Trust us

[oldr_n_wsr]

This deal gets better every day.

AP Exclusive: UN to let Iran inspect alleged nuke work site

Associated Press
By GEORGE JAHN

VIENNA (AP) — Iran will be allowed to use its own inspectors to investigate a site it has been accused of using to develop nuclear arms, operating under a secret agreement with the U.N. agency that normally carries out such work, according to a document seen by The Associated Press.

The revelation on Wednesday newly riled Republican lawmakers in the U.S. who have been severely critical of a broader agreement to limit Iran's future nuclear programs, signed by the Obama administration, Iran and five world powers in July. Those critics have complained that the wider deal is unwisely built on trust of the Iranians, while the administration has insisted it depends on reliable inspections.

"International inspections should be done by international inspectors. Period. The standard of 'anywhere, anytime' inspections - so critical to a viable agreement - has dropped to 'when Iran wants, where Iran wants, on Iran's terms,'" said U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce in a reaction typical of opponents of the broader deal.

The newly disclosed side agreement, for an investigation of the Parchin nuclear site by the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, is linked to persistent allegations that Iran has worked on atomic weapons. That investigation is part of the overarching nuclear-limits deal.

Evidence of the inspections concession, as outlined in the document, is sure to increase pressure from U.S. congressional opponents before a Senate vote of disapproval on the overall agreement in early September. If the resolution passes and President Barack Obama vetoes it, opponents would need a two-thirds majority to override it. Even Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, a Republican, has suggested opponents will likely lose a veto fight, though that was before Wednesday's disclosure.

John Cornyn of Texas, the second-ranking Republican senator, said, "Trusting Iran to inspect its own nuclear site and report to the U.N. in an open and transparent way is remarkably naive and incredibly reckless. This revelation only reinforces the deep-seated concerns the American people have about the agreement."

The Parchin agreement was worked out between the IAEA and Iran. The United States and the five other world powers were not party to it but were briefed by the IAEA and endorsed it as part of the larger package.

On Wednesday, White House National Security Council spokesman Ned Price said the Obama administration was "confident in the agency's technical plans for investigating the possible military dimensions of Iran's former program. ... The IAEA has separately developed the most robust inspection regime ever peacefully negotiated."

All IAEA member countries must give the agency some insight into their nuclear programs. Some are required to do no more than give a yearly accounting of the nuclear material they possess. But nations— like Iran — suspected of possible proliferation are under greater scrutiny that can include stringent inspections.

The agreement in question diverges from normal procedures by allowing Tehran to employ its own experts and equipment in the search for evidence of activities it has consistently denied — trying to develop nuclear weapons.

Olli Heinonen, who was in charge of the Iran probe as deputy IAEA director general from 2005 to 2010, said he could think of no similar concession with any other country.

The White House has repeatedly denied claims of a secret side deal favorable to Tehran. IAEA chief Yukiya Amano told Republican senators last week that he was obligated to keep the document confidential.

Iran has refused access to Parchin for years and has denied any interest in — or work on — nuclear weapons. Based on U.S., Israeli and other intelligence and its own research, the IAEA suspects that the Islamic Republic may have experimented with high-explosive detonators for nuclear arms.

The IAEA has cited evidence, based on satellite images, of possible attempts to sanitize the site since the alleged work stopped more than a decade ago.

The document seen by the AP is a draft that one official familiar with its contents said doesn't differ substantially from the final version. He demanded anonymity because he wasn't authorized to discuss the issue in public.

The document is labeled "separate arrangement II," indicating there is another confidential agreement between Iran and the IAEA governing the agency's probe of the nuclear weapons allegations.

Iran is to provide agency experts with photos and videos of locations the IAEA says are linked to the alleged weapons work, "taking into account military concerns."

That wording suggests that — beyond being barred from physically visiting the site — the agency won't get photo or video information from areas Iran says are off-limits because they have military significance.

While the document says the IAEA "will ensure the technical authenticity" of Iran's inspection, it does not say how.

The draft is unsigned but the proposed signatory for Iran is listed as Ali Hoseini Tash, deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council for Strategic Affairs. That reflects the significance Tehran attaches to the agreement.

Iranian diplomats in Vienna were unavailable for comment, Wednesday while IAEA spokesman Serge Gas said the agency had no immediate comment.

The main focus of the July 14 deal between Iran and six world powers is curbing Iran's present nuclear program that could be used to make weapons. But a subsidiary element obligates Tehran to cooperate with the IAEA in its probe of the past allegations.

