Message for Gob

[Andrew D]

Andrew--while I disagree with what you propose re unilateral action, I appreciate your genuine concern re use of chemical weapons against civilians. But I will ask you, is this concern limited only to chemical weapons, or are there other weapons whose use against civilians must/should be met with the same response (even unilaterally)? I am trying to assess the scope of responsibility you are saying the US must assume to make war somehow more civil.

There are the big three of weapons of mass destruction: biological, chemical, and nuclear.

And I venture to guess that if the Assad regime had thrown nuclear weapons around, this board would be nearly unanimous in demanding that someone -- the UN, NATO, the Arab League, the US, someone -- make sure that the Assad regime did not do so again.

I have emphasized the use of chemical weapons against civilians, because that is what occurred in this instance. In the context of your question, however, we should recall that using chemical weapons against anyone -- civilians or combatants -- violates a peremptory norm of international law. As does using biological or nuclear weapons against anyone.

There are hard questions here. If one side uses biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, does that circumstance justify the other side's doing likewise. (Under international law, the answer is "no," but that might not be the first time that international law has failed to accord with international reality. Which is not necessarily a bad thing: Much of international law must be candidly regarded as aspirational, and there is a valuable place for aspiration in international relations.)

But that is yet another reason for someone -- the UN, NATO, the Arab League, the US, someone -- to act in the face of the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons: If no one does anything, the opposition (or some faction(s) of the opposition) may feel entitled to do likewise, which leads to a chemical-weapons holocaust.

[Andrew D]

Continuing an answer to Big RR's question:

Another reason to enforce the peremptory norm of international law against the use of chemical (or biological or nuclear) weapons against civilians (or against anyone else) is simply that it is a peremptory norm of international law.

It is analogous to taxation. I pay taxes which go, in part, to things of which I disapprove but of which many people approve (the second Iraq war, the War on Drugs, etc.). Other people pay taxes which go, in part, to things of which they disapprove but of which I approve (Social Security, Medicare, the Affordable Care Act, etc.).

My and their paying taxes which go, in part, to things of which we disapprove is grounded in our recognition of a greater reality: If everyone refuses to pay taxes which go to things of which he or she disapproves, the entire system grinds to a halt, and that is worse for everyone. And we punish people who refuse to pay their taxes even if we sympathize with their reasons for their refusal.

Likewise with respect to the international law governing the use of weapons of mass destruction. Even if we have some sympathy for those who use them -- and, more germanely, if we have other reasons to be reluctant to enforce that international law -- we enforce (or, at least, we should enforce) that international law, because if we do not, the whole international legal regime governing the use of weapons of mass destruction collapses.

I have made no secret of my cynicism about the efficacy of international bodies in enforcing international law. Nonetheless, I harbor great hope for international law.

There was a time when the efficacy of US law vis-à-vis the States was in great doubt. Over time, the States have become one nation. But that took the enforcement of US law against the interests of various States.

The efficacy of international law vis-à-vis individual nations is in great doubt. I have hope that over time, the individual nations will become one real international community. But that will take the enforcement of international law against the interests of various individual nations.

Enforcing -- really enforcing -- against the Assad regime the international prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, even against the interests of various individual nations, is an opportunity for the nations of the world to recognize, collectively, that the interests of the whole world prevail over the interests of individual nations. We have that opportunity before us. I continue to hope that we will seize it.

[Big RR]

There was a time when the efficacy of US law vis-à-vis the States was in great doubt. Over time, the States have become one nation. But that took the enforcement of US law against the interests of various States.

I agree Andrew, but in those cases it was the entity which enacted those laws, the federal government, that enforced them by force (or, more precisely, chose which parts of the laws it would enforce by use of military power). If one individual state, say Delaware, had chosen to use its national guard and attack Alabama to enforce the US law, I doubt it would have been embraced as a justified action, even if the US government were perceived as ineffective.

However, what you are suggesting here is exactly the same; the international consortium, for whatever reason, will not enforce the law, and so you are suggesting an individual state, the US, take it upon itself to enforce what the international community will not (or cannot). I have stated in many previous posts why I think such an act on the part of the US would be perceived as nothing but self-serving (especially given our history in this area), but even if the US were entirely interested only in enforcing international law, it would not be seen as such by many in the international community (on all sides of these issues). Indeed, I don't think it would be seen as

the interests of the whole world prevail over the interests of individual nations

, but rather, the interests of the US prevail over the interests of the whole--might makes right. Such a view would blunt the message you appear to earnestly hope would be sent.

