form part of the history of the battle. He sent for Gen. Pleasonton on the 2nd of July, his Chief of Cavalry, and directed him, late in the afternoon, to collect what cavalry and artillery he could, proceed with it to the rear, and take up a position to cover the retreat of the army. As a faithful historian, if I refer to Gen. Pleasonton's movements at all, I must state the origin of it.

Mr. Swinton forgets that the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War reported that there was evidence that Gen. Meade desired to retreat.

On the evening of the 2nd, after sending Pleasonton off, Gen. Meade called a council of war and put the question to the corps commanders whether they were in favor of remaining on the ridge or retreating. Our losses had been heavy and the enemy were then attacking our right, which was denuded of troops. Nevertheless, the council voted to remain and endeavor to hold the ridge. Gen. Meade dissented from the conclusion and expressed his strong dissatisfaction. Mr. Swinton and others deny this. They seem to assume that such action on his part must needs denote timidity or bad generalship. It does not necessarily indicate anything of the kind. As the right of the enemy overlapped the left of our line for a considerable distance, it is said that Longstreet was in favor of turning that flank. This would not only force the Union army from the ridge, but would enable Lee to intervene between Meade and Washington. Meade feared that this would be done. He was, doubtless, apprehensive that Lee would steal a march on him in the night and thus endanger the safety of the capital. I do not suppose that Mr. Swinton in his zeal to defend Gen. Meade will assume that Pleasonton's movement is a myth. The statement is sworn to before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, but as it is in a different volume from the mass of the testimony it has probably escaped Mr. Swinton's notice. The following letter from Gen. Pleasonton reiterates the statement:

Willard's hotel, Washington City, Feb. 8, 1883.
General: Your note of the 6th inst. is received. In answer to your question I have to state that Gen. Meade, on the 2nd of July, 1863, at Gettysburg, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, gave me the order to get what cavalry and artillery I could, as soon as possible, and take up a position in rear to cover the retreat of the army from Gettysburg. I was thus occupied until 10 o'clock at night, when I was recalled by an order from Gen. Meade.
This absence accounted for my not being at the council of war held at Meade's Headquarters early in the evening. * * * * * * * *

Yours very truly,

A. Pleasonton. To Gen. A. Doubleday.

By way of rebuttal, Mr. Swinton parades the following declaration of Gen. Meade. A very slight examination will show that it refers to a different period of the battle: to the morning of the 2nd, and not to the evening. Gen. Meade says: ‘I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall be made known — I utterly deny having intended or thought for one instant to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies which the future should develope during the course of the day might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn.’

The italics are mine.

I will now give the reason for this emphatic declaration on the part of Gen. Meade. On the morning of the 2nd he directed his Chief of Staff, Gen. Butterfield, to study and mark out the lines of retreat. It was subsequently asserted that this was a positive order for the army— which had just formed on the ridge—to withdraw before the enemy assailed it. Gen. Meade denies that it was anything of the kind: it was merely a necessary precaution to avoid confusion in case he lost the position and was driven back.

I did not make the statement that he intended to retreat at that time nor did I refer to his desire to do so in the evening of the 2nd in either a carping or accusing spirit. I am astonished that it should be criticised
The statement of Gen. Meade's views does by no means rest solely upon the testimony quoted above. There is additional evidence to the same effect which I might give, but that several witnesses are averse to coming to the front and being pelted with partisan mud. I have no hesitation, however, to affirm that Gen. Birney, as he rode home from the council that night with his staff officer, Major J. B. Fassitt, commented upon Gen. Meade's statement that Gettysburg was no place to fight in. He subsequently made the same remark to Gen. Sickles when the latter was convalescing from his wound. Both Major Fassitt and Gen. Sickles reside in New York.

Mr. Swinton assumes that I am unable to write an impartial history owing to the hostile relations which he supposes to have existed between Gen. Meade and myself, founded on my criticism of the latter in my testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. I freely admit that I was unnecessarily harsh in my language at that time. The fact is, that just before the battle of Gettysburg I was applied to by an officer of high rank, a confidential friend of Gen. Meade, to give him a list of such officers of my division as had made strong demonstrations when Gen. McClellan was removed from command. The object of the inquiry was to promote these men over the heads of others equally deserving. I looked upon this as a plot to change the army of the Union into a partisan force, which was to become the personal appanage of an individual. Believing Gen. Meade to be a party to this arrangement, I thought he intended to carry out this policy, and testified accordingly. I afterward ascertained that I was mistaken in this respect; that he had no intention of reorganizing the army in the interest of Gen. McClellan. Indeed, he could not have done so, without displacing himself. When I understood the circumstances I did not blame him for his action toward me at Gettysburg. Nor is it true that he was not willing that I should serve under him again. Indeed, I applied to go down to the army to resume command of a division, and I never would have done so if I had not been certain that I would be welcome. Gen. Meade frequently made friendly inquiries concerning me of a relative who was there. I also received a message which came through Lieut. Lambdin, formerly of my staff, to the effect that I would be well received by him in case I returned to the army. The War Department refused my application to go, on the ground that my services could not be spared from Washington at that time.

Mr. Swinton's rose-colored narrative of the war might appropriately be called the ‘History of the Army of Northern Virginia.’

Abner Doubleday, Brevet Major-General United States Army. Mendham, N.