The investigation has been essentially deadlocked for years, with Tehran asserting the allegations are based on false intelligence from the U.S., Israel and other adversaries. But Iran and the U.N. agency agreed last month to wrap up the investigation by December, when the IAEA plans to issue a final assessment.

That assessment is unlikely to be unequivocal. Still, it is expected to be approved by the IAEA's board, which includes the United States and the other nations that negotiated the July 14 agreement. They do not want to upend their broader deal, and will see the December report as closing the books on the issue

[rubato]

I think one would want more facts and a better context before getting all sweaty and bothered. This sounds like all spin and no substance.


yrs,
rubato

[rubato]

And here come the facts to blow your weak-ass Republican bullshit out of the water:


http://www.vox.com/2015/8/20/9182185/ap ... ns-parchin

"... The anonymous source who showed AP the document said there was a final version that is similar, but conspicuously refused to show AP the final version or go into specifics.

"The oldest Washington game is being played in Vienna," Lewis said. "And that is leaking what appears to be a prejudicial and one-sided account of a confidential document to a friendly reporter, and using that to advance a particular policy agenda. Oddly, the AP then quietly deleted the most damning details from the story

Then things got weird: A couple of hours after first publishing, the AP added in a bunch of quotes from Republicans furiously condemning the revelations, but at the same time, the AP removed most of the actual revelations. The information in the article was substantially altered, with some of the most damning details scrubbed entirely. No explanation for this was given.

The new version of the story said nothing about environmental sampling. It said that Iran will provide photos and videos of the site, as well as mechanisms by which the IAEA can verify that these are authentic. But information about how the IAEA would verify this, which was in the original story, had also been removed.

"The original version of the story, before they edited out all of the interesting details, seemed to modestly advance a story that [AP reporter George Jahn] had published a few weeks ago," Lewis said. "But now we're so far down into the weeds of safeguards, it's really hard to know. The version that was originally published seemed to indicate that the level of access was lower than I would have thought, lower than I would have expected the IAEA to accept. But then those paragraphs disappeared."

""This came down to a pissing contest about whether or not we could go walk into Parchin, which is irrelevant ... all of this will come down to nothing""

The new version of the AP story was vague and confusingly worded. The actual information on inspections was buried under 700 words of Republicans condemning the deal (based, presumably, on information from the first draft of the story that has since been scrubbed).

On Thursday morning, shortly before this article went up, the AP reinstated most of the cut sections. (Lewis's quotes here reflect the scrubbed version of the story, though he had seen the original and so was aware of the information in it.)

The AP then published another story that reiterated much of the information but also added a strange new detail that seemed to water down its original claims even further: "IAEA staff will monitor Iranian personnel as they inspect the Parchin nuclear site." It's not clear what they mean by "monitor."

Paul Colford, AP's vice president for media relations, told me via email that the details had been cut to make room for reaction quotes. "As with many AP stories, indeed with wire stories generally, some details are later trimmed to make room for fresh info so that multiple so-called 'writethrus' of a story will move on the AP wire as the hours pass," he wrote.

When I asked Colford if the AP regretted cutting the news out of its own story, he responded, "It was unfortunate that some assumed (incorrectly) that AP was backing off." I pressed him on whether the cuts had been a mistake. He wrote: "As a former longtime New York newspaperman who's been AP's chief spokesman for eight years now, I would say there's always something to learn from such episodes."

So what we're ultimately left with is a story that at its most extreme possible interpretation suggests this: According to a draft IAEA agreement, Iran will pass verifiable photos and videos of the Parchin building on to inspectors, perhaps as well as physical samples, rather than letting inspectors physically visit.

Even that is dubious: Jonathan Alter, the "if true" political reporter, tweeted that the IAEA would indeed be "on the ground" at Parchin, according to the White House. The IAEA has since come out and said the final agreement on Parchin meets all its standards. The IAEA inspector general issued a statement saying he was "disturbed" by the AP story, which "misrepresent the way in which we will undertake this important verification work."

Still, the question remains: Is this story bad news for the Iran deal? That gets to yet another layer of confusion here. The current version of the story describes a situation that arms control experts have long anticipated, and that is not really as big of a deal as it initially sounded. It all comes down to a single, one-time set of inspections at a single, long-dormant facility." ... "

Lie for effect.

yrs,
rubato

[Lord Jim]

I don't know all the details of this story, (I'm not sure why "Vox" should be a more reputable source than AP; looks like there's a lot of un-sourced conjecture in their story as well...)