IMHO, if the international community will not act, we accomplish little in punishing the breaking of international law; if there is a pressing need to protect civilians against an imminent attack, perhaps we should act to stop the attack, but we should not act to punish. One country, even one as strong as the US, is not the entire world.

[Andrew D]

You make a good point, Big RR. Nonetheless, I disagree that Delaware's sending its troops into Alabama -- and I am assuming for the sake of your hypothesis that Delaware's troops would have the wherewithal to enforce US law against Alabama -- would not have been seen as justified. My guess (and neither of us can do more than guess) is that it would have been seen by some as justified and by others as unjustified.

And there are at least two significant differences between the positions of the States vis-à-vis the US and the position of the US vis-à-vis the UN:

First, although Congress has the power to call State troops into service to the US government (see U.S. Const., Art. I Sec. 8), nothing in the Constitution requires that the States maintain any troops to be called into such service. But the States have maintained such troops and gone along with their having been called into service to the US government.

The UN Charter, in contrast, requires Member States "to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces," and prescribes that such agreements "shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council." It further provides that "Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action." (U.N. Charter, Art. 43 Secs. 1 and 3 and Art. 45.) As far as I know, no Member State has entered into any enduring agreement to make available to the Security Council any such armed forces, and no Member State has actually held its air-force contingents available for UN action.

Second, Congress has exercised its power to enforce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and other constitutional Amendments. (E.g., the abolition of peonage and the Voting Rights Act.) The US government has also enforced such constitutional provisions once the Supreme Court has established them as norms of US constitutional law. (E.g., the forcible integration of public schools.)

In contrast, as far as I know, the UN Security Council has authorized the use of force only twice: the Korean War and the First Iraq War. And the authorization of the Korean War happened only because the Soviet Union walked out of the Security Council session in which that authorization was made, and China's seat on the Security Council was held at that time by the Republic of China (Taiwan).

The situation of the States vis-à-vis a US government which has on numerous occasions shown its willingness to enforce the US Constitution is one thing. The situation of the US vis-à-vis a UN whose Member States have never lived up to their obligations and whose Security Council which has almost never shown any willingness to enforce the UN Charter seems to me to be quite another.

One can make the argument that if the US can legally take action to punish Assad's use of chemical weapons against civilians and deter others from doing the same, then any other country can legally take action to punish the US's violation of any rule of international law. But not all rules of international law are on the same footing. The prohibition of the use chemical weapons against civilians is a peremptory norm -- a rule of international law from which no derogation is permitted under any circumstances. (Again, averting the eradication of the entire human species is a special case, one which international law does not appear to have adequately dealt with.)

True, there is no universal agreement on exactly which rules of international law are such peremptory norms. But it is difficult to make the case that the rule against using weapons of mass destruction against civilians is not one of them. (Conversely, it is difficult to make the case that the rule of international law requiring that workers be given "remuneration for public holidays" is a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted under any circumstances. (International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Art. 7(d).))

Even setting all that aside, however, my bottom line is that I do not care how many other nations would or would not see as justified the US's taking action to punish Assad for using chemical weapons against civilians and to deter others from doing the same. If I had to take action to prevent one child in a sandbox from gouging out the eyes of another child in that sandbox with a pointed stick, I would not care whether anyone else did or did not see my action as justified. The rule against children's putting each other's eyes out with pointed sticks needs to be enforced, and those who take exception to such enforcement can -- unless they are willing to provide an alternative and adequate method for its enforcement -- go pound sand.

[Big RR]

Point take Andrew, but I do see a big difference between taking an (even violent) action to avoid immediate harm (such as breaking up the eye gouging in the sandbox) and taking such an action to prevent something that might happen from occurring (such as going into the child's house and seizing all his pencils and other sharpened sticks because he might use them to gouge out eyes). IMHO, the latter is more akin to what is happening here. Yes, we know Assad is capable of these brutal actions, and yes, he has the means to do the same thing again (at least I presume he does), but he is not in the process of doing any such thing. An individual (or individual nation) is justified in stepping in to prevent the immediate harm, but not to take action to prevent something they think might occur. I think only the broader international community (or the government in your sandbox example) could do that.

[Andrew D]

"Not in the process of doing" seems to me an inadequate standard: The US should take action against Assad only if the US takes such action while Assad's chemical-weapons rockets are in midair?

Your analogy to going into a child's house strikes me as not entirely apt. I am talking about taking action in Syria, where the violation of the peremptory norm of international law occurred, not in some other country -- in the sandbox, as it were, not somewhere else.

