Submit To Northern Treachery; To Die We Should Preffer...

[Lord Jim]

So hoist on high the Bonney Blue Flag That Bears The Single Star...


(This is the classiest beat-down an American President gave to an American General in US history; makes Truman-MacArthur look like small potatoes by comparison...)

President Lincoln responds to General Meade, in the wake of The Battle Of Gettysburg...:

Major General Meade:

I have just seen your despatch to Gen. Halleck, asking to be relieved of your command, because of a supposed censure of mine. I am very--very--grateful to you for the magnificent success you gave the cause of the country at Gettysburg;

and I am sorry now to be the author of the slightest pain to you. But I was in such deep distress myself that I could not restrain some expression of it. I had been oppressed nearly ever since the battles at Gettysburg, by what appeared to be evidences that yourself, and Gen. Couch, and Gen. Smith, were not seeking a collision with the enemy, but were trying to get him across the river without another battle.

What these evidences were, if you please, I hope to tell you at some time, when we shall both feel better. The case, summarily stated is this:

You fought and beat the enemy at Gettysburg; and, of course, to say the least, his loss was as great as yours. He retreated; and you did not, as it seemed to me, pressingly pursue him; but a flood in the river detained him, till, by slow degrees, you were again upon him.

You had at least twenty thousand veteran troops directly with you, and as many more raw ones within supporting distance, all in addition to those who fought with you at Gettysburg; while it was not possible that he had received a single recruit; and yet you stood and let the flood run down, bridges be built, and the enemy move away at his leisure, without attacking him. And Couch and Smith! The latter left Carlisle in time, upon all ordinary calculation, to have aided you in the last battle at Gettysburg; but he did not arrive. At the end of more than ten days, I believe twelve, under constant urging, he reached Hagerstown from Carlisle, which is not an inch over fiftyfive miles, if so much. And Couch's movement was very little different.

Again, my dear general, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last monday, how can you possibly do so South of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect, and I do not expect you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.

I beg you will not consider this a prosecution, or persecution of yourself As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.

Abraham Lincoln

[MajGenl.Meade]

From: The (Secret) Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade (google it if you dare - whoa! I even made Google Books!!!!)

HIGH TIDE AND GROIN BRASS

To Mrs. George G. Meade:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Gettysburg, Pa., July 5, 1863

I hardly know when I last wrote to you, so many and such stirring events have occurred. I think I have written since the battle, but am not sure. It was a grand battle, and the men behaved splendidly. They endured long marches, short rations, and stood one of the most terrific cannonadings I ever witnessed. At one time things looked a little blue; but I managed to get up reinforcements in time to save the day.

This morning has been most vexing. Lee and his army have disappeared from our front, but we are quite unable to pursue. There is exhaustion of the entire army, such that a brief period of recruitment is forced upon us. Many officers have been rendered hors de combat, amongst which I particularly mention Generals Reynolds, Hancock and Sickles. Reynolds was killed on the first day, Hancock wounded on the last day, and the third lost a leg on the second day, which would have been a significant advance to our cause had it happened two days before the battle.

A field of combat with all its detritus of equipment, of wounded and dead, is quite affecting. Early today I walked the ridge that marked our most gallant action of July 3, from south to north, and then east to the large hill. My reverie was broken when I espied my orderly, Kowell, crouched over the body of a fallen warrior. Supposing it to be some boon comrade, I approached respectfully, to avoid intrusion upon his grief. Startled nevertheless, he spread wide his hands and cried out “I never did it”. I saw at once that the body was of a rebel soldier. “Fear not,” said I and assured him that the taking of life in battle does not place the soul in jeopardy from the Lord of Hosts.

At this, Kowell gave a peculiar grin and appeared much more at ease, giving further proof that the common soldier is so often relieved at the depth of my understanding. I noted he held in his outspread hands a photograph of the dead man, a watch with its fob, and a few small coins along with a gold tooth. Kowell explained in a most satisfactory manner that the dead boy was one Wesley Culp, of the family for which the nearby hill was named. In the course of only two days, Kowell had somehow made himself the protector of the boy’s sister, and felt it his duty to return to her the few small possessions of her fallen kin. It appears the tooth had come loose owing to a lack of fresh vegetables in the rebel commissary, and Kowell said it was necessary to remove it, so that neither camp followers nor shirkers would despoil the corpse.