But either way it's unfortunate, because quite apart from this allegation, the undisputed conditions of this deal make it so appalling and capitulative in nature, that this story is merely attempting to "make shit smell bad"...

It was quite bad enough without this...

[Econoline]

The "24-day wait" lie, exposed:

Iran deal opponents now have their
"death panels" lie, and it's a whopper

The debate over the Iran nuclear deal may now have its own version of "death panels," a provision that is both a point of overwhelming criticism and largely fictitious.

"Particularly troublesome, you have to wait 24 days before you can inspect," Sen. Chuck Schumer told reporters last week, explaining why he is opposing the deal.

Conservative media have hammered at this idea: that nuclear inspectors must wait 24 days before visiting any place in Iran that is not a declared nuclear site. Sometimes they imply or outright state, as in the case of this staggeringly misleading but representative Fox News story, that the 24-day wait applies even to known nuclear sites.

This certainly sounds scary. It sounds, as the critics often say, like those bumbling appeasers in the Obama administration have handed Iran the ability to cheat on the deal and then prevent inspectors from catching them.

Fortunately, this is all largely false. It's a lot like "death panels," in which Obamacare critics took a benign fact about the health-care bill — it would include end-of-life counseling — and then spun it up into a massive lie about how President Obama was going to cancel Granny's life-sustaining medications and send her to an early grave. This is an issue on which nuclear deal critics have taken a small truth and then exaggerated, distorted, and outright lied about it to make it into something very different.

How the "24-day wait" lie came about

When it comes to inspections, the deal divides Iran into two kinds of sites: declared nuclear sites and every other place.

The declared nuclear sites include any place where nuclear work is happening: uranium mines, uranium plants, centrifuge factories, and of course enrichment sites, which means the places where centrifuges spin up nuclear material. At those sites, inspectors do not have to wait. They will have nuclear sites under continual monitoring.

But what about the rest of the country? What if inspectors worry that Iran might be conducting secret nuclear work someplace else? It's happened before, after all. But this was always going to be a hard problem, and so-called "anytime, anywhere" inspections are not realistically possible: Generally, only countries that have lost a war can be forced to agree to something so obtrusive. And a country like Iran, which fears an attack from the US, worries that Western inspectors could abuse access to military sites to give their governments intelligence on Iran's non-nuclear military programs.

So the deal struck a compromise that actually gives inspectors pretty good access: If they want to go someplace that is not a declared nuclear site, they can demand access. Here's what happens if they do:

• (1) Iran has to grant access within 24 hours, unless it objects to the validity of the demand.
  
  (2) If Iran objects, it and inspectors enter negotiations. If they agree to disagree, the issue gets kicked to a special international commission that includes the US and the other countries that signed the nuclear deal. If it's been 14 days and they're still talking, it goes to the international commission (made up of US, UK, France, Germany, EU, China, Russia, and Iran).
  
  (3) The international commission votes on whether to force Iran to comply. The US and its European allies have a majority on the commission, so if they agree they can overrule the other members. They can hold that vote right away, or they can wait up to seven days.
  
  (4) If the commission votes to force Iran to comply, Iran has to let in the inspectors within three days. If it doesn't, the international sanctions will "snap" back into force.

What critics have done is look at this timeline and focus on the fact that in the most extreme possible scenario, the time between when inspectors demand access and when they get access could be as much as 24 days. Weirdly, this assumes that not just Iran but even the US and its allies will push delays as long as possible, but that is only one of the smaller problems with this idea.

This is a lot more than just misleading — it is a wild distortion of how inspections in general, and this inspection regime in particular, will work, based on a series of misleading or outright dishonest claims about how the deal works.

The truth about the "24-day wait"

Here are a few problems with the idea that inspectors will have to wait 24 days to access undeclared sites in Iran:

• Iran deal critics are lying when they present this process as the default way in which every visit to an undeclared site will go. In fact, under an agreement that Iran has accepted called the Additional Protocol, inspectors are required access within 24 hours. This other, multi-day process is meant as a fail-safe in case that doesn't work.
  .
• Critics claim that because the process could, in theory, take up to 24 days, it means Iran can force inspectors to wait 24 days. This is false. Iran does not control every step of the process — the US and its allies could force a vote on the international commission right away, for example — so it is nonsense to argue that Iran could unilaterally delay inspection up to 24 full days.
  .
• Even if Iran does push for as much delaying as possible, that would be like waving a big, neon-lit invitation over that particular site to Western spy agencies, which have a very good track record of spotting illicit Iranian nuclear activity. If Iran carted out material or bulldozed a test chamber or something, we would spot it, and the jig would be up.
  .
• Nuclear radiation lasts a very long time. If Iran wants to enrich uranium, it will produce radioactive isotopes that cannot be scrubbed out. Yes, there are non-radioactive activities that Iran could conduct, but you need the radioactive stuff to build a bomb, and that is detectable long after 24 days.
  .
• Iran deal critics pretend that during this process, the US and its allies would be powerless, essentially held hostage by Iranian intransigence. In fact, they have a variety of tools built into the deal by which they can pressure Iran to let in inspectors, and if necessary can blow up the deal by bringing back sanctions.

The bigger lie behind the "24 days" lie

This entire line of criticism fundamentally mischaracterizes how nuclear inspections work. Ultimately, inspections are a set of tools meant to determine whether Iran is holding to its commitments under the nuclear deal. If inspectors try to get access to sites but at every turn are delayed by Iranian stall tactics, guess what: It will be extremely clear from all this stalling that Iran is not adhering to the deal. Inspections will have worked.

It's not as if the deal binds our hands to accept Iranian behavior unless we catch them specifically in the act of illicit nuclear development. Repeatedly delaying inspectors up to the highest possible limit would effectively prove that Iran was cheating, without the world even having to catch them red-handed.

If the US suspects from Iran's delays that the country might be cheating on the deal, it can punish and pressure Iran into stopping the delays, even if those delays are technically within the allowed time frame. Indeed, those tools are built into the process.

David Albright, a nuclear expert who is considered otherwise skeptical of the deal, pointed out to the Washington Post's Glenn Kessler that the deal gives the US leverage to, for example, "slow nuclear cooperation and approvals of exports to Iran via the procurement channel." (He added, "Iran should get a message that prompt access is required under the Additional Protocol, despite the language in the [final nuclear deal].")

And if the US gets fed up, it can always use its veto power to unilaterally "snap back" United Nations Security Council sanctions. That's both a threat it can hold over Iran's head if Iran is delaying too much, and a threat it can actually use if it becomes necessary.

If anything, by codifying such a specific procedure for what happens if Iran refuses inspectors entry, the deal makes it easier to figure out if Iran is attempting to exploit the process to delay inspectors so as to cover up illicit development.

"This arrangement is much, much stronger than the normal safeguards agreement, which requires prompt access in theory but does not place time limits on dickering," Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control expert at Middlebury University, wrote in his typically colorful Foreign Policy column.

Lewis sees this process for getting access as a strength that has been turned into a weakness, and one he goes on to compare to the "death panels" lie of the Obamacare debates:

Some of us might think it’s good that the agreement puts defined limits on how much Iran can stall and explicitly prohibits a long list of weaponization activities. Opponents, like Schumer — apparently for want of anything better — have seized on these details to spin them into objections. A weaker, less detailed agreement might have been easier to defend against this sort of attack, perhaps.

... The claim that inspections occur with a 24-day delay is the equivalent of Obamacare "death panels." Remember those? A minor detail has been twisted into a bizarre caricature and repeated over and over until it becomes "true."

Lying about policy has consequences

We all look back on "death panels" now and laugh; 2009 feels so long ago, and Sarah Palin's lie that Obamacare would have bureaucrats decide whether your grandmother's life is worth saving is safely in the past.

But at the time, it felt very significant, and indeed it was. One poll found that 30 percent of Americans, including 47 percent of Republicans, thought it was true. Obamacare became, in the political press, inextricably linked to the "death panels" myth.

It was politically damaging for the health-care act both because it scared people who thought it was true, and because it helped shift the national conversation away from the big picture of what Obamacare did for American health care and refocused it on whatever detail the critics were worked up about that week, whether that detail had significance or not, whether their criticism had merit or not.

Death panels were the boldest of these lies, but they were also the embodiment of a news cycle-driven obsession with whatever the latest controversy happened to be.

We are entering a similar cycle with the Iran nuclear deal. But debunkings never stick as effectively as the lie itself; just ask the 28 percent of voters who still believed as of 2013 that Saddam Hussein was responsible for 9/11. These lies aren't just a way for Sen. Schumer to give himself political cover for voting against the deal; they frighten people, and distort how they see the world. "Death panels" taught Americans to fear health care; "24 days" teaches them to fear even very good diplomatic agreements. Even if the deal passes, these lies have consequences, and we should stop repeating them.

