Stopping a tidal wave is the next trick

[RayThom]

God said it, I believe it, and that settles it. Amen.

[Gob]

So her recorded sins on that picture all happened before 2011 and before she was convicted of sin, repented and accepted the forgiveness and salvation of God? Just like me and most other Christians. Therefore irrelevant to this issue.

Only if you believe that whole "forgiveness" stuff.

[MajGenl.Meade]

No - it's true regardless of what you believe. ETA

Ray of course got it wrong:

God said it. It's true. I believe it.

[Gob]

No, you believe it to be true no matter what others think.

[MajGenl.Meade]

No, you believe it to be untrue no matter what others think and despite the evidence. It's sort of like being a climate change denier

Well, that was a useful exchange.

[Big RR]

Here's my suggestion:

Somebody wants to make a joke about Ann Coulter having the body of an anorexic meth head...?

let 'em do it...

Or somebody wants to make a joke about Hillary Clinton having an ass so big it can be seen from The International Space Station...?

Or Christ Christie being a pie eating king; Or Donald Trump having a live ferret nesting on his head....

Or Rosie O'Doughnuts being called...

Rosie O'Doughnuts...

So what?

These are public figures; they can handle it....they're big boys and girls...(some of them are really big...)

So how about we agree that engaging in rude remarks about, (body, hair, whatever) when applied to public figures is fair game, and will no longer be the source of chastisement...?

(He asked, expecting a self-righteous rejection... )

Jim--agreed, people can say what they want; I'd rather not read it (and can always skip over it) and try to to engage in that sort of behavior (although I have made fun of Trump's hair), but to each his/her own.

[Lord Jim]

I see on the news where there have been rallies for Davis outside the jail where she's being held...(so far the crowds have been in the hundreds)

Mike Hukabee is slated to meet her on Tuesday...

It seems to me that staying in jail right now is a good strategic career move for Davis...

She's becoming a celebrity and a hero to a segment of the religious right, and when this is over will no doubt be much in demand as a speaker at their events...the more her celebrity grows, the higher the personal appearance fees she will be able to command...

And then of course there's the book deal...maybe even a run for congress...(if she finds the right district, she might even win.)

ETA:

My understanding is that unless she backs down or resigns, the only way to get her out under Kentucky law is impeachment and removal by the Kentucky legislature...

This could go on a while...

[Econoline]

Here's a pretty good analysis:

Kim Davis, a Democratic Kentucky County Clerk, was imprisoned for refusing to issue marriage licenses (to any couples) because she believes God's law forbids marriage of same sex couples.

From a public administrative perspective, this would seem to be pretty cut and dried - she's required to carry out the duties of her job and not let her religious beliefs interfere with those duties. So I've been poking around the internet to find out more about her and her beliefs to figure out why she isn't doing the obvious.

For those in a hurry, here's my preliminary hypothesis:

• 1. She's worked in a very closed system - her mom has been her boss for years.
  2. She found Jesus after a life with less than "Christian values' marriage record. Her actions may be part what her new faith tells her and part a convert's attempt to prove her faith.
  3. She's represented by a radical Christian law non-profit that is probably pushing her to be a martyr and get the law group more attention.

For an example of #3, here's what Kim Davis' attorney said:

“Today, for the first time in history, an American citizen has been incarcerated for having the belief of conscience that marriage is the union of one man and one woman,” Mr. Gannam said after a hearing that stretched deep into Thursday afternoon. “And she’s been ordered to stay there until she’s willing to change her mind, until she’s willing to change her conscience about what belief is."

I guess I'd rephrase this. She's not being incarcerated because of her religious beliefs. There are lots of people who share the same religious beliefs and they haven't been incarcerated for them. She's being incarcerated because as the county clerk, she's not performing her legal duties to issue marriage licenses and that non-performance is interfering with the legal rights of people her office is supposed to serve.

What's religious discrimination at work? Let's be clear about religious discrimination at work. The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission tells us that people may not be discriminated against because of their religious beliefs. If there is a conflict with an employee's religious beliefs and their job duties, the organization should try to make reasonable accommodations. From the EEOC website:

"Religious Discrimination & Reasonable Accommodation. The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion.

