(1) the Supremacy Clause, which provides that within the zone in which the US government is empowered to act, the acts of the US government trump the acts of the State governments; and
(2) the Tenth Amendment, which classifies four kinds of powers according to who possesses those powers: (a) only the US government, (b) both the US government and the State governments, (c) only the State governments, or (d) neither the US government nor the State governments.
B. Federalism also involves four bundles of other constitutional provisions:
(3) the dizzying array of powers which the Constitution confers upon the US government;
(4) the various prohibitions which the Constitution imposes upon the US government;
(5) the very few powers which the Constitution explicitly confers upon the State governments; and
(6) the various prohibitions which the Constitution imposes upon the State governments.
C. Finally, federalism also involves (7) the powers about which the Constitution says nothing at all.
For our purposes, the meaning of that provision is obvious: If the US government has the power to do something, and if the US government does that thing, then the State governments must yield to the US government. Such controversy as there has ever been about that core principle is long settled.[1]This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
Powers can be delegated expressly or impliedly. The Tenth Amendment deliberately does not limit the powers delegated to the US government to those "expressly" delegated. Therefore, powers can be delegated to the US government either expressly or impliedly.
(i) The State governments’ exclusive power to control the operation of the State. Subject to various constitutional restrictions, each State has the exclusive power to determine how long its governor’s term in office shall be, how long its legislators’ terms in office shall be, what political subdivisions (cities, counties, parishes, townships, etc.) shall exist within it, and so on.
(ii) The State governments’ exclusive general police power. In general, if I bludgeon my neighbor, the US government cannot prosecute me for doing that. There are special circumstances in which the US government can prosecute me for doing that: My neighbor might be a federal officer, I might bludgeon my neighbor on federal land or in the course of committing a federal crime, etc. But that is the point: For the US government to prosecute me for bludgeoning my neighbor, there must be special circumstances. Thus, the California government can prosecute me for bludgeoning my neighbor simply because I did so within California, but the US government cannot prosecute me for bludgeoning my neighbor simply because I did so within the US.
(iii) The State governments’ exclusive power to regulate matters which, although they deal with the same subject matter as do the powers of the US government, lie beyond the scope of the powers of the US government. For example, the US government has the power to lay and collect taxes to provide for the general welfare of the US. That power is limited by the qualification that the welfare for which the taxes are laid and collected must be general, not merely local. A State, on the other hand, has the power to lay and collect taxes to provide for the local welfare of any portion of that State, regardless of whether those taxes also provide for the welfare of any other portion of that State. In other words, States can lay and collect taxes to provide for some merely local welfare, whereas the US government cannot. So the States' power to lay and collect taxes for merely local welfare is one of the States' exclusive powers.
First, almost all of the powers which are prohibited to the State governments are either (a) expressly delegated to the US government[6] or (b) prohibited to the US government.[7] Almost all of the other powers which are prohibited to the State governments either (a) are conditioned on the consent of Congress[8] or (b) have been held to fall within one of the US government’s delegated powers.[9] So identifying a power which is prohibited to the State governments but is neither delegated to the US government nor prohibited to the US government is a daunting task.
Second, it is far from clear how the people could exercise their exclusive powers if not through the State or US governments. The people have the exclusive power, for example, to grant titles of nobility. How could they go about doing so without acting through the State or US governments? Even a popular vote would take place under the auspices of one government or another: Some governmental entity would be in charge of determining who may and who may not vote, in charge of counting the votes, etc.
For example, the Constitution tells us that the US government has the power “To regulate Commerce … among the several States” (Article I, Section 8). And the Tenth Amendment tells us, redundantly, that because Article I, Section 8, gives the US government that power, the US government does, indeed, have that power. But the Tenth Amendment tells us nothing about how broad or narrow that power is.
--> If A has a State-granted monopoly of steam navigation on that State’s waters, but B has a US-granted coasting license and runs competing boats between that State and another State, does the US-granted coasting license trump the State-granted monopoly?[10]
--> What if a sugar company acquires all of the stock of its leading competitors, thereby securing control of almost all of the sugar refining in the United States? Does the US government’s power to regulate interstate commerce reach that company’s activities, even though they take place only within one State? What if meat companies combine with the intent to restrain interstate commerce, but each company’s acts occur solely within a single State?[11]
--> What if the US government has not chosen to regulate interstate railroad traffic? Does that mean that each State government is free to regulate railroad traffic within its own borders? Or does the US government’s power to regulate interstate railroad traffic preempt the State governments from regulating railroad traffic within their own borders, even though the US government has not exercised its power to regulate interstate railroad traffic?[12]
The Tenth Amendment sheds no light on such questions. It tells us that the US government has the power to regulate interstate commerce – which is, of course, exactly what Article I, Section 8 has already told us – but it tells us nothing about how far that power extends, about what things are within the scope of that power and what things are not.