While commending his industrious compassion, I was forced later this afternoon to dismiss him as my orderly. Poor Hancock is in great pain, a brass nail from his saddle having been driven into a most delicate area. The wretched Kowell was overheard telling other soldiers that the general’s problem was merely a little prick. Such dismissive diminution of a superior officer’s serious condition cannot be countenanced.

Baldy was shot again, and I fear will not get over it. Two horses that George rode were killed, his own and the black mare. But we are both safe and I find that regardless of risk, the most difficult part of my work is acting without any intelligence on which to predicate action.

I may be forced to post others of my letters to Margaret and others should this persistent Sicklemania endure

Meade

[rubato]

"We were too tired to wipe out a weakened enemy trapped and helpless before us."


Pity we had a general who required quite so much bunk-time.

You'd think it was M's army who lost seeing that Lee's troops had sufficient energy for running's away, building bridges, and so many other energetic and army-saving activities.

yrs,
rubato

[MajGenl.Meade]

From the actual Meade Letters beginning 7 days after he found himself named commander of an army instead of one corps within that army (Gettysburg was fought on days 3 4 and 5 of his command):

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Gettysburg, Pa., July 5, 1863.
It was a grand battle, and is in my judgment a most decided victory, though I did not annihilate or bag the Confederate Army. This morning they retired in great haste into the mountains, leaving their dead unburied and their wounded on the field. They awaited one day, expecting that, flushed with success, I would attack them when they would play their old game of shooting us from behind breastworks — a game we played this time to their entire satisfaction.


HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Frederick, July 8, 1863.
I arrived here yesterday; the army is assembling at Middletown. I think we shall have another battle before Lee can cross the river, though from all accounts he is making great efforts to do so. For my part, as I have to follow and fight him, I would rather do it at once and in Maryland than to follow into Virginia . . . From the time I took command till to-day, now over ten days, I have not changed my clothes, have not had a regular night’s rest, and many nights not a wink of sleep, and for several days did not even wash my face and hands, no regular food, and all the time in a great state of mental anxiety . . . I send you a document received yesterday afternoon. It will give you pleasure I know. Preserve it, because the terms in which the General in Chief speaks of the battle are stronger than any I have deemed it proper to use myself. I never claimed a victory, though I stated that Lee was defeated in his efforts to destroy my army. I am going to move as soon as I can get the army supplied with subsistence and ammunition.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, South Mountain Pass, July 10, 1863.

Lee has not crossed and does not intend to cross the river, and I expect in a few days, if not sooner, again to hazard the fortune of war. I know so well that this is a fortune and that accidents, etc., turn the tide of victory, that, until the question is settled, I cannot but be very anxious. If it should please God again to give success to our efforts, then I could be more tranquil.

Ialso see that my success at Gettysburg has deluded the people and the Government with the idea that I must always be victorious, that Lee is demoralized and disorganized, etc., and other delusions which will not only be dissipated by any reverse that I should meet with, but would react in proportion against me.I have already had a very decided correspondence with General Halleck upon this point, he pushing me on, and I informing him I was advancing as fast as I could. The firm stand I took had the result to induce General Halleck to tell me to act according to my judgment. I am of opinion that Lee is in a strong position and determined to fight before he crosses the river.