Examples of some common religious accommodations include flexible scheduling, voluntary shift substitutions or swaps, job reassignments, and modifications to workplace policies or practices."

So an employer (and this is aimed at all employers, not specifically at governments as employers where the obligation to serve the public is even greater) should attempt to find an accommodation. In this case, she could, as the court suggested, delegate the task she finds objectionable, to someone else. There are deputies in the office who are willing to do this.

But since Davis is the head of the office, I can see her thinking that if she lets a deputy issue a license to a same-sex couple, it would be the same as if she were condoning it. This gets us to the next level of consideration. Is making an accommodation an undue hardship to the office and the people it serves? Back to the EEOC website:

"Religious Discrimination & Reasonable Accommodation & Undue Hardship. An employer does not have to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices if doing so would cause undue hardship to the employer. An accommodation may cause undue hardship if it is costly, compromises workplace safety, decreases workplace efficiency, infringes on the rights of other employees, or requires other employees to do more than their share of potentially hazardous or burdensome work."

In the Davis case, it compromises one of the duties of the clerk's office - to issue marriage licenses - and it causes major harm to some members of the public. Apparently, Davis' way of accommodating her religious beliefs was to stop issuing marriage licenses to anyone. She's not, in her mind, discriminating because heterosexual couple also are denied marriage licenses. The court rejected that.

To turn this around and say that Kim Davis is being discriminated against based on her religious beliefs is understandable only if you believe that Kim Davis has the right to impose her religious beliefs on the people of her county who have the legal right to wed.

Here's some interesting background I found while trying to understand Davis' reasoning.

• 1. Davis has been a deputy county clerk for over 24 years, working under the chief clerk, her mother.
  2. Working for a relative is legal in Kentucky.
  3. There were some challenges to her salary which was significantly greater than the deputy sheriff and chief judge deputy. (I didn't see how long these two had been in office compared to Davis.)
  4. She's an Apostolic Christian.
  5. When her mother stepped down, Davis ran and won. I'd note she beat her Democratic primary opponent by 23 votes, or by less than 1/2 percent.

From The Morehead News:

"The highest staff wage in 2011 – $63,113 – was paid to Bailey’s chief deputy clerk, Kim Davis, who also happens to be her daughter. Davis is listed at $24.91 hourly for a 40-hour work week and an annual wage of $51,812. She received an additional $11,301 in overtime and other compensation during 2011. Her rate of pay apparently triggered most of the complaints, The Morehead News has learned from various sources. Kentucky law permits elected county officials to employ family members and to set their levels of pay. It is a common practice throughout the state."

She has been married four times to three different men, according to US News and World Report. Wikipedia (which has put most of these references together) describes her marriages this way:

Davis has been married four times to three different husbands. Her second and fourth husbands are the same. The first three marriages ended in divorces in 1994, 2006, and 2008. She is the mother of twins, who were born five months after her divorce from her first husband in 1994. Her third husband is the biological father of her twins, who were adopted by her fourth husband, Joe.

Look, I'm not judging her here. Love and marriage is hard to figure out, especially when you get married at 18. We don't know what her circumstances were. But I suspect this past, which is not the ideal of her new faith, puts some pressure on her to show that she is now truly committed, like standing firm for her idea of God's will in this case.

She became an Apostolic Christian in 2011. Their website may help people understand the stand she is taking.

Apostolic Christian beliefs are rooted in a literal interpretation of the Bible. We believe that the Bible’s teachings are applicable to all times and all cultures.

I'm not sure this is how they mean it, but the words suggest that they believe that everyone should obey the doctrine they believe.

Their doctrine might also help us understand why a woman who has had a somewhat turbulent married life might now be standing firm with her new beliefs:

We believe salvation is obtained by grace through faith in Jesus Christ. True faith is evidenced by obedience to God's Word, which instructs a soul to do as the Lord Jesus emphatically taught, "Repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."1 The biblical pattern of repentance is observed, which includes godly sorrow2 for a past sinful life, confession of sins, restitution for past wrongs, and becoming dead to sin. The wonderful and matchless grace of God is given to those who are humble in heart, along with peace and forgiveness from God.

