Plan B Forum

This is an astonishingly good Iran deal

Updated by Max Fisher on April 2, 2015, 8:48 p.m. ET @Max_Fisher max@vox.com


When Aaron Stein was studying nuclear non-proliferation at Middlebury University's Monterey graduate program, the students would sometimes construct what they thought would be the best possible nuclear inspection and monitoring regimes.

Years later, Stein is now a Middle East and nuclear proliferation expert with the Royal United Services Institute. And he says that the Iran nuclear framework agreement, announced on Thursday, look an awful lot like those ideal hypotheticals he'd put together in grad school.

"When I was doing my non-proliferation training at Monterey, this is the type of inspection regime that we would dream up in our heads," he said. "We would hope that this would be the way to actually verify all enrichment programs, but thought that would never be feasible."

"If these are the parameters by which the [final agreement] will be signed, then this is an excellent deal," Stein concluded.

The framework nuclear deal establishes only the very basics; negotiators will continue to meet to try to turn them into a complete, detailed agreement by the end of June. Still, the terms in the framework, unveiled to the world after a series of late- and all-night sessions, are remarkably detailed, and almost astoundingly favorable to the United States.

Like many observers, I doubted in recent months that Iran and world powers would ever reach this stage; the setbacks and delays had simply been too many. Now, here we are, and the terms are far better than expected. There are a number of details left to be worked out, including one very big unresolved issue that could potentially sink everything. This is not over. But if this framework does indeed become a full nuclear deal in July, it would be a huge success and a great deal.
Iran gives up the bulk of its nuclear program in these terms

Iran's then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad looks over centrifuges at the nuclear facility at Natanz (Photo by the Office of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran via Getty)

Iran's then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad looks over centrifuges at the nuclear facility at Natanz (Photo by the Office of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran via Getty)

The framework deal requires Iran to surrender some crucial components of its nuclear program, in part or even in whole. Here are the highlights:

Iran will give up about 14,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges
Iran will give up all but its most rudimentary, outdated centrifuges: its first-generation IR-1s, knock-offs of 1970s European models, are all it gets to keep. It will not be allowed to build or develop newer models.
Iran will give up 97 percent of its enriched uranium: it will hold on to only 300 kilograms of its 10,000 kilogram stockpile in its current form.
Iran will destroy or export the core of its plutonium plant at Arak, and replace it with a new core than cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. It will ship out all spent nuclear fuel.

Iran would simply not have much of its nuclear program left after all this.

A shorthand that people sometimes use to evaluate the size of Iran's nuclear program is its "breakout time." If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei woke up tomorrow morning and decided to kick out all of the inspectors and set his entire nuclear program toward building a nuclear warhead — to "break out" to a bomb — right now it would take him two or three months. Under the terms of the framework, his program would be so much smaller that it would take him an entire year to build a single nuclear warhead.

These terms are not abject surrender. Iran is allowed to keep a small nuclear program, and it won some concessions of its own. For example, what little uranium enrichment is allowed will be done at Iran's facility at Natanz — a hardened, reinforced-concrete structure that was once used for covert enrichment and that the US had hoped to close.

Iran will also be allowed to do some research at another hardened facility the US had wanted to close, at Fordow, though the research is restricted and will be barred from using fissile material. These are not big concessions, and they matter mostly for their symbolic value, but it's something.

Still, when you look at many of the specifics laid out in the framework, the hard numbers and timetables and the detailed proscriptions, those all tend to be quite favorable to the United States.
The core issue that the framework really nails

IAEA nuclear inspectors at Iran's nuclear facility at Natanz in 2014 (KAZEM GHANE/AFP/Getty)

IAEA nuclear inspectors at Iran's nuclear facility at Natanz in 2014 (KAZEM GHANE/AFP/Getty)

Even though the agreement is only a framework, the summary released on Thursday goes into striking detail on an issue that was always going to be among the most crucial: inspections.

Whatever number of centrifuges Iran has or doesn't have, whatever amount of uranium it's allowed to keep or forced to give up, none of it matters unless inspectors have enough authority to hold Tehran to its end of the deal — and to convince the Iranians that they could never get away with cheating. To say that the US got favorable terms here would be quite an understatement; the Iranians, when it comes to inspections, practically gave away the farm.

"I would give it an A," Stein said of the framework. When I asked why: "Because of the inspections and transparency."

There are two reasons that inspections are so important. The first is that super-stringent inspections are a deterrent: if the Iranians know that any deviation is going to be quickly caught, they have much less incentive to try to cheat, and much more incentive to uphold their side of the deal.

The second is that, if Iran were to try a build a nuclear weapon now, it likely wouldn't use the material that's already known to the world and being monitored. Rather, the Iranians would secretly manufacture some off-the-books centrifuges, secretly mine some off-the-books uranium, and squirrel it all away to a new, secret underground facility somewhere. That would be the only way for Iran to build up enough of an arsenal such that, by the time the world found out, it would be too late to do anything about it.