I believe if he had been able to cross when he first fell back that he would have done so; but his bridges being destroyed he has been compelled to make a stand and will of course make a desperate one. The army is in fine spirits, and if I can only manage to keep them together, and not be required to attack a position too strong, I think there is a chance for me. However, it is all in God's hands. I make but little account of myself, and think only of the country.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 14, 1863.
I found Lee in a very strong position, intrenched. I hesitated to attack him, without some examination of the mode of approaching him. I called my corps commanders together, and they voted against attacking him. This morning, when I advanced to feel his position and seek for a weak point, I found he had retired in the night and was nearly across the river. I immediately started in pursuit, and my cavalry captured two thousand prisoners, two guns, several flags, and killed General Pettigrew. On reporting these facts to General Halleck, he informed me the President was very much dissatisfied at the escape of Lee. I immediately telegraphed I had done my duty to the best of my ability, and that the expressed dissatisfaction of the President I considered undeserved censure, and asked to be immediately relieved.In reply he said it was not intended to censure me, but only to spur me on to an active pursuit, and that ‘it was not deemed sufficient cause for relieving me.' This is exactly what I expected; unless I did impracticable things, fault would be found with me. I have ignored the senseless adulation of the public and press, and I am now just as indifferent to the censure bestowed without just cause.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, Berlin, Md., July 16, 1863.
I wrote to you of the censure put on me by the President, through General Halleck, because I did not bag General Lee, and of the course I took on it. I don't know whether I informed you of Halleck's reply, that his telegram was not intended as a censure, but merely ''to spur me on to an active pursuit," which I consider more offensive than the original message; for no man who does his duty, and all that he can do, as I maintain I have done, needs spurring. It is only the laggards and those who fail to do all they can do who require spurring. They have refused to relieve me, but insist on my continuing to try to do what I know in advance it is impossible to do. My army (men and animals) is exhausted; it wants rest and reorganization; it has been greatly reduced and weakened by recent operations, and no reinforcements of any practical value have been sent. Yet, in the face of all these facts, well known to them, I am urged, pushed and spurred to attempting to pursue and destroy an army nearly equal to my own, falling back upon its resources and reinforcements, and increasing its morale daily. This has been the history of all my predecessors, and I clearly saw that in time their fate would be mine. This was the reason I was disinclined to take the command, and it is for this reason I would gladly give it up

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 7, 1863.
I see the Herald is constantly harping on the assertion that Gettysburg was fought by the corps commanders and the common soldiers, and that no generalship was displayed. I suppose after a while it will be discovered I was not at Gettysburg at all.

[Lord Jim]

he found himself named commander of an army instead of one corps within that army (Gettysburg was fought on days 3 4 and 5 of his command):

So Meade's excuse for not pursuing The Army Of Northern Virginia and annihilating it when he had the chance in 1863, and thus saving tens of thousands of lives, was that he was new on the job?

[rubato]

From the actual Meade Letters beginning 7 days after he found himself named commander of an army instead of one corps within that army (Gettysburg was fought on days 3 4 and 5 of his command):
... I am going to move as soon as I can get the army supplied with subsistence and ammunition.[/background]

Montgomery was always making this excuse too. How many times did he let Rommel and others get away while he was waiting for more supplies?

"...

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, South Mountain Pass, July 10, 1863.

Lee has not crossed and does not intend to cross the river, and I expect in a few days, if not sooner, again to hazard the fortune of war. I know so well that this is a fortune and that accidents, etc., turn the tide of victory, that, until the question is settled, I cannot but be very anxious. If it should please God again to give success to our efforts, then I could be more tranquil. ... "

Five days of rest and he's STILL to tired to do anything. That man is a napping machine! The Christian god only appointed 1 day of rest per week.

Ialso see that my success at Gettysburg has deluded the people and the Government with the idea that I must always be victorious, that Lee is demoralized and disorganized, etc., and other delusions which will not only be dissipated by any reverse that I should meet with, but would react in proportion against me.I have already had a very decided correspondence with General Halleck upon this point, he pushing me on, and I informing him I was advancing as fast as I could. The firm stand I took had the result to induce General Halleck to tell me to act according to my judgment. I am of opinion that Lee is in a strong position and determined to fight before he crosses the river.

Napping on his laurels, again.