Following conversion, which is manifested by a new walk of life in Christ, the convert gives a testimony of his or her faith and conversion experience to the congregation. This is followed by water baptism by immersion.3 Baptism symbolizes the burial of the old sinful nature into the death of Christ, and the subsequent rising of a soul out of the baptismal waters as a new creature in Christ Jesus. This is followed by the laying on of hands, whereby a church elder prays over the new member. This prayer acknowledges and entreats the presence of the Holy Spirit in the believer's heart, and consecrates the new child of God into a life of service for him. The new member is thus formally united with the church, which is Christ's body.

Self-denial, separation from sin and unfruitful works, and nonconformity to worldliness are integral parts of the Christian walk of life and they lead to a life of peace and joy." [emphasis added]

So as a convert to a religion that frowns on her former lifestyle, she could feel strongly compelled to stand firmly by the new teachings of the church. We'll see whether this ultimately leads to peace and joy.

The proper action for a government official whose religious beliefs are in conflict with his official duties is to either find an accommodation or resign from the position. An accommodation was offered - allow others in the office to issue the licenses - and rejected by Davis. Her key option now is to resign and find a job that is consistent with her religious values.

Another contributing factor may be the legal non-profit - Liberty Counsel - supporting her. Other clerks in her situation apparently have found resolutions without resorting to lawsuits. Raw Story reports that another right wing Christian legal non-profit that fights against same-sex marriage, Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF), has found solutions for their clients.

Jim Campbell, an ADF lawyer, said his group has not consulted with Liberty Counsel on the Kentucky case and is not representing any county clerk in related litigation. Campbell said he worked with a few employees of county clerk offices outside Kentucky seeking to avoid issuing licenses to same-sex couples based on religion and said those situations were resolved within those offices and had not escalated to a lawsuits.

The RawStory article includes a comparison between the ADF and the Liberty Counsel:

Among those who support gay marriage, Liberty Counsel has a reputation for being more extreme than ADF. “Liberty Counsel is among the most irresponsible of ‘Religious Right’ organizations,” said Greg Lipper, an attorney at Americans United for Separation of Church and State. “ADF at least tries to fit its legal arguments within existing law; Liberty Counsel openly flouts it.”

It's hard for anyone to know what is in the heads of people like Liberty Counsel executive director Matthew Staver, a former law professor at the Jerry Falwell founded Liberty University. To a certain extent, he probably believes his cause is right and just. But possibly there's also a need to get attention. Is Kim Davis a perfect client to make this losing case with? Or is she an imperfect client who finds herself in way over her head? Her life has been difficult already. This may not be the best option for her future well being. Right now she's in jail and Staver isn't.

And so called liberal organizations have also looked for good situations to make their legal and political points. But this seems such a totally lost cause, so out of step with the law.

http://whatdoino-steve.blogspot.com/201 ... means.html

[MajGenl.Meade]

A good read, econo. One clarification - to state that God's law applies at all times and in all cultures does not mean everyone has to conform to it. It means that God's law does not change due to the passage of time nor does it change because a culture changes. Thus, murder, divorce and homosexuality remain sins no matter that it's 2015 and no matter what the culture decides to legalise.

Trade you one:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/vol ... 1454859111

When does your religion legally excuse you from doing part of your job?
By Eugene Volokh September 4 

Can your religion legally excuse you from doing part of your job? This is one of the questions in the Kentucky County Clerk marriage certificate case. But it also arises in lots of other cases — for instance, the Muslim flight attendant who doesn’t want to serve alcohol and who filed a complaint on Tuesday with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission over the airline’s denial of an exemption.

The question has also arisen before with regard to:
1.Nurses who had religious objections to being involved in abortions (even just to washing instruments that would be used in abortions);
2.Pacifist postal workers who had religious objections to processing draft registration forms;
3.A Jehovah’s Witness employee who had religious objections to raising a flag, which was a task assigned to him;
4.An IRS employee who had religious objections to working on tax exemption applications for organizations that promote “abortion, … homosexuality, worship of the devil, euthanasia, atheism, legalization of marijuana, immoral sexual experiments, sterilization or vasectomies, artificial contraception, and witchcraft”;
5.a philosophically vegetarian bus driver who refused to hand out hamburger coupons as part of an agency’s promotion aimed at boosting ridership;
6.and more.

