dgs49 wrote:...and yet, Thomas Jefferson opposed the charter because the bank was unconstitutional.
What did he know?
Thomas Jefferson had numerous views about the Constitution which were rejected by the Framers. I see no reason to take his opinion over theirs. Doing so is simply more of
dgs49's ignoring the Constitution as it is in favor of the Constitution as he wishes it were.
What about the rest of my list, Andrew?
As I said, I have no inclination to go through your whole rhetorical litany. It suffices to say that nothing on your list constitutes an expenditure of federal money for a purpose which is merely local, rather than general. Therefore, all of them are justifiable under the General Welfare Clause. Not by your interpretation of that clause, to be sure, but your interpretation was one side of an early constitutional debate, and your side lost.
The Constitution says:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; ....
(U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8 (emphasis added).)
In another constitutional debate which Jefferson lost, he argued that (as he put it later):
Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but were restrained to those specifically enumerated; and that, as it was never meant they should provide for that welfare but by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not have been meant they should raise money for purposes which the enumeration did not place under their action; consequently, that the specification of powers is a limitation of the purposes for which they may raise money.
(Letter to Albert Gallatin, 16 June 1817.)
Alexander Hamilton, on the other hand, argued that:
The National Legislature has express authority "To lay and Collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the Common defence and general welfare" with no other qualifications than that "all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United states, that no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid unless in proportion to numbers ascertained by a census or enumeration taken on the principles prescribed in the Constitution, and that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state." These three qualifications excepted, the power to raise money is plenary, and indefinite; and the objects to which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive, than the payment of the public debts and the providing for the common defence and "general Welfare." The terms "general Welfare" were doubtless intended to signify more than was expressed or imported in those which Preceded; otherwise numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a Nation would have been left without a provision. The phrase is as comprehensive as any that could have been used; because it was not fit that the constitutional authority of the Union, to appropriate its revenues shou'd have been restricted within narrower limits than the "General Welfare" and because this necessarily embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification nor of definition.
It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the National Legislature, to pronounce, upon the objects, which concern the general Welfare, and for which under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems to be no room for a doubt that whatever concerns the general Interests of learning of Agriculture of Manufactures and of Commerce are within the sphere of the national Councils as far as regards an application of Money.
The only qualification of the generallity of the Phrase in question, which seems to be admissible, is this--That the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made be General and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular spot.
(
Report on Manufactures, 5 December 1791 (italics omitted).)
Hamilton won. As Joseph Story (Supreme Court Justice 1811-1845) put it:
A power to lay taxes for any purposes whatsoever is a general power; a power to lay taxes for certain specified purposes is a limited power. A power to lay taxes for the common defence and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power. It is limited to those objects. It cannot constitutionally transcend them. If the defence proposed by a tax be not the common defence of the United States, if the welfare be not general, but special, or local, as contradistinguished from national, it is not within the scope of the constitution. If the tax be not proposed for the common defence, or general welfare, but for other objects, wholly extraneous, (as for instance, for propagating Mahometanism among the Turks, or giving aids and subsidies to a foreign nation, to build palaces for its kings, or erect monuments to its heroes,) it would be wholly indefensible upon constitutional principles. The power, then, is, under such circumstances, necessarily a qualified power.
(2
Commentaries on the Constitution (1833) sec. 923.)
Jefferson also contended that:
For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. [Congress] are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose.
(Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, 15 February 1791 (italics omitted).)
That is a rather a bizarre argument: It amounts to saying that even if Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes for the general welfare, it does not have the power to spend for the general welfare the taxes which it has collected for the general welfare. What else is Congress supposed to do with those taxes once it has collected them? As Story observed, "if congress is authorized to lay taxes for such purposes, it would be strange, if, when raised, the money could not be applied to them. That would be to give a power for a certain end, and then deny the end intended by the power." (2
Commentaries on the Constitution, sec. 920.)
The Hamiltonian interpretation of the General Welfare Clause was officially adopted by a
conservative Supreme Court in
United States v. Butler, where the Court held that the General Welfare Clause is limited only by the qualification that "the powers of taxation and appropriation extend only to matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare." (297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936).) That, of course, is what Hamilton had said -- that "the object to which an appropriation of money is to be made [must] be General and not local; its operation extending in fact, or by possibility, throughout the Union, and not being confined to a particular spot."
There are many people, of whom
dgs appears to be one, who wish that Jefferson's view had prevailed. But it did not.
Moreover, the "discretion belongs to Congress" to determine what is in the general welfare, and the Supreme Court will reverse Congress only if "the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power." (
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).) Again, that is what Hamilton had said: "It is therefore of necessity left to the discretion of the National Legislature, to pronounce, upon the objects, which concern the general Welfare, and for which under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper."
And Congress evidently has never crossed that line, because "[n]o Taxing and Spending Clause statute has ever been invalidated because it did not serve the general welfare ...." (
The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2d ed. 2005) at p. 1005.) Your side lost the debate over the General Welfare Clause a long time ago. Live with it.
Reason is valuable only when it performs against the wordless physical background of the universe.