I believe if he had been able to cross when he first fell back that he would have done so; but his bridges being destroyed he has been compelled to make a stand and will of course make a desperate one. The army is in fine spirits, and if I can only manage to keep them together, and not be required to attack a position too strong, I think there is a chance for me. However, it is all in God's hands. I make but little account of myself, and think only of the country.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 14, 1863.
I found Lee in a very strong position, intrenched. I hesitated to attack him, without some examination of the mode of approaching him. I called my corps commanders together, and they voted against attacking him. This morning, when I advanced to feel his position and seek for a weak point, I found he had retired in the night and was nearly across the river. I immediately started in pursuit, and my cavalry captured two thousand prisoners, two guns, several flags, and killed General Pettigrew. On reporting these facts to General Halleck, he informed me the President was very much dissatisfied at the escape of Lee. I immediately telegraphed I had done my duty to the best of my ability, and that the expressed dissatisfaction of the President I considered undeserved censure, and asked to be immediately relieved.In reply he said it was not intended to censure me, but only to spur me on to an active pursuit, and that ‘it was not deemed sufficient cause for relieving me.' This is exactly what I expected; unless I did impracticable things, fault would be found with me. I have ignored the senseless adulation of the public and press, and I am now just as indifferent to the censure bestowed without just cause.

Ok, you WAITED for 9 days and during that time Lee built defenses? UNFAIR! You were TIRED! Your uniform was dirty and torn and you needed a new one! Your tent leaked! He should have just waited there and done nothing.


Patton (or many others) would have been too busy ending the war to write such long self-justifying letters.

yrs,
rubato

[Rick]

Meade had lost close to 27%

Lee only slightly more at somewhere around 32%

I don't blame him for prudence, even if he was a Northern aggressor.

Been down here a long time...

[Lord Jim]

The strategy of The South was not to "conquer" The Union....

It was to wear The Union down to the point that the northern states would decide the fight wasn't worth the candle...

And that strategy very nearly succeeded...

Had it not been for the dramatic turn of events on the battlefield in the summer and fall of 1864, Lincoln would most likely have been defeated, and President McClellan would have let the south go it's own way...

Speaking as a proud son of the south, who's great great grandfather fought valiantly with The 16th North Carolinians (we still have his letters ETA:he had a thumb blown off at Shiloh...he was lucky... a lot of young men lost more than that in that meat grinder.) for The Cause, I am nevertheless very glad and thankful that they failed in their endeavor...

Looking at the larger picture, if the south had succeeded in breaking away from the Union, that would not have been the end of it....

New England would have quite possibly broken away as well; Texas and California might have pursued separate courses...

When the evils of Fascism and Communism rose in Europe, there would have been no United States to confront and defeat them....

The Balkanization of North America would not have served human progress well...

For all its faults, it is indisputable that the world is a much better place today than it would be if this great continental nation did not exist...

[Scooter]

It might not have been the last war between North and South either, or between some part of the U.S. and Mexico, or between some part of the U.S. and British North America. A strong and united U.S. has served everyone well.

[Sean]

History might have been very different if certain Generals had stopped writing bloody letters and led the troops a bit...

[MajGenl.Meade]

MALIGNED AND BLAME


To Mrs. George G. Meade

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 7, 1863.

I am yet on the anxious bench. To-day I have sent in my official report, in which I have told the plain truths, acknowledged the movement of November 26th to December 1st was a failure, but claimed the causes were not in my plans, but in the want of support and co-operation on the part of subordinates. It was the same lack of tenacity shown by certain corps commanders after the battle in Pennsylvania. In fact, the general* who claimed to have saved the army there by standing without movement is one and the same who ruined my perfect plans to bring Lee to battle last week by once again standing still!

I have received by special courier a few lines from General Lee in which he sympathizes with me in the failure, but says he is satisfied I have done right, and he hopes I will not resign, but hold on till the last. It would not be wise for us to advert to such an indorsement so this must remain entre nous. Gettysburg was not good to Lee either. His note reminded me that we were both hampered in the execution of our strategy by a lack of intelligence. Lyman explains that this is a reference to Sickles on the one hand and to Jeb. Stuart on the other, with which I heartily concur.

I have often wished that the geographic positions of those two persons on July 2nd last had been reversed, as our gallant soldiery stifled Stuart with greater ease than I have yet managed with Sickles. Neither of them was where their General ordered, and so two great army commanders to this very day must contend with ignorant criticism of their dispositions. This especially from those who never were on such a field of battle but instead chew their fictions over dinner and employ their pens to excuse the errors of mediocrities while condemning their superiors, such as Lee and myself, who are blameless.