And of course it arises routinely when people are fine with their job tasks, but have a religious objection to doing them on particular days (e.g., Saturdays and Fridays after sundown).

Under Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, both public and private employers have a duty to exempt religious employees from generally applicable work rules, so long as this won’t create an “undue hardship,” meaning more than a modest cost, on the employer. If the employees can be accommodated in a way that would let the job still get done without much burden on the employer, coworkers, and customers — for instance by switching the employee’s assignments with another employee or by otherwise slightly changing the job duties — then the employer must accommodate them. (The Muslim flight attendant I mentioned above, for instance, claims that she has always been able to work out arrangements under which the other flight attendant serves the alcohol instead of her.)

Thus, for instance, in all the cases I mentioned in the numbered list above, the religious objectors got an accommodation, whether in court or as a result of the employer’s settling a lawsuit brought by the EEOC. Likewise, the EEOC is currently litigating a case in which it claims that a trucking company must accommodate a Muslim employee’s religious objections to transporting alcohol, and the court has indeed concluded that the employer had a duty to accommodate such objections. But if the accommodation would have been quite difficult or expensive (beyond the inevitable cost that always come when rearranging tasks), then the employer wouldn’t have had to provide it.

Now I’m not saying this to praise the law, or to claim that it’s demanded by vital principles of religious principles. One can certainly argue against this approach, especially as applied to private employers, but also as applied to the government.

The government is barred by the Free Exercise Clause from discriminating based on religion, but the government has no constitutional duty to give religious objectors special exemptions from generally applicable rules. Maybe it (and private employers) shouldn’t have such a statutory duty, either. But my point so far has been simply to describe the American legal rule as it actually is, and as it has been for over 40 years (since the religious accommodation provisions were enacted in the 1972 amendments to Title VII).

Once we see this rule, we can also make some practical observations about it:

1. The rule requires judgments of degree. Some accommodations are relatively cheap (again, always realizing that any accommodation involves some burden on employers), while other are more expensive. The courts have to end up drawing some fuzzy line between them. Maybe that’s a bad idea, but that’s what Congress set up with the “reasonable accommodation” requirement. So if you want to argue that one religious objector shouldn’t get the relatively easy accommodation she wants, you can’t do that by analogy to another claim where the accommodation would be very expensive.

2. The rule turns on the specific facts present in a particular workplace. An accommodation can be very expensive when the objecting employee is the only one at the job site who can do a task, but relatively cheap when there are lots of other employees. It can be very expensive when all the other employees also raise the same objection, but relatively cheap when the other employees are just fine with doing the task.

Again, maybe that’s a bad rule, but it’s the rule Congress created. And if you want to argue that one religious objector shouldn’t get an accommodation that’s easy at the objector’s job site, you can’t do that by pointing out that the accommodation would be expensive at other job sites.

3. The rule accepts the risk of insincere objections. Of course, when sincere religious objectors can get an exemption, others can ask for the same exemption even just for convenience rather than from religious belief. That’s not much of a problem for many exemption requests, since most people have no personal, self-interested reasons not to transport alcohol on their trucks, or raising an American flag on a flagpole. But for some accommodations, there is a risk of insincere claims, for instance when someone just wants Saturdays off so he can do fun weekend things. The law assumes that employers will be able to judge employees’ sincerity relatively accurately, and to the extent some insincere objections are granted, this won’t be too much of a problem. Again, the law might be wrong on this, but it’s the law.

4. The rule accepts the risk of slippery slopes, and counts on courts to stop the slippage. Once some people get a religious exemption, others are likely to claim other religious exemptions; indeed, some people who before managed to find a way to live with their religious objections without raising an accommodation request might now conclude that they need to be more militant about their beliefs. Here too, the law accepts this risk, and counts on courts to cut off the more expensive accommodations.