You see a child in a sandbox try to gouge out another child's eye with a pointed stick. You intervene and prevent that from happening. You observe that the child has a pile of pointed sticks. You also observe that nearby parents are studiously ignoring the entire course of events.

Are you justified in taking away the child's pointed sticks and dragging him and kicking and screaming out of the sandbox, even if you have to pull him out by his hair, and even if you end up with some of his bleeding scalp in your hand? I think so.

Perhaps the best version of the sandbox analogy is going into the sandbox, taking away all of the offending child's sharp objects, and busting him upside the head. Which I think entirely appropriate (even too mild, if the child has already gouged someone's eye out).

[Big RR]

OK Andrew, but expanding n your analogy; you see a child threatening (attempting) the poking of another's eyes out; but the incident ends. Two weeks later you see the same child in that sandbox not doing anything out of the ordinary or threatening anyone, but you know there are sticks in the area that may be used if the child started up. Are you then justified in "dragging him and kicking and screaming out of the sandbox, even if you have to pull him out by his hair, and even if you end up with some of his bleeding scalp in your hand?" I don't think so; if you really fear, you should either try call the police or get some other multilateral action. And that's where I think we are with Syria.

[rubato]

Least intelligent analogy of the month.

"How is a raven like a writing desk"

It isn't.

Wholly useless.



yrs,
rubato

[Andrew D]

You're welcome to come up with a better one, rubato.

(And in various ways, a raven is like a writing desk ....)

[Big RR]

My recollection is that the riddle is "Why is a raven like a writing desk" and asked by the Mad Hatter to Alice (Alice in Wonderland); when she says she doesn't know he just laughs because there is no answer.

Lewis Carroll was asked about this again and again and eventually wrote (I don't have the cite, sorry):

Enquiries have been so often addressed to me, as to whether any answer to the Hatter's Riddle can be imagined, that I may as well put on record here what seems to me to be a fairly appropriate answer, viz: 'Because it can produce a few notes, tho they are very flat; and it is never put with the wrong end in front!' This, however, is merely an afterthought; the Riddle, as originally invented, had no answer at all.

and rubato, I concur with Andrew and invite you to come up with a better analogy.

[rubato]

You're welcome to come up with a better one, rubato.

(And in various ways, a raven is like a writing desk ....)

A dead raven, perhaps. Both are meubles.

And it should be "WHY is a raven like a writing desk". My memory replaced one 3-letter word with another.

Compare Assad using chemical weapons on civilians with a child in a sand box stabbing another with a stick? Ravens are more like writing desks.

yrs,
rubato

[rubato]

If the neighbor up the street shot and killed several children and the police refused to act I would be justified in killing him or at least disarming him (if that is possible without killing him or taking any risk in doing so) even if he had stopped shooting and it was days later. I would be morally obliged to act if I were the person in the neighborhood with the greatest capacity to act or if I were the only person physically capable of acting.



yrs,
rubato

[Andrew D]

Any analogy is useful only as far as it goes. The children-in-the-sandbox analogy is clearly nowhere near perfect (and it has become more imperfect as it has been stretched). Nor is rubato's.

What we have here is not merely a neighbor who has shot and killed several people. Assad still has chemical weapons and the capacity to use them, and he is still in Syria. So the situation is more akin to a neighbor who has shot and killed several people and is holding many more people hostage.

And we do not have the police refusing to act. The police are acting: They are attempting to talk the murderer and hostage taker down.

But there is a big difference between what the international community is trying to do and what the police would be trying to do. The police would be trying to talk the murderer and hostage taker into surrendering and being taken into custody, whereas what the international community is trying to do amounts to talking the murderer and hostage taker into surrendering and being set free.

Then there is the problem of the hostages themselves. To analogize them to the Syrian opposition, one must hypothesize that once the threat posed by the murderer and hostage taker is removed, at least some of the hostages will attack at least some of the other hostages.

So the question presented is something more like this:

If a neighbor has shot and killed several people, and
If the neighbor is holding many other people hostage, and
If the police are attempting to talk the murderer and hostage taker down, and
If the police intend, if they succeed in talking the murderer and hostage taker down, to set the murderer and hostage taker free, and
If the threat to the hostages is removed, there will be bloodshed among the hostages; and

If a bystander can fire upon the murderer and hostage taker, and
If the bystander is likely to kill the murderer and hostage taker by firing upon her or him, and
If the bystander is likely to kill at least one of the hostages by firing upon the murderer and hostage taker; then

Is the bystander justified in firing upon the murderer and hostage taker?