Even so, Lee is too discretionary in much of his orders and thereby Stuart wandered somewhat further than either intended. Such will never happen to me as I am much accustomed to keeping tight control over my cavalry. I should perhaps not offer Lee advice on this in reply to his note as it would improve his generalship to my detriment and to that of the country.

This reminds me that the Herald is constantly harping on the assertion that Gettysburg was fought by the corps commanders and the common soldiers, and that no generalship was displayed. I suppose after a while it will be discovered I was not at Gettysburg at all!

The lies of the Herald are totally scotched by some rather illiterate lines penned by Private Kowell, in which he earnestly assures me that the rank and file has as much confidence as ever in my ability to command. They at least know where blame for failure and delay is to be laid.


* General G. K. Warren

[Lord Jim]

Gen'l, as a War Of Northern Aggression buff, I have to say I find that letter most intriguing (unless it's an Onion type parody; which given it's content seems quite possible...)

Now let me make sure I've got this straight:

I have received by special courier a few lines from General Lee in which he sympathizes with me in the failure, but says he is satisfied I have done right, and he hopes I will not resign,

The Commanding General Of The Army Of The Potomac, is consoling himself about the conduct of his command, based on the fact that The Commanding General Of The Enemy Forces is giving him the "thumbs up" and telling him he hopes he won't quit....

Rather like:

"My Dear General Weygand,

You have conducted yourself in an exemplary fashion; I wouldn't change a thing...hang in there...

Your devoted friend,

Karl

Gerd von Rundstedt"

To continue:

It would not be wise for us to advert to such an indorsement so this must remain entre nous.

Well, one would certainly hope that the commanding General of The Union Forces would not "advert" that he was justifying and rationalizing his actions based on the approval of The Commander Of The Army Of Northern Virginia...

Since that would have amounted to a clear cut case of High Treason...

His note reminded me that we were both hampered in the execution of our strategy by a lack of intelligence.

Well, in that observation, General Meade was at least half right...

Certainly one of them was hampered by a lack of intelligence....

[Lord Jim]

I have to say that I had always considered the actual General Meade, (unlike our Gen'l Meade, who's a witty, well read, superb wordsmith and highly intelligent fellow) to be more or less a well meaning bumbler of mediocre ability who was simply in over his head, and was up against a man (Lee) who by every standard of the conduct of warfare was vastly his superior...

This letter suggests he may have been worse than that...

In his casual, even eager, willingness to communicate on a personal level with the enemy commander, he may very well have stumbled into the area of Treason...

Though not in a malevolent, but innocently foolhardy way...

Taking that letter in it's totality, it is obvious that even though he was in command of the forces arrayed against him, he held Lee in such high esteem that he still sought his approval....

And it is equally obvious that Lee understood the way Meade regarded him and manipulated Meade's need for his approval to his advantage...

That may sound like 21st century psycho babble, but if you read that letter carefully, it comes through quite clearly...



It was just Lee's bad luck that at the end of the day he faced a General (Grant) who he couldn't play head games with...

[MajGenl.Meade]

Another one sucked in! I thought the titles gave these away?!

http://www.clevelandcivilwarroundtable. ... /meade.htm

The (Secret) Life and Letters of General George Gordon Meade
By Major General George Gordon Meade
The Cleveland Civil War Roundtable
Copyright © 2007, 2008 All Rights Reserved

Editor's Note: In the more than 100 years since his decease, the General has been busy reconstructing from memory his secret, lost letters which shed new light on topics of great interest to the members of the Cleveland Civil War Roundtable. He currently is living in Bloemfontein South Africa working on a complimentary biography of General D. E. Sickles (decs'd) and may be contacted at Majgenlmeade @ aol.com.

Don't feel bad LJ. The Surratt Society in D.C. was very interested in one of my letters that dealt with Meade's being taken in by John Wilkes Booth as he escaped scot-free.

THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN: A STUD IN COMMAND

To Mrs. George G. Meade

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, August 9, 1864.