Really robust inspections would be the best way stop that from happening. They would prevent Iran from sneaking off centrifuges or siphoning away uranium that could be used to build an off-the-grid nuclear weapons program, without the world finding out.

The inspections issue has not gotten much political attention. When I spoke to Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury's Monterey Institute of International Studies, on Tuesday before the framework was announced, he seemed worried that negotiators would not focus on it much. Rather, overwhelming political focus in Washington and Tehran on issues like Iran's number of allowed centrifuges seemed likely to push inspections from the top priorities.

Lewis suggested that a top item on his wish-list would be inspections so robust that inspectors don't just get to visit enrichment sites like Natanz and Fordow, but also centrifuge factories. That, he said, "would be a big achievement."

Sure enough, come Thursday, Lewis got his wish, and then some: centrifuge factory inspections is one of the terms in the framework, and it's pretty robust. For the next 20 years, inspectors would have "continuous surveillance at Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities."

"I was shocked to read that they got them to agree to let us walk around their centrifuge production facilities. That's amazing," Stein said.

It's not just centrifuge factories. Inspectors will have access to all parts of Iran's nuclear supply chain, including its uranium mines and the mills where it processes uranium ore. Inspectors will also not just monitor but be required to pre-approve all sales to Iran of nuclear-related equipment. This provision also applies to something called "dual-use" materials, which means any equipment that could be used toward a nuclear program.

"The inspections and transparency on the rotors, and the bellows, and the uranium mines is more than I ever thought would be in this agreement," Stein added. [see link]

Syria "systematically" using chemical weapons
December 3, 2014, 8:18 PM

At the Hague Wednesday, the U.S. accused the Syrian regime of continuing to use chemical weapons on civilians as recently as September, despite claims that it has fully destroyed its stockpile as required under a 2013 U.N. treaty. The Obama administration frequently cites that U.S.-Russia brokered deal as a major foreign policy success, in part because the diplomatic agreement helped avert U.S. military strikes triggered by a sarin gas attack that killed hundreds of civilians outside Damascus.

Yet the Syrian regime has not been completely disarmed of that lethal cache, Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told members of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW.)

"Now there is compelling evidence that Syria continues to use chemical weapons systematically and repeatedly," Gottemoeller said.

In her prepared remarks, Gottemoeller laid out "key findings" from OPCW investigators which indicate that the regime used chemical weapons in attacks against opposition-controlled towns in northern Syria during April and May of this year and again in August and September. Eyewitness reports of regime helicopters indicate that the Syrian government carried these attacks out.

She also pointed to "serious concerns" that the OPCW has been unable to verify whether Syria has declared all of its chemicals, munitions and facilities associated with its weapons program.[You mean when you count on the crooks to tell you where their meth labs are they lie? Shocking...] The U.S. is "profoundly skeptical", Gottemoeller said, of Syrian claims that no records exist to corroborate the declaration that they have made.

"Indeed, chemical weapons capabilities may very well remain in the hands of the Syrian government," she said.

As for the ongoing inquiry into the weapons that Syria has publicly declared, U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak said more monitoring is needed. He said that the destruction of 12 weapons production facilities is "limping along" and is now significantly behind schedule.

it was a victory in fact if not in practice

rubato wrote:The Republicans blocked Obama's preferred, and much more vigorous, actions against Syria. If there is a failure it is theirs.


yrs,
rubato

House Speaker John Boehner will support strike on Syria

House Speaker John Boehner plans to vote to approve a measure authorizing U.S. military action against Syria, the Ohio Republican said after a meeting with President Barack Obama in the White House Tuesday.

“This is something that the United States and the country need to do. I’m going to support the president’s call for action,” Boehner said after the meeting with the president and other congressional leaders. "I believe that my colleagues should support this call for action."

In response to reports showing what the United States says is strong evidence that the Syrian government was responsible for a chemical attack that killed more than 1,000 civilians in August, Obama on Saturday said he would seek approval for a “limited” military strike in the region.

In a statement Tuesday, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor also said he would support Obama's call for action.

"I intend to vote to provide the President of the United States the option to use military force in Syria," Cantor said. "While the authorizing language will likely change, the underlying reality will not. America has a compelling national security interest to prevent and respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially by a terrorist state such as Syria, and to prevent further instability in a region of vital interest to the United States."

are you saying that Obama should have continued the deployment as an armed occupation without the consent of the Iraqi government

So basically your view is that no deal is possible and that a nuclear-armed Iran is inevitable?

so Jim, what you're saying is we should have had a president who agreed to sacrifice more American lives to keep a "moron" in power and blindly followed the FSA despite its insistence on installing sharia law in areas it controlled?

I'm gald to see we have a president who didn't blindly do either of those things.