5. The rule rejects the “you don’t like the job requirements, so quit the job” argument. Again, that argument is a perfectly sensible policy argument against having a Title VII duty of religious accommodation. It’s just an argument that religious accommodation law has, rightly or wrongly, rejected.

6. The rule focused on what specific accommodations are practical. If someone demands as an accommodation that a company completely stop shipping alcohol, that would be an undue hardship for an employer. But if it’s possible to accommodate the person by just not giving him the relatively rare alcohol-shipping orders, then that might well not be an undue hardship.

* * *
OK, now we’ve seen the big picture, which is that sincere religious objections can indeed legally excuse you from doing part of your job — if the employer can exempt you without undue cost to itself, its other employees, or its clients (recognizing that some cost is inevitable with any exemption request). Now let’s try to see how it can apply to the Kim Davis controversy.

First, a technical but important legal point: Title VII expressly excludes elected officials. But Kentucky, like about 20 other states, has a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) statute that requires government agencies to exempt religious objectors from generally applicable laws, unless denying the exemption is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest. The federal government also has a RFRA, which may apply to federal court orders issued to state elected officials.

Such RFRAs are narrower than Title VII (they apply only to the government) but also broader (they apply not just to employment but to all government action). Nothing in them exempts accommodation claims by elected officials. Moreover, the 1963-90 Free Exercise Clause rules that the RFRAs were meant to restore included protections for elected officials, see McDaniel v. Paty (1978); though McDaniel involved a rule that discriminated against religious practice, the plurality opinion treated it as a standard religious exemption request.

The terms of these RFRAs actually seem to offer greater protection for claimants — to deny an exemption, the government must show not just “undue hardship” but unavoidable material harm to a “compelling government interest.” Tagore v. United States (5th Cir. 2013) illustrates this: When Sikh IRS agent Kawaljeet Tagore sought a religious exemption from IRS’s no-weapons-in-the-workplace policy for her kirpan (a 3-inch dulled symbolic dagger), the court concluded that accommodating the request was an “undue hardship,” but allowed the RFRA claim to go forward, so that the trial court could determine whether denying the exemption “furthers a compelling government interest with the least restrictive means.” On the other hand, Harrell v. Donahue (8th Cir. 2011) took the view that, at least as to federal employees, RFRA provided no protections beyond those offered by Title VII.

The Kentucky appellate courts have had no occasion to interpret the Kentucky RFRA yet (it was enacted in 2013), and I don’t know of cases under other state RFRAs dealing with government employees or elected officials. But it’s very likely that (1) the Kentucky RFRA, by its terms, would apply to religious exemption claims brought by elected officials, and (2) it would provide at least the protections offered to ordinary employees by the Title VII religious accommodation regime, and possibly more.

* * *

With all this in hand, we turn to the Kim Davis controversy.

1. The current lawsuit is a federal claim against her, claiming that her policy of not issuing any marriage licenses (for any couples, same-sex or opposite-sex) is a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s right to marry. Whether the policy does violate the right to marry (and not just the state law mandating that clerks issue marriage licenses, a state law that federal courts generally don’t enforce) is an interesting question, given that licenses are available from neighboring counties. Compare Ezell v. City of Chicago (7th Cir. 2011), which rejected the “you can go to the neighboring city” argument when it came to Chicago’s ban on shooting ranges and Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim (1981), which did the same as to a town’s ban on live entertainment.

But in any event, if Davis has a federal constitutional duty to issue marriage licenses, she wouldn’t be able to get a religious exemption from that duty, and decline to issue such licenses at all — denying County residents their constitutional right would certainly be an “undue hardship” imposed on the County and its citizens, and requiring her to comply with the Constitution would be the least restrictive means of serving the compelling interest in protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.

Yet besides her losing claim in the federal lawsuit, it seems to me that Davis has a much stronger claim under state law for a much more limited exemption. Davis’s objection, it appears (see pp. 40, 133, and 139 of her stay application and attachments), is not to issuing same-sex marriage licenses as such. Rather, she objects to issuing such licenses with her name on them, because she believes (rightly or wrongly) that having her name on them is an endorsement of same-sex marriage. Indeed, she says that she would be content with


Modifying the prescribed Kentucky marriage license form to remove the multiple references to Davis’ name, and thus to remove the personal nature of the authorization that Davis must provide on the current form.