[Lord Jim]

It's funny; the article keeps referring to the "24 day wait lie" but when you read the content of the article you discover it isn't a lie at all:

(1) Iran has to grant access within 24 hours, unless it objects to the validity of the demand.

First of all, given the behavior of the Iranian regime for decades, anyone who doesn't assume as a given that the Iranians will object each and every time an inspection is requested anywhere this agreement doesn't have them obligated to allow them, (and when..."when" not "if"... the Iranians begin to cheat on this deal, obviously it will be at a site that isn't covered.) is way out in la la land....

Therefore what the article calls the most "extreme possible" scenario is in reality the "most likely possible" scenario; not a lie.

[MajGenl.Meade]

... and not only that but

"Iran should get a message that prompt access is required under the Additional Protocol, despite the language in the [final nuclear deal]."

Yeah, I bet they get that message and just snap to attention to abide by it... given that the language of the deal says something else.

This is a giant cave-in - and there are secret protocols (I know about them because I got a message via my aluminum hat) that try to bind Iran to the fight against ISE (Islamic State Everywhere). You betcha.

I say again, this deal should have freed imprisoned Americans and Christians in Iran - did it? Still waiting..... for the other shoe

[Lord Jim]

Mr. Fischer (the author of the article) is attempting to present his grossly unrealistic opinions as "facts" and then calling those who disagree with his rose-colored glasses perspective "liars"...

Presenting opinions as though they were facts seems to be SOP for the good folks at Vox...

[wesw]

I m surprised that econoline isn t digging deeper for the truth and is accepting of such drivel, he is obviously a bright guy....

don t let party loyalty Trump common sense.

[Econoline]

Therefore what the article calls the most "extreme possible" scenario is in reality the "most likely possible" scenario; not a lie.

From the article:

"...in the most extreme possible scenario, the time between when inspectors demand access and when they get access could be as much as 24 days. Weirdly, this assumes that not just Iran but even the US and its allies will push delays as long as possible..."

So you're saying that the "most likely possible" scenario is that the US and our allies will push to delay the inspection process as long as possible????? Why the hell would you believe that???

Furthermore:

If inspectors try to get access to sites but at every turn are delayed by Iranian stall tactics, guess what: It will be extremely clear from all this stalling that Iran is not adhering to the deal. Inspections will have worked.

It's not as if the deal binds our hands to accept Iranian behavior unless we catch them specifically in the act of illicit nuclear development. Repeatedly delaying inspectors up to the highest possible limit would effectively prove that Iran was cheating, without the world even having to catch them red-handed.

If the US suspects from Iran's delays that the country might be cheating on the deal, it can punish and pressure Iran into stopping the delays, even if those delays are technically within the allowed time frame. Indeed, those tools are built into the process.

[ ... ] If anything, by codifying such a specific procedure for what happens if Iran refuses inspectors entry, the deal makes it easier to figure out if Iran is attempting to exploit the process to delay inspectors so as to cover up illicit development. "This arrangement is much, much stronger than the normal safeguards agreement, which requires prompt access in theory but does not place time limits on dickering," Jeffrey Lewis, an arms control expert at Middlebury University, wrote

[Big RR]

This deal is not great--no deal is. But given the alternatives, I think we are better off with it than without it. There is no sense in completing alienating Iran when the Arab world is aligning against the west, and while the hawks would have us march in on two fronts, that only spells disaster in the log run. Like it or not, we have to play the game and keep a close eye on everything, and this permits us to do so. If the deal falls apart, I'd bet western sanctions (at least from some western countries) are not far behind; and marching in to fight Iran is sheer lunacy. We are not going to beat Iran into submission; we can either choose to try to help moderates in the country and establish a relationship with them, or we can spend a lot of money and lioves to achieve little to nothing.

[Econoline]

Well said, Big RR.

[Long Run]

If inspectors try to get access to sites but at every turn are delayed by Iranian stall tactics, guess what: It will be extremely clear from all this stalling that Iran is not adhering to the deal. Inspections will have worked.

It's not as if the deal binds our hands to accept Iranian behavior unless we catch them specifically in the act of illicit nuclear development. Repeatedly delaying inspectors up to the highest possible limit would effectively prove that Iran was cheating, without the world even having to catch them red-handed.