That is why the Supreme Court observed that the Tenth Amendment “leav[es] the question, whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government [the US government], or prohibited to the other [a State government], to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument [the Constitution].”[13]
Simply shouting “Tenth Amendment! Tenth Amendment!” may be emotionally satisfying, but it is analytically useless. In the end, to determine what the US government’s power to regulate interstate commerce – or any of the US government’s other powers – does and does not include, we must construe the power itself. The Tenth Amendment, notwithstanding the importance of the constitutional principle which it (re)states, is simply not helpful in answering such questions.
There is another issue: If the US government has the power to regulate a certain subject, but the US government does not regulate that subject, are the State governments free to regulate that subject? (See Part III.D below.) We will squarely confront that issue when we address Congress’s power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” (Art. I, Sec. 8).
2. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. 316, 406.
3. The power to coin money is delegated to the US government in Article I, Section 8; the power to enter into treaties is delegated to the US government in Article II, Section 2; and both powers are prohibited to the States in Article I, Section 10.
4. The power to tax is delegated to the US government in Article I, Section 8; it is not prohibited to the State governments in anything in the Constitution.
5. For example, subject to various constitutional restrictions, the States have the exclusive power to determine who is qualified to vote for Representatives in the US Congress. (See Article I, Section 2.) Also subject to various constitutional restrictions, the States -- specifically, the State legislatures -- have the exclusive power to determine how presidential electors are chosen. (See Article II, Section 1.) The most obvious constitutional restriction is race: No State may exclude African-Americans from voting for Representatives, and no State legislature may exclude African-Americans from choosing presidential electors (unless it excludes the public generally, which it has the power to do).
6. The State governments are prohibited from entering into treaties, and the US government is empowered to enter into treaties. The State governments are prohibited from granting letters of marque and reprisal, and the US government is empowered to grant letters of marque and reprisal. The State governments are prohibited from coining money, and the US government is empowered to coin money. The State governments are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, and the US government is empowered to borrow money on the credit of the US. (See Article I, Sections 8 and 10.)
7. The State governments are prohibited from passing bills of attainder, and so is the US government. The State governments are prohibited from passing ex post facto laws, and so is the US government. The State governments are prohibited from granting titles of nobility, and so is the US government. (See Article I, Sections 9 and 10.)
8. See Article I, Section 10.
9. The State governments are prohibited from “mak[ing] any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts” (Article I, Section 10). The power to do so is not expressly delegated to the US government, but it has been held to be impliedly delegated to the US government under the express power “To coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof” (Article I, Section 8). (See Gold Clause Cases (1935) 294 U.S. 240, 294 U.S. 317, and 294 U.S. 330.)
The odd one out here is the Constitution's prohibition of the State governments' enacting "any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts" (Article I, Section 10). There is no parallel provision either delegating the power to do so to the US government or prohibiting the US government from doing so. For a time, the Supreme Court held that the powers of US government were restricted by the "liberty of contract" which the Court found in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court has largely abandoned that view. We will confront that issue when we discuss the substance of the US government's power to regulate interstate commerce.
10. See Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 22 U.S. 1 (holding that the US-granted coastal license trumped the State-granted monopoly).
11. Compare E. C. Knight Co. v. US (1895) 156 U.S. 1 (holding that the sugar monopoly was beyond the reach of the US government’s power to regulate interstate commerce) with Swift & Co. v. US (1905) 196 U.S. 375 (holding that the US government’s power to regulate interstate commerce reached even the intrastate activities of companies which intended to restrain interstate commerce).
12. Compare Peik v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. (1877) 94 U.S. 164 (holding that in the absence of regulation by the US government, a State government could regulate a railroad’s intrastate activities) with Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois (1886) 118 U.S. 557 (holding that even in the absence of regulation by the US government, if a railroad was part of an interstate network, a State could not regulate the railroad’s intrastate activities).
See also Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. (1829) 27 U.S. 245 (referring in passing to “the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state”) and Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia (1852) 53 U.S. 299 (holding that when the subject matter of the commerce requires a uniform national rule, only the US government may regulate it; but if the commerce is of a local nature, and the US government has not exercised its power to regulate that commerce, a State government may regulate that commerce).
13. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. 316, 406.