Quack

[Rick]

Further if one follows carefully the line of events after this almost inaction on the part of Meade we see that it precipitated the rise to power of one Adolf Hitler...Quack Quack

[MajGenl.Meade]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 6, 1864.
I returned from Washington to-day. I went there Friday morning on business connected with the reorganization of the army. The night before I left I saw Mr. Wilkeson's attack on me in the Senate and Reverdy Johnston's reply and defense. When I reached Washington I was greatly surprised to find the whole town talking of certain grave charges of Generals Sickles and Doubleday, that had been made against me in their testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. On Saturday I was summoned before the committee. I found there only Mr. Wade, of Ohio. He was very civil, denied there were any charges against me, but said the committee was making up a sort of history of the war and was now taking evidence to enable it to give an account of the battle of Gettysburg, and my administration since commanding the army. I then occupied about three hours giving a succinct narrative of events. Subsequently Mr. Stanton told me (this is strictly confidential), that there was and had been much pressure from a certain party to get Hooker back in command, and that thinking, through Sickles and others, they might get me out (a preliminary step) they had gotten up this halloobaloo in the Committee on the Conduct of the War; but that I need not worry myself, there was no chance of their succeeding. The only evil that will result is the spreading over the country certain mysterious whisperings of dreadful deficiencies on my part, the truth concerning which will never reach the thousandth part of those who hear the lies. I suppose and fear you will be worried about them, but I beg you to be calm and quiet, and rest satisfied that I will come out all right in the end.

I saw nobody in Washington, except people about the Government, except Mr. Howard, of Michigan, whom I went to see and to whom I explained the absurd charge of Sickles, that I had ordered a retreat at Gettysburg, and that that battle was fought in spite of all my efforts to prevent it.

It is a melancholy state of affairs, however, when persons like Sickles and Doubleday can, by distorting and twisting facts, and giving a false coloring, induce the press and public for a time, and almost immediately, to take away the character of a man who up to that time had stood high in their estimation. However, I suppose we cannot change human nature; we must be patient, await the period when the truth will slowly and surely make itself be known

.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 8, 1864.
I am curious to see how you take the explosion of the conspiracy to have me relieved, for it is nothing less than a conspiracy, in which the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with Generals Doubleday and Sickles, are the agents

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 14, 1864.
When I arrived, I immediately went before the committee and filed documentary evidence to prove the correctness of my previous assertion that I never for an instant had any idea of fighting anywhere but at Gettysburg, as soon as I learned of Reynolds's collision and obtained information that the ground was suitable. Mr. Wade was the only member present. He took great pains to endeavor to convince me the committee were not responsible for the newspaper attacks on me, and I might rest assured there was no disposition on their part to do me injustice.

Afterwards I saw Mr. Stanton, who told me Mr. Wade had been to see him, and said my testimony was the clearest statement that had ever been made to the committee, and that as far as he could see, it was perfectly satisfactory in explanation of all charges against me. I soon found the tide had turned in my favor, and that Sickles had overreached himself. I also ascertained that Chandler and Wilkinson were my foes on the committee, that Wade was rather friendly, and that Harding, of the Senate, Grooch and Odell, of the House, were my warm friends.

To Mr. Henry A. Cram, New York :
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 15, 1864.
The ingenuity of my enemies, in the theory of their attack, is worthy of admiration. They acknowledge the battle of Gettysburg as one of the greatest victories the world has ever seen; but they expect to prove that it was fought in opposition to all the plans I had formed; that I was all the time expecting disaster and issuing orders to retreat; in fine, that had I not been there, great as was the battle, it would have been far greater. Now, although I can tear away all this flimsy framework of argument in this operation, I shall have to expose that as a prudent general, whilst my orders were always looking to fighting, I did at times, in discussions, councils, preparatory orders, etc., hold in view the contingency of a reverse and endeavor to be prepared for it. This is the sum and substance of my offense, and I regret to say that, among a certain class of my fellow-country-men, this will be an offense and indicative of what they call too much cavilling, and being paralyzed by contingent reverses, proving that I did not have the dash and blundering audacity of others.

My enemies consist of certain politicians who wish me removed to restore Hooker; then of certain subordinates, whose military reputations are involved in the destruction of mine; finally, a class of vultures who in Hooker's day preyed upon the army, and who sigh for a return of those glorious days. I expect to retain my place, but I am anxious about my reputation.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, March 20, 1864.
I have received a letter from Gibbon which has worried me a great deal. It is now evident that Butterfield, either intentionally or otherwise, misconstrued something that I said to him on the 2d of July into instructions to prepare an order to withdraw the army. To-be-sure, this order was never issued; it is also certain I never intended it to be prepared, much less issued. Nevertheless, the fact that he did prepare it, and, as he will swear, was ordered to do so, notwithstanding it was never issued, will operate against me, as people disposed to find fault will say I was all the time anticipating defeat, and hampered accordingly. God knows my conscience is clear that I never for a moment thought of retreating, although I presume I held in view the contingency that the enemy might compel me so to do, and I may have told Butterfield to familiarize himself with the roads, etc., so that if it became necessary we would be prepared to do it promptly and in good order. Out of this he has manufactured the lie that I intended at the time to do so. The falsehoods that have been uttered against me, and the evidence of a regular conspiracy which has been organizing almost since the date of the battle, make me heartsick. I believe now that Butterfield commenced deliberately, from the time I assumed command, to treasure up incidents, remarks and papers to pervert and distort in the future to my injury. How otherwise to account for his having a copy of this pretended order? Not only is no such order or paper found among the records of the Adjutant General's Office, but the clerks and others have no recollection of any order.