Wasn't this the same deal in Iraq? Hussein delayed and stalled, which lead to an inference of guilt. Only, we now have the cautionary situation of Iraq which will limit any initiative to take action.

It is hard to know if this is a best deal possible or another in a long line of bad decisions, but our allies in the region all think it is a bad deal. Add that this Administration has a long losing streak on Middle East policies so it doesn't get the benefit of the doubt. Of course, now that the hard-to-get sanctions have been lifted, and are unlikely to be reinstalled given Russian and other dynamics, the Administration has already given up the leverage it had. Rather than using the lifting of sanctions as leverage on Iran, it gave up that leverage to try to force Congress to accept the deal that had no chance otherwise of being agreed to (heck, there is significant opposition to the deal by Democrats). If the deal is not ratified by Congress, then there is no deal and no sanctions. What a mess . . . situation normal

[Guinevere]

Well said, Big RR.

I wish to associate myself with the remarks of BigRR and Econo, on this one.

[Big RR]

our allies in the region all think it is a bad deal

Indeed they do, but then none of them like Iran at all, and most would prefer to see us march in there and face the brunt ot their forces and the casualties.

Wasn't this the same deal in Iraq? Hussein delayed and stalled, which lead to an inference of guilt.

Similar, and let's not forget it did prevent Iraq from developing any WMDs; I believe that's what we're trying to do with Iran as well.

Rather than using the lifting of sanctions as leverage on Iran,

Rather? It's because of the sanctions that I ran came to the table in the first place and negotiated a deal that severely hampers their ability to get nuclear weapons.

If the deal is not ratified by Congress, then there is no deal and no sanctions.

That's not my understanding; if Congress fails to ratify, then Obama can choose to veto it. If that happens, Congress can override or it becomes an enforceable agreement; this has pretty much been par for the course with most negotiations of accords and treaties for many years. If Congress overrides, we are back to suare one and the sanctions are still in place (as they are now)--of course some of our European and other allies might back out of the coalition, but then that's part of what pushed us to make some concessions.

What a mess . . . situation normal

Politics, the art of the possible.

[Econoline]

Wasn't this the same deal in Iraq? Hussein delayed and stalled, which lead to an inference of guilt.

Similar, and let's not forget it did prevent Iraq from developing any WMDs; I believe that's what we're trying to do with Iran as well.

Good point. Plus this deal specifically allows for reinstating sanctions if Iran violates the conditions, and assurances that our allies would back us up if that happened.

Politics, the art of the possible.

[Sue U]

It is hard to know if this is a best deal possible or another in a long line of bad decisions, but our allies in the region all think it is a bad deal.

In fact, our ally Turkey thinks it's a good deal, our allies in the Arab Gulf States are on board with the deal, and Pakistan and India both favor the deal. As far as the Israelis go, the politicians are against it (for political reasons), but the nuclear, security and intelligence experts are for it (for practical reasons).

Add that this every Administration has a long losing streak on Middle East policies

FTFY.

[Long Run]

Plus this deal specifically allows for reinstating sanctions if Iran violates the conditions, and assurances that our allies would back us up if that happened.

This seems one of the more unlikely things to occur. It took very good diplomacy over a long period of time to get the sanctions in place, and then to enhance them over time so that enough countries participated that the sanctions had real effect. Once sanctions are gone, it will be nearly impossible to rebuild the sanctions to anywhere near the current level, short of Iran committing an atrocity.

[Long Run]

In fact, our ally Turkey thinks it's a good deal, our allies in the Arab Gulf States are on board with the deal, and Pakistan and India both favor the deal

There is a big difference between supporting the deal and holding their nose and reluctantly going along, as well as those who have essentially been bought off (e.g., Turkey will be rolling in the moolah from the mullahs).

Obama sought to Isolate Israel as lone voice against Iran deal, but Arabs quietly agree

US President Barack Obama’s statement on Wednesday that all countries that have commented on the Iran deal support it – except for Israel – is misleading. Arab leaders are only being polite in their reticence.

Leaders of the Gulf Arab states have opted for a less confrontational approach with Washington than the strong public opposition exhibited by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government.

Instead of voicing their displeasure publicly and directly to the US over its rapprochement with Iran, they have instead chosen to get their message across unofficially through articles in Arab owned-media and by leaking their strong discontent to the Western press.

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran/G ... ael-411399

[Big RR]

Arab leaders are only being polite in their reticence.

And how many times in the past have they been this polite?