Plan B Forum

I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg;

and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle.

What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this:

You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him.

You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.

Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.

I beg you will not consider this a prosecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

Abraham Lincoln

HIGH TIDE AND GROIN BRASS

To Mrs. George G. Meade:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Gettysburg, Pa., July 5, 1863

I hardly know when I last wrote to you, so many and such stirring events have occurred. I think I have written since the battle, but am not sure. It was a grand battle, and the men behaved splendidly. They endured long marches, short rations, and stood one of the most terrific cannonadings I ever witnessed. At one time things looked a little blue; but I managed to get up reinforcements in time to save the day.

This morning has been most vexing. Lee and his army have disappeared from our front, but we are quite unable to pursue. There is exhaustion of the entire army, such that a brief period of recruitment is forced upon us. Many officers have been rendered hors de combat, amongst which I particularly mention Generals Reynolds, Hancock and Sickles. Reynolds was killed on the first day, Hancock wounded on the last day, and the third lost a leg on the second day, which would have been a significant advance to our cause had it happened two days before the battle.

A field of combat with all its detritus of equipment, of wounded and dead, is quite affecting. Early today I walked the ridge that marked our most gallant action of July 3, from south to north, and then east to the large hill. My reverie was broken when I espied my orderly, Kowell, crouched over the body of a fallen warrior. Supposing it to be some boon comrade, I approached respectfully, to avoid intrusion upon his grief. Startled nevertheless, he spread wide his hands and cried out “I never did it”. I saw at once that the body was of a rebel soldier. “Fear not,” said I and assured him that the taking of life in battle does not place the soul in jeopardy from the Lord of Hosts.

At this, Kowell gave a peculiar grin and appeared much more at ease, giving further proof that the common soldier is so often relieved at the depth of my understanding. I noted he held in his outspread hands a photograph of the dead man, a watch with its fob, and a few small coins along with a gold tooth. Kowell explained in a most satisfactory manner that the dead boy was one Wesley Culp, of the family for which the nearby hill was named. In the course of only two days, Kowell had somehow made himself the protector of the boy’s sister, and felt it his duty to return to her the few small possessions of her fallen kin. It appears the tooth had come loose owing to a lack of fresh vegetables in the rebel commissary, and Kowell said it was necessary to remove it, so that neither camp followers nor shirkers would despoil the corpse.

While commending his industrious compassion, I was forced later this afternoon to dismiss him as my orderly. Poor Hancock is in great pain, a brass nail from his saddle having been driven into a most delicate area. The wretched Kowell was overheard telling other soldiers that the general’s problem was merely a little prick. Such dismissive diminution of a superior officer’s serious condition cannot be countenanced.

Baldy was shot again, and I fear will not get over it. Two horses that George rode were killed, his own and the black mare. But we are both safe and I find that regardless of risk, the most difficult part of my work is acting without any intelligence on which to predicate action.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Gettysburg, Pa., July 5, 1863.
It was a grand battle, and is in my judgment a most decided victory, though I did not annihilate or bag the Confederate Army. This morning they retired in great haste into the mountains, leaving their dead unburied and their wounded on the field. They awaited one day, expecting that, flushed with success, I would attack them when they would play their old game of shooting us from behind breastworks — a game we played this time to their entire satisfaction.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Frederick, July 8, 1863.
I arrived here yesterday; the army is assembling at Middletown. I think we shall have another battle before Lee can cross the river, though from all accounts he is making great efforts to do so. For my part, as I have to follow and fight him, I would rather do it at once and in Maryland than to follow into Virginia . . . From the time I took command till to-day, now over ten days, I have not changed my clothes, have not had a regular night’s rest, and many nights not a wink of sleep, and for several days did not even wash my face and hands, no regular food, and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety . . . I send you a document received yesterday afternoon. It will give you pleasure I know. Preserve it, because the terms in which the General in Chief speaks of the battle are stronger than any I have deemed it proper to use myself. I never claimed a victory, though I stated that Lee was defeated in his efforts to destroy my army. I am going to move as soon as I can get the army supplied with subsistence and ammunition.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, South Mountain Pass, July 10, 1863.

Lee has not crossed and does not intend to cross the river, and I expect in a few days, if not sooner, again to hazard the fortune of war. I know so well that this is a fortune and that accidents, etc., turn the tide of victory, that, until the question is settled, I cannot but be very anxious. If it should please God again to give success to our efforts, then I could be more tranquil.

Ialso see that my success at Gettysburg has deluded the people and the Government with the idea that I must always be victorious, that Lee is demoralized and disorganized, etc., and other delusions which will not only be dissipated by any reverse that I should meet with, but would react in proportion against me.I have already had a very decided correspondence with General Halleck upon this point, he pushing me on, and I informing him I was advancing as fast as I could. The firm stand I took had the result to induce General Halleck to tell me to act according to my judgment. I am of opinion that Lee is in a strong position and determined to fight before he crosses the river.