The foregoing analogy is surely not perfect. But it comes closer to the reality on the ground.

[Andrew D]

Rather than groping for inevitably imperfect analogies, perhaps we should dispense with analogies altogether. It seems to me that the essential question remains the one I previously posed:

What are the alternatives?

We can engage the Assad regime diplomatically, as in the Kerry-Lavrov plan referred to in the opening posting. At least two problems: First, the likelihood that it will "work" is virtually nil. Second, even in the extremely unlikely event that it does "work," Assad will lose nothing by having used chemical weapons against civilians. Which means that no one else will be deterred from doing -- indeed, some people might be encouraged to do -- the same thing.

We can arm the opposition. At least three problems: First, arming the rebels while leaving the Assad regime intact is as likely to increase and prolong the bloodshed as to decrease and shorten it. Second, arming the rebels means, in effect, arming a bunch of al-Qaeda jihadists who want to kill us. Third, the punitive effect on Assad -- and, therefore, the deterrent effect on others -- will be vanishingly small.

So engaging the Assad regime diplomatically is a poor solution even if it "works," which it almost certainly will not. And arming the opposition will probably do more harm than good, as well as being an at least equally poor solution even if, as seems likely, the opposition ultimately prevails.

I'm all for some deus ex machine solution that will make the whole problem go away. But I don't see one in the offing.

[Andrew D]

By the way, anyone with even a passing acquaintance with ravens and writing desks should be able to generate numerous answers to how (i.e., in what way(s)) one is like the other. "Why" a raven is like (or unlike) a writing desk is -- unless one merely poses a "how" question in the guise of a "why" question -- a matter which has vexed human thought for millennia.

[Rick]

Oops

[Big RR]

But Andrew, you seem to think that the US unilaterally attacking Assaad would unequivocally show him, and other would be gassers of civilians, that they will be subject to quick and certain justice, and that such actions will deter similar events in the future. And that's the point I just don't see; what I do see is other countries saying you will be punished for such actions if the US deems it in its interest to do so, and let go (or even rewarded) if the US somehow determines such punishment is not in its interest (US foreign policy at least since the Korean War). This doesn't generate deterrence, just fear and maybe hatred, maybe even encouraging others to act the same way.

IMHO, only a multilateral response has the possibility of deterrence showing that the civilized world will not stand by while such actions occur. And that is not likely to occur.

[oldr_n_wsr]

If the police are attempting to talk the murderer and hostage taker down, and
If the police intend, if they succeed in talking the murderer and hostage taker down, to set the murderer and hostage taker free, and

Actually, I think it's more like the police are trying to take certain types of guns away from the hostage taker and then still leave him with his other weapons and hostages.
you can't have that semi automatic AK-47 but you can keep the semi auto 12 guage

[Gob]

The global chemical weapons watchdog says it has now adopted a detailed plan for the destruction of Syria's stockpile by mid-2014.

Friday had been the deadline for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to agree a final destruction timetable.

The deadline was set under a US-Russia brokered plan backed by the UN.

The plan was adopted despite an earlier setback, when Albania rejected a request to host the destruction.

Where the stockpile will be transported to be destroyed remains unclear.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24966482

[Gob]

The first consignment of Syrian chemical weapons materials has left the country on a Danish ship.

The vessel left the northern Syrian port of Latakia on Tuesday, escorted by Russian and Chinese warships.

Removing the most dangerous chemicals is the first step of a UN-backed deal to eliminate Syria's chemical arsenal.

A previous bid to collect the materials was aborted after Syrian officials failed to deliver the toxic chemicals to the collection point in Latakia.

The hazardous cargo is due to be taken to Italy, where it will be loaded onto a US Navy ship and shipped to international waters for destruction in a specially created titanium tank on board.

The mission is being run jointly by the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
Continue reading the main story

Removing Syria's chemical stockpile remains the biggest challenge in the OPCW's history.

The news that only two sites out of 12 have had their contents deposited at the port of Latakia, a week after the original deadline, reflects the continuing challenges of conducting such a complex operation inside a country still very much at war.

The BBC team was ordered to leave the Norwegian warship, now providing protection to the Danish cargo vessel, before it entered Syrian territorial waters.

A media blackout was in force until the high-profile cargo had sailed a safe distance from the conflict zone.

This initial delivery will be viewed as largely symbolic unless the remainder of the most dangerous chemical agents start arriving for collection in the coming days.

The agreement was brokered by the US and Russia after rockets filled with the nerve agent sarin were fired at three towns in the Ghouta agricultural belt around the Syrian capital Damascus on 21 August.