I had a letter to-night from Cortlandt Parker, reporting that Stanton, who is an enthusiastic admirer of Grant, says that Grant has a most exalted opinion of me. Grant told Stanton, that when he first came East he thought Sherman was the first soldier in the country, but now he believed I was Sherman’s equal, if not superior. I certainly think Grant has a queer way of showing his appreciation and I learn only at third hand of these improvements in his powers of reasoning. Contemplating the past months, despite the ignorance of journalists, reflected among certain senators at Washington, I really do believe that I have wrought a change in Grant.

Entre nous, at supper last Wednesday, Warren made an obscure remark that Sherman and Sheridan were Grant’s favorites simply because their names commenced with the ‘sh’ sound that Grant found so congenial. Upon my enquiry, nothing would do for Warren but to sit at table muttering “shertainly shir”, which convulsed the company, but left me nonplussed. To my knowledge, Grant does not number a speech impediment among his weaknesses.

Have you ever thought that since the first week after Gettysburg, now more than a year, I have never been alluded to in public journals except to abuse and vilify me? And why this is I have never been able to imagine. Grant and Sherman are puffed up in periodicals, but it cannot be argued that either of them has achieved success against a foe remotely comparable to Lee. No other commander has so mauled and baffled the famous Lee, a task which my army continues even now, with Grant taking all the credit of course.

Who after all is Beauregard, and what are Pemberton and Bragg? True, Grant has a certain plodding tenacity and a disregard for withdrawal and defeat. Such words, along with temperance and grace, are not within his lexicon. As for Sherman, he is opposed by a man indelicately referred to by some as “Slow Joe”, against whom I venture even Butler would shine. Were it not for an accident at Pittsburgh Landing, which removed the adequate rebel General A. S. Johnston at the very moment he was sweeping them both from the field, our two lions would today be roaring even further to the west, escorting government incompetents to defraud the Indian tribes.

Whatever is said today, you can be sure that time and history will vindicate my reputation. Future generations will debate the facts of our various campaigns with dispassion. They cannot fail to acknowledge that Grant and Sherman, measured against lesser foes, are not at all of the same quality as the victor at Gettysburg. Indeed, if Lee is lauded as the finest general of the Confederacy, and yet it is my army that drives his to its death, then there is only one candidate for recognition as the preeminent commander of this entire rebellion.

There was an awful explosion to-day at City Point of a powder and ammunition vessel. It is said sixty were killed and one hundred and fifty wounded. The weather continues awfully hot, but the army is in good health.

[Lord Jim]

And this is just tasteless, self pitying whining of the first order:

the Herald is constantly harping on the assertion that Gettysburg was fought by the corps commanders and the common soldiers, and that no generalship was displayed.

When the battle was over, the Army of the Potomac suffered 23,049 casualties. The Army of Northern Virginia suffered 28,000 casualties. With a total of 51,000 casualties, the Battle of Gettysburg is bloodiest battle in American history.

http://library.thinkquest.org/17525/aftermath.htm

Over 23,000 killed or wounded in his own ranks, and 28,000 killed or wounded (young men who were not a part of a "foreign" army; but who were also Americans) on the opposing side, in three days...

And this self pitying jackass has the temerity to bemoan the fact that more credit is being given to the boys who fell by the score in that maelstrom, than he is sitting on his fat ass back in a tent?

Words fail...

[Lord Jim]

Okay, you punked me...

In my defense, I did note at the outset that it read like something from The Onion...






(Yeah that's a weak defense, but it beats none at all... )

[Lord Jim]

To be perfectly honest General, I completely missed stuff like this:

Editor's Note: In the more than 100 years since his decease, the General has been busy reconstructing from memory his secret, lost letters

I was so ready to take the bait, I didn't even notice the size of the hook....

I've now gone on at great length doing an in depth analysis of something that's completely fraudulent, and that I should have easily seen as fraudulent....



I'm sure that when others read this, a good laugh will be had at my expense...

Oh well, won't be the first time...probably won't be the last....

[MajGenl.Meade]

Ah no - that was an actual Meade quote indeed about The Herald. But he was not denigrating either his corps commanders or his soldiers of whom he though very highly.