I believe if he had been able to cross when he first fell back that he would have done so; but his bridges being destroyed he has been compelled to make a stand and will of course make a desperate one. The army is in fine spirits, and if I can only manage to keep them together, and not be required to attack a position too strong, I think there is a chance for me. However, it is all in God's hands. I make but little account of myself, and think only of the country.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 14, 1863.
I found Lee in a very strong position, intrenched. I hesitated to attack him, without some examination of the mode of approaching him. I called my corps commanders together, and they voted against attacking him. This morning, when I advanced to feel his position and seek for a weak point, I found he had retired in the night and was nearly across the river. I immediately started in pursuit, and my cavalry captured two thousand prisoners, two guns, several flags, and killed General Pettigrew. On reporting these facts to General Halleck, he informed me the President was very much dissatisfied at the escape of Lee. I immediately telegraphed I had done my duty to the best of my ability, and that the expressed dissatisfaction of the President I considered undeserved censure, and asked to be immediately relieved.In reply he said it was not intended to censure me, but only to spur me on to an active pursuit, and that ‘it was not deemed sufficient cause for relieving me.' This is exactly what I expected; unless I did impracticable things, fault would be found with me. I have ignored the senseless adulation of the public and press, and I am now just as indifferent to the censure bestowed without just cause.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berlin, Md., July 16, 1863.
I wrote to you of the censure put on me by the President, through General Halleck, because I did not bag General Lee, and of the course I took on it. I don't know whether I informed you of Halleck's reply, that his telegram was not intended as a censure, but merely ''to spur me on to an active pursuit," which I consider more offensive than the original message; for no man who does his duty, and all that he can do, as I maintain I have done, needs spurring. It is only the laggards and those who fail to do all they can do who require spurring. They have refused to relieve me, but insist on my continuing to try to do what I know in advance it is impossible to do. My army (men and animals) is exhausted; it wants rest and reorganization; it has been greatly reduced and weakened by recent operations, and no reinforcements of any practical value have been sent. Yet, in the face of all these facts, well known to them, I am urged, pushed and spurred to attempting to pursue and destroy an army nearly equal to my own, falling back upon its resources and reinforcements, and increasing its morale daily. This has been the history of all my predecessors, and I clearly saw that in time their fate would be mine. This was the reason I was disinclined to take the command, and it is for this reason I would gladly give it up

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 7, 1863.
I see the Herald is constantly harping on the assertion that Gettysburg was fought by the corps commanders and the common soldiers, and that no generalship was displayed. I suppose after a while it will be discovered I was not at Gettysburg at all.

he found himself named commander of an army instead of one corps within that army (Gettysburg was fought on days 3 4 and 5 of his command):

MajGenl.Meade wrote:From the actual Meade Letters beginning 7 days after he found himself named commander of an army instead of one corps within that army (Gettysburg was fought on days 3 4 and 5 of his command):
... I am going to move as soon as I can get the army supplied with subsistence and ammunition.[/background]

"...

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, South Mountain Pass, July 10, 1863.

Lee has not crossed and does not intend to cross the river, and I expect in a few days, if not sooner, again to hazard the fortune of war. I know so well that this is a fortune and that accidents, etc., turn the tide of victory, that, until the question is settled, I cannot but be very anxious. If it should please God again to give success to our efforts, then I could be more tranquil. ... "

Ialso see that my success at Gettysburg has deluded the people and the Government with the idea that I must always be victorious, that Lee is demoralized and disorganized, etc., and other delusions which will not only be dissipated by any reverse that I should meet with, but would react in proportion against me.I have already had a very decided correspondence with General Halleck upon this point, he pushing me on, and I informing him I was advancing as fast as I could. The firm stand I took had the result to induce General Halleck to tell me to act according to my judgment. I am of opinion that Lee is in a strong position and determined to fight before he crosses the river.

I believe if he had been able to cross when he first fell back that he would have done so; but his bridges being destroyed he has been compelled to make a stand and will of course make a desperate one. The army is in fine spirits, and if I can only manage to keep them together, and not be required to attack a position too strong, I think there is a chance for me. However, it is all in God's hands. I make but little account of myself, and think only of the country.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 14, 1863.
I found Lee in a very strong position, intrenched. I hesitated to attack him, without some examination of the mode of approaching him. I called my corps commanders together, and they voted against attacking him. This morning, when I advanced to feel his position and seek for a weak point, I found he had retired in the night and was nearly across the river. I immediately started in pursuit, and my cavalry captured two thousand prisoners, two guns, several flags, and killed General Pettigrew. On reporting these facts to General Halleck, he informed me the President was very much dissatisfied at the escape of Lee. I immediately telegraphed I had done my duty to the best of my ability, and that the expressed dissatisfaction of the President I considered undeserved censure, and asked to be immediately relieved.In reply he said it was not intended to censure me, but only to spur me on to an active pursuit, and that ‘it was not deemed sufficient cause for relieving me.' This is exactly what I expected; unless I did impracticable things, fault would be found with me. I have ignored the senseless adulation of the public and press, and I am now just as indifferent to the censure bestowed without just cause.