Now this would be a cheap accommodation that, it seems to me, a state could quite easily provide. It’s true that state law requires the County Clerk’s name on the marriage license and the marriage certificate. But the point of RFRAs, such as the Kentucky RFRA, is precisely to provide religious objectors with exemptions even from such generally applicable laws, so long as the exemptions don’t necessarily and materially undermine a compelling government interest.

And allowing all marriage licenses and certificates — for opposite-sex marriages or same-sex ones — to include a deputy clerk’s name, or just the notation “Rowan County Clerk,” wouldn’t jeopardize any compelling government interest. To be sure, it would have to be clear that this modification is legally authorized, and doesn’t make the license and certificate invalid. But a court that grants Davis’s RFRA exemption request could easily issue an order that makes this clear.

Indeed, Kim Davis has filed a federal complaint against state officials under, among other things, the Kentucky RFRA. And, as I noted, one of the proposed accommodations that she herself has suggested, albeit in the federal stay application, is the simple removal of her name. But that sort of accommodation based on the Kentucky state RFRA is not a remedy that’s likely to be available in federal court.

But if Davis sues in state court, seeking a declaration that she can issue licenses and certificates without her name — as a Kentucky RFRA-based exemption from the Kentucky statutory requirements for what must go on her license — I think she’d have a good case. The federal district court rejected her Kentucky RFRA argument on the grounds that the requirement doesn’t much burden her beliefs:

The record in this case suggests that the burden [on Davis] is more slight. As the Court has already pointed out, Davis is simply being asked to signify that couples meet the legal requirements to marry. The State is not asking her to condone same-sex unions on moral or religious grounds, nor is it restricting her from engaging in a variety of religious activities. Davis remains free to practice her Apostolic Christian beliefs. She may continue to attend church twice a week, participate in Bible Study and minister to female inmates at the Rowan County Jail. She is even free to believe that marriage is a union between one man and one woman, as many Americans do. However, her religious convictions cannot excuse her from performing the duties that she took an oath to perform as Rowan County Clerk. The Court therefore concludes that Davis is unlikely to suffer a violation of her free exercise rights under Kentucky Constitution

But though I agree that her religious convictions can’t excuse her from issuing marriage licenses altogether, I think the judge erred in the rest of the analysis in this paragraph. If Davis believes that it’s religiously wrong for her to issue licenses with her name on them, ordering her to do that indeed burdens her religious beliefs, enough to trigger the Kentucky RFRA. And giving her the more modest exemption from the include-the-court-clerk’s-name requirement might therefore indeed be required by the Kentucky RFRA. (The federal district court’s conclusion about the inapplicability of the Kentucky RFRA won’t be binding on state courts, because that conclusion came in a preliminary injunction hearing; such conclusions on preliminary injunction generally lack so-called “collateral estoppel” effect on future hearings.)

[UPDATE: Some commenters argue that the clerk’s name can only be removed if the Kentucky Legislature amends the relevant law. But with RFRA, the Kentucky Legislature has already enacted a state law that provides for religious exemptions from existing state laws — there doesn’t have to be any follow-up statute implementing any such exemption; a court can simply issue an order saying that an exemption from one state statute (the signature requirement) is available because of another state statute (the RFRA).

Relatedly, some commenters argue that asking to be excused from the state law requiring the clerk’s signatures would be trying to violate the law. I agree that just refusing to issue licenses is a violation of state law. But asking for an exemption from a state statute under the state RFRA would be asking for something that state law itself provides, because state law includes the state RFRA.]

So if Kim Davis does indeed go through the state courts, and ask for a modest exemption under the state RFRA — simply to allow her to issue marriage licenses (opposite-sex or same-sex) without her name on them — she might indeed prevail. Rightly or wrongly, under the logic of Title VII’s religious accommodation regime and the RFRA religious accommodation regime, she probably should prevail.