He was talking about the concerted effort by Sickles, his supporters and some members of the Committee to Investigate the Conduct of the War (mainly Zachariah Chandler) to persuade the country that Meade planned to retreat on day one of Gettysburg etc etc and did nothing of any value on the field of battle. That was gross lying.

Meade wasn't sitting in a tent LJ - remember that the commanding general was required to maintain an HQ position so that corps commanders, messengers and so forth could locate them. Meade's HQ was a little house behind the clump of trees and he was always within a reasonable distance of that designated place. His horse was shot and his son's horse shot twice as they moved about on Cemetary Ridge.

BTW Chandler's grudge against Meade began when the latter refused (and had his officers refuse also) to swear an 1861 loyalty oath to the Union that was imposed upon US officers who happened to be in Michigan at the time - his position was that he had already sworn to serve his country and had done so for years and he would only swear such a "local" oath if instructed to do so by the War Department. They did not so instruct.

Good for the old Snapping Turtle!
Meade

[Lord Jim]

Meade wasn't sitting in a tent LJ - remember that the commanding general was required to maintain an HQ position so that corps commanders, messengers and so forth could locate them. Meade's HQ was a little house behind the clump of trees

Very well Gen'l...

He wasn't in a tent...

But sitting in "a little house behind a clump of trees" sounds like a distinction without a significant difference, and it certainy doesn't exactly sound like "leading from the front"....

I'm really not suggesting that a commanding General should put himself directly in the line of fire, (The War Of Northern Aggression was the first "modern war" and modern wars aren't fought that way...) but if that quote is authentic, I stand by my observation that it seems extremely callous and self absorbed for Meade to be wringing his hands about not getting sufficient credit for himself, when one looks at the scale of carnage and sacrifice made by the young front line soldiers during those three days...

ETA:

Meade must have really felt slighted when Lincoln showed up to yammer on about "The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here", rather than talking about, "My great General Meade, without who's brilliance this victory could not have been achieved"....

[MajGenl.Meade]

(sight) no LJ it wasn't about credit.

It was about the persistent attacks on Meade as part of a plan to get him removed and Hooker or someone else (whoever the pols and the papers backed at the time - not Grant by the way) reinstated. Part of that campaign involved the positive assertion, repeated in some newspapers who had their own political axe to grind, that the army fought Gettysburg without a commanding general and that Meade in fact wanted to run away. He makes a rather good joke - it will soon be found that he wasn't actually at Gettusburg at all at the current rate of false reporting.

As to leading from the front, on a front of over three miles where would you suggest the HQ should be? Oh about half way along the line might be right so that commands and messages could go back and forth from both wings with equal facility would you say? The wounding of his horse and that of his son shows that he was not in the rear - if you've been to Gettysburg you know that the HQ was actually within a short walk of the line and received the brunt of the Confederate cannon fire on Day 3 - they shot too high and missed the front line.

And I don't think he felt slighted in the least - Lincoln had already provided him with sufficient congratulation, appreciation and sustained him in his position. The OP letter was never sent by Lincoln but was filed away - he thought better of it. Instead he used Halleck to convey his disappointment and Meade offered his resignation via Halleck if the President thought that he should not continue in command. Smart move by Lincoln because Halleck acted as the buffer leaving President and General of the AOP free to retain cordial relations.

Unlike McClellan, Hooker, Pope, Burnside - Meade didn't lose to Lee and held his command for two full years, longer than any other.

I can't imagine where the Army of the Potomac would have been on Day 2 of Gettysburg if Little Mac had been in command - oh perhaps I can. Baltimore? Penzance?

Of all of them, Hooker might have stood his ground. But let's not lose sight of the fact that the disaster at Chancellorsville rather clouds the fact that Hooker stole a brilliant and huge march on Lee, outflanked him and had the way open to really end the war long before Gettysburg. As he put it himself, he simply lost his nerve. Meade never did (and was besides one of the corps commanders who didn't understand why they were recalled from their wonderful advance and tried to persuade Hooker not to turn tail and run).

Meade was given command on June 28th 1863 and Gettysburg began on July 1 1863 just three days later. I think he did rather well

Meade