I have received by special courier a few lines from General Lee in which he sympathizes with me in the failure, but says he is satisfied I have done right, and he hopes I will not resign,

"My Dear General Weygand,

You have conducted yourself in an exemplary fashion; I wouldn't change a thing...hang in there...

Your devoted friend,

Karl

Gerd von Rundstedt"

It would not be wise for us to advert to such an indorsement so this must remain entre nous.

His note reminded me that we were both hampered in the execution of our strategy by a lack of intelligence.

The (Secret) Life and Letters of General George Gordon Meade
By Major General George Gordon Meade
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Copyright © 2007, 2008 All Rights Reserved

Editor's Note: In the more than 100 years since his decease, the General has been busy reconstructing from memory his secret, lost letters which shed new light on topics of great interest to the members of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable. He currently is living in Bloemfontein South Africa working on a complimentary biography of General D. E. Sickles (decs'd) and may be contacted at Majgenlmeade @ aol.com.

THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: A STUD IN COMMAND

To Mrs. George G. Meade

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 9, 1864.

I had a letter to-night from Cortlandt Parker, reporting that Stanton, who is an enthusiastic admirer of Grant, says that Grant has a most exalted opinion of me. Grant told Stanton, that when he first came East he thought Sherman was the first soldier in the country, but now he believed I was Sherman’s equal, if not superior. I certainly think Grant has a queer way of showing his appreciation and I learn only at third hand of these improvements in his powers of reasoning. Contemplating the past months, despite the ignorance of journalists, reflected among certain senators at Washington, I really do believe that I have wrought a change in Grant.

Entre nous, at supper last Wednesday, Warren made an obscure remark that Sherman and Sheridan were Grant’s favorites simply because their names commenced with the ‘sh’ sound that Grant found so congenial. Upon my enquiry, nothing would do for Warren but to sit at table muttering “shertainly shir”, which convulsed the company, but left me nonplussed. To my knowledge, Grant does not number a speech impediment among his weaknesses.

Have you ever thought that since the first week after Gettysburg, now more than a year, I have never been alluded to in public journals except to abuse and vilify me? And why this is I have never been able to imagine. Grant and Sherman are puffed up in periodicals, but it cannot be argued that either of them has achieved success against a foe remotely comparable to Lee. No other commander has so mauled and baffled the famous Lee, a task which my army continues even now, with Grant taking all the credit of course.

Who after all is Beauregard, and what are Pemberton and Bragg? True, Grant has a certain plodding tenacity and a disregard for withdrawal and defeat. Such words, along with temperance and grace, are not within his lexicon. As for Sherman, he is opposed by a man indelicately referred to by some as “Slow Joe”, against whom I venture even Butler would shine. Were it not for an accident at Pittsburgh Landing, which removed the adequate rebel General A. S. Johnston at the very moment he was sweeping them both from the field, our two lions would today be roaring even further to the west, escorting government incompetents to defraud the Indian tribes.

Whatever is said today, you can be sure that time and history will vindicate my reputation. Future generations will debate the facts of our various campaigns with dispassion. They cannot fail to acknowledge that Grant and Sherman, measured against lesser foes, are not at all of the same quality as the victor at Gettysburg. Indeed, if Lee is lauded as the finest general of the Confederacy, and yet it is my army that drives his to its death, then there is only one candidate for recognition as the preeminent commander of this entire rebellion.

There was an awful explosion to-day at City Point of a powder and ammunition vessel. It is said sixty were killed and one hundred and fifty wounded. The weather continues awfully hot, but the army is in good health.

the Herald is constantly harping on the assertion that Gettysburg was fought by the corps commanders and the common soldiers, and that no generalship was displayed.

When the battle was over, the Army of the Potomac suffered 23,049 casualties. The Army of Northern Virginia suffered 28,000 casualties. With a total of 51,000 casualties, the Battle of Gettysburg is bloodiest battle in American history.

Editor's Note: In the more than 100 years since his decease, the General has been busy reconstructing from memory his secret, lost letters

Meade wasn't sitting in a tent LJ - remember that the commanding general was required to maintain an HQ position so that corps commanders, messengers and so forth could locate them. Meade's HQ was a little house behind the clump of trees