Plan B Forum

Oddly, every girl who ever went out with me had one as well.

Long Run wrote:The Arizona Memorial is a visit that is well worth the time when in Honolulu.

MajGenl.Meade wrote:oldr, don't you suspect that many of us already are?

Miles wrote:The message, when it was received, made no mention of imediate war it only declared that diplamatic relations were at a stalemate, paraphazing. Even if they had been delivered ontime it was designed to give no warning as to an attack that would have been on it's way as the message was being delivered.

rubato wrote:The goal of the Japanese was to deliver the declaration of war before the attack

Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

The Japanese Invasion of Malaya (also called the Battle of Kota Bharu) began just after midnight on 8 December 1941 (local time) before the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first major battle of the Pacific War, and was fought between ground forces of the British Indian Army and the Empire of Japan.

Meeting of Committee of Advisement
Dec. 8-7:40 A. M.
(12:40 P. M., 7 Dec., Pearl Harbor time.)
In the Imperial Palace

First, the Navy Minister reported on the military action against American and British Troops which had been in progress since this morning in the Malayan, Hong Kong and Hawaiian areas.

1st President of the Council-I propose that a Committee of Advisement headed by the Vice-President of the Council, and constituted of all the members of the Advisory Council, meet immediately and consider this matter.

Premier Tojo-explained the reasons for declaring war.

Advisor Ishii-At what time will war be declared? It is necessary to make sure that America and Britain don't saddle us with the responsibility.

Premier-We hope for an immediate declaration.

[2]

Advisor Kubota-A state of war already exists, but what is the viewpoint of the Imperial Headquarters.

Premier-At the conference of Dec. 1 they determined to commence hostilities against England, America, and the Netherlands.

Advisor Shimizu-What is the attitude of Thailand?

Premier-It is not yet clear, but negotiations are in progress for a policy Mutual Defense.

Advisor Shimizu-Aren't we going to declare war on Holland?

Premier-We are not declaring war against Holland because of military expediency.

The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end. The Japanese tried to uphold the conventions of war while still achieving surprise, but the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5,000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, but transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese ambassador to deliver it in time. (In fact, U.S. code breakers had already deciphered and translated most of the message hours before he was scheduled to deliver it.)

The final part of the "14 Part Message" is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations, it was viewed by a number of senior U.S government and military officials as a very strong indicator that negotiations were likely to be terminated and that war might break out at any moment. A declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

For decades, conventional wisdom held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a break in relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington. In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at International Christian University in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations ... [a]nd they clearly prevailed."