There’s a lot of appeal to the “you take the job, you follow the rules — if you have a religious objection to the rules, quit the job” approach may be. But it’s not the approach that modern American federal employment law has taken, or the approach that the state religious exemption law in Kentucky and many other states has taken.

Muslim truck drivers who don’t want to transport alcohol, Jehovah’s Witnesses who don’t want to raise flags, Sabbatarians (Jewish or Christian) who don’t want to work Saturdays, and philosophical vegetarians who don’t want to hand out hamburger coupons can take advantage of this law. Conservative Christian county clerks who don’t want to have their names listed on marriage certificates and licenses likely can, too.

[Econoline]

That was indeed interesting and useful, Meade, and I agree with the author that, even for most advocates of gay marriage, the modest accommodation proposed--allowing the County Clerk's office to issue marriage licenses with a deputy clerk's name (or just the title "County Clerk" without an individual's name)--would seem reasonable.

[MajGenl.Meade]

It does appear to be a possible secular solution, econo. From the theological point of view, I still have a problem with it. Is it at all analogous to being willing to push the button for an electric chair as long as the execution order didn't name me as the executioner? (I read that she'd be willing to issue the licenses as long as it doesn't state her name)

[Econoline]

A reasonable (to her or any other religious objector) way of answering that would be to note that the license is being issued by the office of County Clerk, not any particular individual, and that removing her name from the certificate eliminates any possible confusion as to her individual moral culpability.

[rubato]

If someone does not want to be elected to that office and have her name on those documents, than a moral person would resign.

Or is it just a few too many pieces of silver for her to do that?


yrs,
rubato

[MajGenl.Meade]

ADD again?

There’s a lot of appeal to the “you take the job, you follow the rules — if you have a religious objection to the rules, quit the job” approach may be. But it’s not the approach that modern American federal employment law has taken, or the approach that the state religious exemption law in Kentucky and many other states has taken.

Actually, though I hate to say it, I still think she should have quit the job rather than refuse to do the job.

[rubato]

ADD again?

There’s a lot of appeal to the “you take the job, you follow the rules — if you have a religious objection to the rules, quit the job” approach may be. But it’s not the approach that modern American federal employment law has taken, or the approach that the state religious exemption law in Kentucky and many other states has taken.

Actually, though I hate to say it, I still think she should have quit the job rather than refuse to do the job.

ADD? or simple morality?


Get over yourself.


yrs,
rubato

[Econoline]

[MajGenl.Meade]

ADD again?

There’s a lot of appeal to the “you take the job, you follow the rules — if you have a religious objection to the rules, quit the job” approach may be. But it’s not the approach that modern American federal employment law has taken, or the approach that the state religious exemption law in Kentucky and many other states has taken.

Actually, though I hate to say it, I still think she should have quit the job rather than refuse to do the job.

ADD? or simple morality?

Get over yourself.

yrs,
rubato

What on earth are you talking about? Oh forget it. You don't know and if you explain no one else will either

[Big RR]

I agree Meade; econo's post is amusing but it does lead to an interesting result; suppose a fundamentalist Islamic person became head of a state DMV and refused to grant licenses to female drivers--would we just say they should be issued without his/her signature. There may be certain discretionary actions that the county clerk has, but issuance of marriage licenses is not one--people show the required ID (or whatever), pay the fee, and they get a license. Having her name printed on the license is no more an endorsement of the marriage it permits (nor should it be) than having her name on an elevator certificate means she inspected it (or even knows anything about elevators), it is a purely ministerial act that implies no endorsement whatsoever and should not be subject to any employment concessions to religious beliefs.

[oldr_n_wsr]

The government should get out of "marriage" altogether. The gov should just issue "union" licenses and then let the people go to their church/etc to get the religious ceremony if they choose.

[Big RR]

Personally, I see it the other way; the government should issue marriage licenses and even perform civil ceremonies, but people who choose to can have their marriages performed, blessed, solemnized, or whatever by any religious institution (which can call it whatever it wants; it can even trademark a new term for marriages performed by that church). At its core, marriage is a civil contract enforceable 9and dissolvable, according to the civil law.