BoSoxGal wrote: ↑Mon May 16, 2022 4:16 pm
I hope that Sue will share her perspective on this case.
Be careful what you wish for.
Just as a factual matter as to value, it's not a "$15 million oil change," that's just a gimmicky headline. It's a claim for damages for the injury and wrongful death of a 42-year-old man who was providing for his wife and children. And just because the lawsuit demands $15 million as compensation, that doesn't mean that's what will be ultimately awarded; that's for a jury to decide based on the proofs of the decedent's pain & suffering and the economic loss to the survivors. In Michigan, apparently, you can plead a monetary amount in the complaint that starts the lawsuit (some states allow it, some states require it to meet a jurisdictional threshold, and some states -- like mine -- prohibit mentioning a specific amount for personal injury damages). By way of comparison, if this case were venued in NJ or NY, I would estimate "full value" of damages at twice that amount, with a "reasonable" settlement being in the $10-15 million range depending on all available insurance coverage.
Okay, moving on to liability rules, let's start with the basics, which here means that liability for both automobile-related injuries and workplace injuries is highly regulated by statute rather than common law, since both are subject to compulsory insurance. (So if you want to blame someone for how complicated and fucked up some of these systems are, blame legislators and insurance companies. Lawyers are just navigating through the rules they created.) So although common-law principles of negligence generally apply, they are substantially modified by both the auto and workers comp statutes.
Section 257.401 of Michigan's Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part:
The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family.
So you can see from the highlights that the automobile owner (and the owner's insurer) is liable as long as the vehicle is operated with the owner's "consent or knowledge." And this right here is why there is a defense to liability, because the language of this statute is subject to interpretation. I do not know if there is Michigan case law that specifically addresses this issue, but if I were defending this case, I'd argue that there was no "consent or knowledge" regarding the auto dealership allowing an unlicensed driver unfamiliar with a stick shift to operate the vehicle. To the extent he allowed the dealership to "drive," it is a reasonable to expect that the dealership ensure that its staff is minimally qualified to do so.
Problem is, if the vehicle owner gets out of the case, the deceased employee's family is left with no compensation beyond worker's comp, because comp is the legislative trade-off for workplace injuries in lieu of suing the employer for its or co-employees' negligence. In Michigan, the comp death benefit is an average of the highest 39 paid weeks during the last 52 weeks of employment, and it is paid out for a maximum of 500 weeks. So if the deceased was making $2,000/wk (~100k/year), the maximum his family would receive from comp is $1 million -- paid over 10 years. And that is nothing in a case like this.
So that's where the statutes would leave the bereaved under ordinary circumstances as a matter of legislative policy choices. But common sense and a decent respect for the value of human life tell us that the employer's negligence in this case was far beyond the ordinary dumbfuckery of running a business involving dangerous machinery, and the dealership
*should* be held responsible for the loss. What's a judge to do?
In this case, the trial court got around the statutes by allowing for indemnity as kind of a legal fiction to make the vehicle owner merely a pass-through for the dealership's liability. The question now becomes whether it is permissible to get this kind of liability through the "back door" of indemnification when direct liability is barred by the comp statute. And I'm gonna guess this will be a loser on appeal because this is the exceptional case that would contradict the legislature's express public policy decision regarding compensation for workplace injury. Michigan law allows for an exception to the "comp bar" only where the employer has committed an "intentional" wrong.
In my state, we solved this problem judicially with a series of cases that would allow for direct employer liability in limited circumstances despite the comp bar. Now, an employee can sue an employer directly where the employer's conduct was so flagrant as to effectively be an "intentional" wrong or where it was substantially certain that someone would be injured or killed by the act or practice.
See, e.g., Millison v. E.I. du Pont (employer concealed evidence of advancing asbestos disease in employees' medical exams) and
Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery (employer's removal of a safety guard on machinery was substantially certain to result in injury).* Whether this Michigan case rises to that level of "intentional" wrong or "substantial certainty" of injury -- or whether anyone is even arguing that Michigan courts adopt this approach -- is anyone's guess.
* Point of personal pride:
Millison and
Laidlow were both litigated up to the NJ Supreme Court by friends and mentors of mine, and I have used both precedents to obtain rulings on employer liability in the first-ever use of "offensive collateral estoppel" in NJ, on behalf of one of the original
Millison plaintiffs. (Unfortunately, my decisions went unpublished.)
ETA:
ex-khobar Andy wrote: ↑Mon May 16, 2022 5:22 pm
How can one lawyer represent both the dealership and the Jeep owner if they are appealing the indemnification ruling?
To the extent that the indemnification riling means that liability for the Jeep owner = liability for the dealership, they have an identity of interests with respect to the issue. So with proper consent of the parties and waiver of any other conflicts, one lawyer can represent both. Moreover, the dealership's liability insurer and excess insurer stand to be on the hook for substantially more of any damages awarded than the Jeep owner's auto insurer. Auto coverage is probably $100k or less, while I would guess that the dealership probably has between $5 and $10 million in liability coverage.